objects defigned for that purpose, befides their being in fome measure new, should be capable of exciting pain or pleasure from other causes. Pain and pleasure are fimple ideas, incapable of definition. People are not liable to be mistaken in their feelings, but they are very frequently wrong in the names they give them, and in their reasonings about them. Many are of opinion, that pain arifes neceffarily from the removal of some pleafure ; ; as they think pleasure does from the ceafing or diminution of fome pain. For my part I am rather inclined to imagine, that pain and pleasure in their most fimple and natural manner of affecting, are each of a pofitive nature, and by no means neceffarily dependent on each other for their exiftence. The human mind is often, and I think it is for the moft part, in a state neither of pain nor pleasure, which I call a ftate of indifference. When I am carried from this ftate into a state of actual pleasure, it

does

does not appear neceffary that I should pafs through the medium of any fort of pain. If in such a state of indifference, or eafe, or tranquillity, or call it what you please, you were to be fuddenly entertained with a concert of mufic; or suppose some object of a fine shape, and bright lively colours to be presented before you; or imagine your smell is gratified with the fragrance of a rofe; or if without any previous thirst you were to drink of fome pleasant kind of wine; or to taste of some sweetmeat without being hungry; in all the several senses, of hearing, smelling, and tasting, you undoubtedly find a pleasure; yet if I enquire into the state of your mind previous to these gratifications, you will hardly tell me that they found you in any kind of pain; or having satisfied these several fenfes with their feveral pleasures, will you fay that any pain has succeeded, though the pleafure is abfolutely over? Suppofe on the other hand, a man in the fame state of indifference,

indifference, to receive a violent blow, or to drink of fome bitter potion, or to have his ears wounded with fome harsh and grating found; here is no removal of pleasure; and yet here is felt, in every fense which is affected, a pain very diftinguishable. It may be faid perhaps, that the pain in these cases had its rise from the removal of the pleasure which the man enjoyed before, though that pleasure was of fo low a degree as to be perceived only by the removal. But this feems to me a fubtilty, that is not discoverable in nature. For if, previous to the pain, I do not feel any actual pleasure, I have no reason to judge that any fuch thing exists; fince pleasure is only pleasure as it is felt, The fame may be faid of pain, and with equal reafon. I can never perfuade myself that pleasure and pain are mere relations, which can only exift as they are contrafted; but I think I can discern clearly that there are pofitive pains and pleasures, which do not at all depend upon each other.

other. Nothing is more certain to my own feelings than this. There is nothing which I can distinguish in my mind with more clearness than the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of these I can perceive without any fort of idea of its relation to any thing else. Caius is afflicted with a fit of the colic; this man is actually in pain; ftretch Caius upon the rack, he will feel a much greater pain; but does this pain of the rack arife from the removal of any pleasure? or is the fit of the colic a pleasure or a pain just as we are pleased to confider it?

SECT. III.

The difference between the removal of PAIN and pofitive PLEASURE.

WE

E fhall carry this propofition yet a step farther. We shall venture to propose, that pain and pleasure

are

are not only, not neceffarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceafing of pleasure does not operate like pofitive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in its effect has very little resemblance to pofitive pleasure.* The former of these propofitions will, I believe, be much more readily allowed than the latter; because it is very evident that pleasure, when it has run its career, fets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind quickly fatisfies; and when it is over, we relapfe into indifference, or rather we fall into a foft tranquillity, which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the former fenfation. I own it is not at first view fo apparent, that the re

moval

* Mr. Locke [effay on human understanding, 1. 2. c. 20. fect. 16.] thinks that the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered and operates as a pleafure, and the lofs or diminishing of pleasure as a pain. It is this opinion which we confider here.