網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

about how they want to balance their interest in freedoms against their interest in effective representation.

The result was so completely lopsided that in 1951 the Congress withdrew that provision for elections because it was perfectly obvious what the view of the employees might be.

You, of course, Mr. Chairman, have put this in a way that summarizes this better than I can. You have said recently in the Congressional Record that "antiunionism does not justify the violation of the basic freedom of individuals to determine by majority vote the goals and policies of the group," which is about all that there is to be said about it.

I recognize in this same connection a narrower but in some ways a more strongly held view, the view of those few, and they are few, who oppose the membership in a labor organization as a matter of conscience or as a matter of religious principle. This is a point which has been advanced not in great detail but with great vigor, and I think with great responsiveness on the part of a good many people in the country. It is a point which is entitled to respect because our most sensitive chord in this country is individual freedom, and that is a good thing. If we err at all, it is on the side of paying more attention to individual freedom sometimes than is absolutely required. That is not error. That is our strength.

So we accord particular attention to those who as a matter of principle, as a matter of conscience, as a matter of religious conviction, say anything or take any position, and there are a few who oppose membership in any organization. That group faces something of a dilemma because, honest to their principles as they are, it is hard for them to organize even a position of opposition to membership in an organization.

I respect completely, in making this statement, the position of those who are identified as the Plymouth Brethren, but who even in their identification make it clear that this is not a group position. That view has been expressed, and I can say about that only this, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I respect that view completely. At the same time, it does seem to me that the balance must be struck between the issue of principle, of individual principle which is involved here, and the interest of the larger group of those who propose to defend another freedom, which is the freedom to be represented effectively and the freedom to agree. I have included in my statement and should like to read here, out of respect not only for the position which is taken but for the man who took it, the statement of Judge Learned Hand on this subject.

Mr. Justice Douglas has already been noted for the record on a similar point. Surely Judge Learned Hand and Mr. Justice Douglas stand as leaders of this point of view. Here is what he said when he was asked as a member of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to speak to this particular issue. He said:

The First Amendment gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his religious necessities. A man might find it incompatible with his own conscience to live in a city in which open saloons were licensed; yet he would have no constitutional right to insist that the saloons must be closed. He would have to leave the city or put up with the iniquitous dens, no matter what economic loss his change of domicile entailed. We must accommodate our idiosyncracies, religious as well as secular, to the

compromise necessary in communal life, and we can hope for no reward for the sacrifices this may require beyond our satisfaction from within, or our expectations of a better world. Otten v. B. & O.R.R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58 (C.A. 2, 1953)

I see no compromise of anybody's religious views, if having made his point completely and having received full respect for it, it must nevertheless be accommodated to the necessities of 180 or 190 million people living together, necessarily representing some of their interests through organizations of one kind or another.

But beyond that, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee the Labor Management Relations Act in section 8 goes further to accommodate that point of view, than almost anybody in the general public realizes, because it has been made clear in section 8, the section which will become fully effective if section 14(b) is repealed, that the only requirement of the individual represented by a union is in practical effect that he pay the union initiation fees and the union dues.

Section 8 is so involved that unfortunately it is not an easy vehicle of public instruction or persuasion. But what it comes down to, as confirmed in the decisions of the Supreme Court, is that the only thing which can be insisted upon as a condition of continued employment is the payment of the union initiation fees and the union dues.

The Supreme Court in NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, has stated specifically that:

If an employee in a union shop unit refuses to respect any union imposed obligation other than the duty to pay dues and fees the employee may not be discharged for nonmembership even though he is not a formal member.

.

[ocr errors]

I believe deeply that this issue must be discussed with a full recognition of the individual liberties involved. I believe deeply that the integrity of the democratic decisionmaking process makes it incumbent upon anybody who makes that argument not to impeach my belief in individual liberties, because nothing is stronger, and it is incumbent to make it clear that the only thing which is required by the law if section 14 (b) is repealed is that the dues, the costs of representation, be paid, and that there is no requirement of participation in any other of the formalities of membership.

I note briefly the other set of arguments which have been advanced against this repeal. They have to do with alleged inequities of union practice of one kind or another. This matter will be developed, I am sure, in subsequent debate and questioning.

I want to make it clear only that in my own reading of the law, in my own judgment, there is today a complete set of legal limitations upon the exercise of any excesses by labor unions, so that what we are talking about when we speak of a union shop is membership in or at least the payment of dues to a union whose practices are sufficiently controlled by provisions of the law. I point out that the Labor Management Relations Act includes specific prohibitions against any unfair union labor practices in collective bargaining.

It contains provisions against excessive initiation fees or dues. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, the Landrum-Griffin Act, assures internal union democracy. The Corrupt Practices Act provides specifically against any improper influencing of the public elections and that is made specifically applicable to labor unions by original section 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Now in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there is a complete prohibition against discrimination by labor unions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. So in conclusion on this first point, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I can only say to you with the complete candor, honesty, and deep conviction that what I see here is a matter of rights, of individual rights; that there is involved the freedom to make one's own decisions.

What is principally involved, as far as freedom is concerned, is the freedom to agree; freedom of a union and of a company to agree that what makes sense from the standpoint of administering that particular industry relationship is an arrangement whereby those who are represented by the union will contribute to the costs and expenses of the administration of that union, and that so far as any individual liberties beyond that are concerned, there is no imposition upon them which is not fully balanced in terms of their own selfinterest by the desirability of effective representation.

The second point which is involved here, and to which you have al luded, Mr. Chairman, is the point of whether the law with respect to this particular matter should be a matter of uniformity throughout the country as a whole, or whether it should be left up to particular States.

I point out that every other provision of the National Labor Relations Act, and more broadly every other provision of the Labor Management Relations Act, with, I suppose, the possible exception of the issue which is presented in section 301, is established as a matter of national policy in this country.

The Congress and the courts have faced squarely over the years the question of the extent to which the ground rules for labor-management relations should advisedly be uniform throughout the country and the extent to which they should advisedly be left up to decision in particular States.

Except with respect to the point covered in 14(b), that decision has been to establish uniform ground rules for labor relations to whatever extent any law covering them is important. I submit that the lesson

of that experience confirms the wisdom of the decision made with respect to every other provision of the labor relations law, and confirms the unwisdom of the decision made with respect to section 14(b). I have a great respect for the decision, at the same time, of Congress 18 years ago to provide for State experimentation with respect to this particular issue.

That is in the tradition of democratic federalism, to use the States sometimes as testing areas for issues on which there is particular dispute and controversy.

It seems to me that the decision to experiment made in 1947 is the soundest basis for the decision today in the light of the results of that experimentation to turn to the establishment of a national and a uniform policy with respect to this issue as with respect to all others. Congressman Ayres expressed this view recently on the floor of the House in which he said:

There comes a time when experience brings about a review of some sections of what might be considered a very fair law.

It seems to me that this is that time, when the lesson of experience is now embodied into the law of the land.

These have been profitable years of experience because they have included so much experimentation of different kinds. They have included the experience of some 24 or 25 States choosing at one point or another to adopt State right-to-work laws. Five of them have repealed those laws, so that today the lesson of experience is that in 19 States this is deemed to be wise."

In 31 States it is deemed to be unwise. I suggest that the strong trend in collective bargaining as well as the strong trend in legislative decisionmaking in the States now confirms that a single general rule is here of great value to the country.

There is a very practical reason for this. It is not just a matter of jurisprudence of jurisprudential principle or anythig of that kind. The plain facts of the matter are that the State right-to-work laws have been used among other things as part of what is certainly not an unconscionable but it seems to me a very unwise interstate competition in terms of attracting industry to one State or another.

I don't think that is good for industrial relations. I don't think it is good for collective bargaining. I don't think it is good for the economy of this country. In ways which are usually not very subtle, and dropping at this point the facade of any interest about individual liberties, it is true that interests in those States which have the rightto-work laws have advertised the advances of those States in terms of being free of any pressure by any labor union to ask for the increased strength of a union shop.

This is not an incidental point, because I rather suspect that the possibility of doing this comes from-comes very close to the support for a good deal of this kind of thing. It is a related and I think an exceedingly important point that leaving this matter to the separate determinations in the various States has given rise to continuous and increasing antagonism. I have a little difficulty with this issue. I think there is a good deal in the suggestion and public comment of the last few weeks that if an argument for the repeal of section 14 (b) is to get rid of controversy about it, that could have been accomplished by leaving the whole matter alone.

I appreciate that argument. Yet the truth of the matter is that section 14(b) deliberately invites the differences among the States which have developed. I think that it is fair to point out that there is this controversy among the States, of a political nature as well as all others, as a result of the decision which was made in 1947, and it seems to me that it is appropriately removed.

I call attention to the fact that the President emphasizes in his recent message recommending the repeal of section 14(b) that he does so, using his words:

With the hope of reducing conflict in our national labor policy that for several years has divided Americans in various States.

You, Mr. Chairman, have said much the same thing, both this morning and in your earlier statement, that repeal of this provision would remove from the political arena the prospects of recurrent and divisive debates. We know, whether for good reasons or bad, there will be eternal conflict on this point until it is cleared up one way or the other. I think the basis for the best removal of this would be in this particular forum.

I hope whatever decision is made this year will have the effect of at least curtailing this divisiveness. I think that will be contributed to most completely by the elimination of this particular point.

So on the second point, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it seems to me that what we face is the fact that the Congress made a decision 18 years ago to experiment. The results of the experimentation are now in.

They seem to me to support, they seem to most American labor and to a substantial part of American management, to most of the legislatures of the various States, to support a uniform policy on this particular point.

I urge very strongly that what I conceive of as the central right here, the right to decide this issue by private collective bargaining, be returned to American labor and to American management.

Thank you.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for a very splendid statement. I will yield myself 5 minutes at this point for a few

comments.

You pointed out very dramatically and very well the inconsistency in the law between the provision of section 8 and the contrary provision of section 14 (b). This subject wasn't one which was ignored at the time of the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.

In the history of the debate, when an attempt was made in section 8 to outlaw a union shop, Senator Taft had this to say:

This amendment proposes completely to abolish the union shop. We considered the arguments very carefully in the committee and I, myself, came to the conclusion that since there had been for so long a time so many union shops in the United States, and since in so many trades it was entirely customary that worked satisfactorily, I at least was not willing to go to the extent of abolishing the possibility of a union shop contract.

He went on to say:

I think it would be a mistake to go to the extreme of absolutely outlawing a contract which provides for a union shop requiring all employees to join a union, if that arrangement meets with the approval of the employer, meets with the approval of a majority of the employees, and is embodied in a written contract.

His position was somewhat ambiguous because later he apparently approved the section 14(b). And yet he was there, don't you think. approving something for the States which he would not approve of as a matter of Federal policy?

Secretary WIRTZ. I think that was the complete illustration of the decision that in our judgment this is the right rule, section 8. In our judgment, there may be a case made here for some experimentation of the States. I think Mr. Justice Holmes' reference to that situation, where conflicting notions still hold the battlefront against each other, the time for determination of the right answer has not yet come. I suppose that it was that which prompted Senator Taft and a number of others to: (a) endorse a particular result; (b) to say that if there should be some experimentation, let's get it.

Mr. THOMPSON. Of course, the purpose, some people feel, in all legislation relating to labor-management relations, is to promote industrial peace, and the advocates of retention of 14 (b) use this argument quite a bit.

« 上一頁繼續 »