compelled to favor it or support it. And labor unions are not Government itself.

The contention is then made that the majority of the employees having voted the union in, the will of the majority must control. As has been noted, the will of the majority does control in the respect that the union represents and speaks for all and no individual employee or employees may make any agreement or arrangement with their employer except by and through and with the consent of the union. In this sense, the minority is bound by the vote of the majority.

But the majorities cannot obliterate all the liberties of minorities. In America, there are rights, which are not dependent upon, nor affected by, the outcome of votes and elections. If Democrats lose to Republicans in an election, or vice versa, the losing voters are not thereby required to join the winning party, nor financially support it. If a given church be, by far, the predominant church in a community, the members of other denominations are not therefore required to support or pay money to the dominant church-not in this land of liberty.

Some people purport to oppose right-to-work laws on the ground that they retard economic advancement. The statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Commerce show just the opposite. The average weekly earnings of employees in industries in right-to-work States has increased 46.85 percent in the last 10 years compared to an increase of 42.8 percent in States that do not have the right-to-work laws. In capital expenditures, in per capita personal income, in population, in bank deposits, in motor vehicle registrations, in retail trade sales, in retail trade payrolls-in all these and various other categories, the rates of increase in right-towork States in the last 10 years has substantially exceeded the rates of increase in the States that do not have right-to-work laws.

And with respect to labor peace and stability of labor relations, Department of Labor figures show that in the States which do not have right-to-work laws, there is nearly twice as much time lost through strikes and work stoppages as there is in the right-to-work States, where union membership is voluntary.

It has been suggested that there should no longer be this division in our country between States and have right-to-work laws-and that a uniformity should be achieved in this matter. Yet, strangely, the uniformity now being proposed is a uniformity of compulsion. Why not a uniformity of freedom? Uniformity among men can indeed be achieved by taking freedom away from them and imposing compulsion upon them. But should it not be our objective-has it not heretofore been the objective in America-to expand and assure the areas of free choice and action, not the areas of compulsion and no choice? And so, gentlemen, we come back to what I submit is the center and the heart of this entire matter. We are here dealing with a fundamental principle of liberty and freedom-freedom of the individual to work and earn his livelihood without being compelled against his will, to join or support any private organization. And the question is this: Shall it be or shall it no longer be-permissible to guarantee this freedom to American citizens? I earnestly urge that this is a liberty which must be preserved in our land.

I would like to emphasize the final point as to why not a uniformity of freedom as opposed to a uniformity of compulsion. Uniformity among men can indeed be achieved by taking freedom away from them and imposing compulsion upon them, but should it not be our objective? Has it not heretofore been the objective in America to expand and assure the areas of free choice and action, not the areas of compulsion and no choice?

Mr. THOMPSON. The gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. SCOTT. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time.

Mr. THOMPSON. The gentleman from Alabama?

Mr. ANDREWS. No questions.

Mr. THOMPSON. I have a couple of questions.

Mr. WOLTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. Does the State of North Carolina have a fair employment practices statute?

Mr. WOLTZ. No, sir; I don't think so.

Mr. THOMPSON. Do you think that it should?

Mr. WOLTZ. Well, I can only give you our own practice in that matter. We employ almost 700 people. We have a Negro foreman in one department, working approximately 35 or 40 white men under him. We have a completely integrated work force, in our sewing department, and we do believe in this principle. I don't believe that anyone should be denied an opportunity to seek economic well-being through employment, and we as a company do practice this. I know there are many other companies who do not. But I firmly believe in the principle.

Mr. THOMPSON. I congratulate you.

Mr. WOLTZ. Nor do I-and I would like to say also that I believe this thing of individual liberty in the matter of union compulsion, as well, this is just as wrong as it is to deny somebody the opportunity to earn a living because of race, color, or creed.

Mr. THOMPSON. Or to vote?

Mr. WOLTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I am sorry that we don't have more time for you.

Mr. WOLTZ. I wish we did, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON. We must go vote.

The subcommittee will adjourn now until 10 a.m. tomorrow. (Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 2, 1965.)

REPEAL OF SECTION 14(b) OF THE LABOR-MANAGE

MENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 1965

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR

OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank Thompson, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Thompson, O'Hara, Scott, Carey, Sickles, Scheuer, Daniels, Gibbons, Griffin, Andrews, and Gurney.

Also present: Robert E. McCord, director of the subcommittee; Charles W. Radcliffe, minority counsel for education, and Mike Bernstein, counsel to the minority.

Mr. THOMPSON. The subcommittee will be in order for a continuation of the hearings on the bill H.R. 77 and related legislation. The first witnesses this morning will be the Council of State Chambers of Commerce: Mr. Otto R. T. Bowden, of Jacksonville, Fla. I notice our colleague, Mr. Haley, is with us.

Would you care to introduce these witnesses, Mr. Haley?

Mr. HALEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will let my good friend introduce the members of his delegation. I merely came here to say hello to him and to see that the boys found their way around this maze of a building that you have here.

Mr. THOMPSON. We would be honored if you would like to sit with us. You may.

Mr. HALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I must return to my other committee where I have a pending bill.

STATEMENTS OF OTTO R. T. BOWDEN, ATTORNEY, JACKSONVILLE, FLA.; JACK TROVATO, PRESIDENT, TROVATO ELECTRIC CO., VIENNA, VA.; LOUIS E. WEISS, PRESIDENT, MIDLAND METALCRAFT, INC., WICHITA, KANS.; WILLIAM L. GATZ, PRESIDENT, WONDER STATE MANUFACTURING CO., PARAGOULD, ARK,; FRANK FLICK, PRESIDENT, FLICK-REEDY CORP., BENSENVILLE, ILL.; AND ROBERT ANDERSON, PRESIDENT, STANDARD PLYWOOD, INC., CLINTON, S.C., APPEARING ON BEHALF OF MEMBER STATE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE

Mr. BOWDEN. Mr. Chairman, my name is Otto R. T. Bowden, a practicing attorney in Jacksonville, Fla.

Mr. THOMPSON. Would you identify your associates?

Mr. BOWDEN. Mr. Jack Trovato, from Vienna, Va.; Mr. Louis E. Weiss, of Wichita, Kans.; Mr. William Gatz, of Arkansas; Mr. Frank Flick, of Bensenville, Ill.; and Mr. Robert Anderson, from South Carolina.

Mr. THOMPSON. Gentlemen, you are all welcome.

You may proceed.

Mr. BOWDEN. I am chairman of the Labor Relations Committee of the Florida State Chamber of Commerce and represent that organization on the Labor Relations Committee of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce. I am here representing the Council of State Chambers of Commerce and its 31 member chambers.

For record purposes, this is to state that the Labor Relations Committee of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce and its member chambers of commerce oppose the repeal of section 14(b) of the TaftHartley Act.

We are now in the era of great sociological change. At no time in the history of these United States have we seen more protection being afforded to the right of individuals, through legislation and through court decrees. If this period of history is to be known by any title, it certainly must be known as "The Era of the Individual."

This has been pointed up by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases involving the rights of individuals being represented by counsel in criminal cases; by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the freedom of speech and the rights of persons to make such statements; by decisions of the Supreme Court as to the rights of individuals to abstain from religious instructions in public schools; the recognition of the right of conscientious objectors during time of war not to bear arms because of their beliefs and principles; by acts of the current administration and of the Attorney General of the United States in their zeal to protect the freedom of assembly and the right to protest by individuals; and, lastly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which guarantees the right of an individual to service in places of public accommodation, and the right of the individual of nondiscrimination in his job opportunities by reason of his race, religion, national origin, or sex.

With this background, repeal of section 14(b) would be inconsistent with the thinking of this era of the individual. Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act is in accord with the era of the individual and with its principles in that it insures the worker that he cannot be forced against his wishes to join a labor organization in order to fulfill a most basic and elementary right, that being his right to work and support his family without the payment of any tribute to any person or organization. If a worker can be deprived of this basic right, then all others can be more easily abrogated.

It appears inconsistent that a man, because of his convictions, can be excused from combat duty in time of war when the fact of our Nation is in peril, and yet be required to join a labor organization in peacetime in order to work and thereby fulfill his obligations to home and family.

The question of compulsory unionism, as opposed to voluntary unionism, strikes at the very foundation of our American liberties. Individual freedom of choice is the basic issue involved and it is an

issue which affects one's constitutional right to life, liberty, and possession of property. What is gained by assuring an individual that he has the right to be served at a place of public accommodation; yet to require that he join a labor union to work in order to pay for the accommodations to which he is assured?

It appears that such legislation strikes at a person's vanity rather than his integrity and can hardly be justified in view of all the presentday circumstances. What good is it to assure a person that he will not be discriminated against in employment by reason of his race, creed, place of origin, or sex, if he can be discriminated against in the employment gained because of his nonmembership in a labor organization?

We feel that an employee's conscientious objection to membership in a labor organization should be afforded the same respect, consideration, and protection as his other basic rights which this administration so jealously guards.

American labor leaders have won an extraordinary collection of special legal privileges and exemptions based on the theory that unions are voluntary associations. Union membership is either voluntary or it is not, and a union which has to resort to coercion and involuntary membership to recruit members, illustrates there is something drastically wrong with the union itself.

Unions that are honestly run and serve the best interests of their members do not need compulsory unionism to keep them going. There is little to say for unions that can exist only by forcing workers to join under the threat of losing their jobs. Labor here should be as it is in France, where it is regarded as a movement; a morality, and not a business. It is surprising that so many believers in democracy and the rights of individuals, who call themselves liberals, should be against voluntary unionism and in favor of compulsory unionism. Right-to-work laws, so-called, as protected by section 14(b) are not antiunion, rather, they are proworker and they cannot possibly wreck unions as some opponents claim because unions are protected by both State and Federal laws in various ways.

It should be emphasized that the right, not to join a union, is a necessary corollary of the right to join, for without the right not to join, there can be no such thing as a right to join. Freedom rests on choice, and where choice is denied, freedom is destroyed as well.

Right-to-work laws are aimed at taking away the right of compulsion from the union and giving that right back to the individual worker where it belongs. Section 14(b) does not impede unions in their legitimate purposes and growth. They do not prevent any worker from joining a union, but they prevent unions from enforcing membership against the will of the worker and against their consciences.

As a practicing attorney, I know from experience, that there will be serious objections on the part of the small businessman to the repeal of section 14(b) due to conflict with the philosophy of many small and large employers. I also know, from experience, that many of these businesses will never agree to a union contract which contains any clause which would remove from the individual worker his rights of election, as to his membership, or nonmembership, in any labor organization.