SHERMAN PITTED AGAINST JOHNSTON. 625 XXVIII. SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. GEN. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, at his forces around Chattanooga with the instance of Lt.-Gen. Grant, suc- 54,568 Cavalry. Artillery. Total, an army barely short of 100,000 men of all arms, with 254 guns. It was far superior in every thing but cavalry to that which it confronted; and which, though estimated by Sherman at 55,000 to 60,000, probably numbered hardly more than 50,000.* Johnston's army was organized in three corps, led by Hardee, Hood, and Polk. Sherman was from time to time rëenforced, so as nearly to keep his original number good; but, as he advanced into Georgia, the necessity of maintaining his communications seriously reduced his force at the front. The country between Chattanooga and Atlanta is different from, but even more difficult than, that which separates Washington from Richmond. Rugged mountains, deep, narrow ravines, thick, primitive woods, with occasional villages and more frequent clearings, or irregular patches of cultivation, all traversed by mainly narrow, ill-made roads, succeed each other for some 40 miles; then intervenes a like distance of comparatively open, facile country, traversed by two considerable rivers; then another rugged, difficult region of mountains and passes reaches nearly to the Chatta Johnston reported his infantry at 40,900. Sherman estimated his cavalry (under Wheeler) at 10,000. Estimating his artillery at 3,100, his total force would be 54,000. It was occasionally swelled rather than strengthened by drafts of such Georgians not already in the service as passed for militia. The force which Sherman, after passing the Oostenaula, could show at the front, was probably about 70,000 to Johnston's 45,000. hoochee; across which, 8 miles dis- | evacuate his stronghold and fall back tant, lies the new but important city of Atlanta a focus of several railroads, having some 20,000 inhabitants, and then the seat of extensive manufactories of Confederate supplies. It had been well fortified, early in 1863. Johnston's position at Dalton was covered by an impassable mountain known as Rocky-Face ridge, cloven by the passage of Mill creek called Buzzard's Roost gap. The railroad traverses this pass, but our army could not; it being naturally very strong and now thoroughly fortified. Hence, while Thomas menaced and feebly assailed it in front, McPherson flanked the enemy's left, moving down by Ship's gap, Villanow, and Snake creek gap, to seize either Resaca or some other point well in its rear, while Schofield should press on Johnston's right. In executing these orders, Thomas was compelled to bear more heavily on the Rebel front than was intended: Newton's division of Howard's (4th) corps, and Geary's of Hooker's (20th) corps, assaulting in earnest and even carrying portions of the ridge; whence they were soon repelled with loss. Meantime, McPherson had reached the front of Resaca, scarcely resisted; but he could not carry it, and dared not remain between it and Johnston's main body; so he fell back to a strong position in Snake creek gap, which he could hold for some hours against all gainsayers. Sherman now, leaving Howard's corps and some cavalry to threaten Dalton in front, moved' the rest of his forces rapidly in the track of Schofield, and through Snake creek gap; which compelled Johnston to May 7. 0 rapidly to Resaca; advancing in force against which, Kilpatrick, fighting the enemy's cavalry, was disabled by a shot. Sherman had calculated on seriously damaging Johnston when he thus retreated, but was unable to reach him-Johnston having the only direct, good road, while our flanking advance was made with great difficulty. Howard entered Dalton on the heels of the enemy, and pressed him sharply down to Resaca. Sherman forthwith set on foot a new flanking movement by his right to turn Johnston out of Resaca; which Johnston countered by an attack on Hooker and Schofield, still in his front and on his left; but he was rather worsted in the bloody fight® thus brought on: Hooker driving the Rebels from several hills, taking 4 guns and many prisoners. The Rebels retreated across the Oostenaula during the night, and our army entered Resaca in triumph next morning. McPherson crossed on our right at Lay's ferry next day; Gen. Thomas moving directly through Resaca, on the heels of Hardee, who covered the Rebel retreat; while Schofield advanced on our left, over a rough region, by such apologies for roads as he could find or make. Jeff. C. Davis's division of Thomas's army kept down the north-west bank of the Oostenaula to Rome, where he took 8 or 10 great guns, and destroyed mills and founderies of great importance to the enemy; leaving here a garrison. Johnston made a momentary stand against our central advance in a strong position covering Adairsville; but, on the approach of our main body, he again retreated, with only 7 May 10-11. * May 15. sharp skirmishing between our van and his rear-guard; until, having passed through Kingston, he was again found holding a strong and fortified position about Cassville, apparently intent on a decisive battle. Upon being pressed, however, he retreated, under cover of night, across the Etowah; burning the railroad and other bridges, and taking a still stronger position covering the Allatoona pass, where the country again becomes mountainous, rugged, and difficult, and where he doubtless had determined to fight in earnest. Sherman, after halting two days to rest and reconnoiter, decided to flank him out of this by moving well to the right, concentrating his army on Dallas; to which point Jeff. C. Davis, at Rome, had already been directed, and on which Thomas now advanced; McPherson moving still farther to the right, by Van Wert, and swinging in on Thomas's right; while Schofield, moving on the east, should aim to come in on Thomas's left. Johnston promptly divined this movement, and prepared to baffle it. well sheltered foe. Next morning, the Rebel intrenched lines stretched unbrokenly from Dallas to Marietta, over a most difficult region, wherein days were necessarily spent by Sherman, amid continual skirmishing and fighting, in making careful approaches. He had just ordered Schofield to advance our left and flank the enemy's right, when Johnston struck heavily at our right at Dallas, held by McPherson. But this attack gave our men the advantage of breastworks, and was repulsed with loss; as one made by Howard's corps on Cleburne, farther toward the center, was repulsed by the enemy. Our army was now moved" to the left along the Rebel front, enveloping the Allatoona pass, and compelling the enemy to evacuate it; as he soon after did his intrenchments covering New Hope church, and Ackworth also. Allatoona pass was promptly garrisoned by Sherman, and made a secondary base of supplies: the railroad bridge across the Etowah being repaired, and our trains down the road run to this point. 12 Gen. Frank Blair here came up,' with two divisions of the 17th corps, and Col. Long's brigade of cavalry; raising Sherman's effective force nearly to that with which he left Chattanooga; and he moved forward next day to Big Shanty. Thomas, advancing from Burnt Hickory to Dallas, was confronted" at Pumpkinvine creek by Rebel cavalry, whom he rapidly pushed across, saving the burning bridge; but, as Hooker's corps, in the van, pushed on, his foremost division (Geary's) found the enemy in line of battle; Kenesaw mountain, with its almost and a severe conflict ensued, without equally formidable neighbors, Pine decisive result. Hooker finally con- and Lost mountains, now loomed becentrated his command four miles fore him, with Rebel lines two miles north of Dallas, and struck hard, by long covering the points not impreg Sherman's order, at Stewart's posi-nable by nature-lines which the ention covering New Hope church; emy were actively strengthening whence, though he gained some each hour. Here Sherman halted ground, he was unable to drive the perforce, and studied and planned May 19. 10 May 25. 11 June 1. 12 June 8. OUR REPULSE AT KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 629 Hooker's corps, and Hascall's of Schofield's army, but utterly failed— the enemy being repulsed from our lines with heavy loss, including some prisoners. and manoeuvered; finally attempting to force, by sharp fighting, a way between Kenesaw and Pine mountains. In the desultory conflict that ensued, Lt.-Gen. Polk, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, was instantly Sherman now determined to askilled" by a cannon-ball. He was en-sault in turn, and did" so, after caregaged, with Johnston and Hardee, in ful preparation, at two points, south making observations, when they were of Kenesaw, and in front of Gens. observed on our side, and two shots Thomas and McPherson respectively; fired at them-it was said by Thom- but the enemy's position was found, as's order-the first of which scat- at fearful, cost, absolutely impregnatered the party to places of safety; ble-each attack being signally rebut Polk soon tired of his, and, com- pulsed, with an aggregate loss of ing out to watch the firing, was 3,000, including Gens. Harker and struck in the side by a three-inch Dan. McCook, killed, and Col. Rice, shot, which tore him to pieces. He with other valuable officers, badly neither spoke nor breathed thereaf- wounded. The Rebels, thoroughly sheltered by their works, reported their loss at 442. ter. Pushing forward wherever the rugged nature of the ground would permit, with frequent assaults and constant battering and picket-firing, Sherman compelled the enemy to abandon Pine mountain," and then Lost mountain," with the long line of strong breastworks connecting the latter with Kenesaw. Meantime, rain fell almost incessantly; the narrow mountain roads were rocky gullies; and the Rebel batteries on Kenesaw belched iron constantly at our lines-the balls generally passing harmlessly over the heads of our men, whom the enemy's guns could not be depressed sufficiently to reach. It being evident that we were steadily though slowly gaining ground, especially on our right, a sally and attack were made " by the enemy, led by Hood, with intent to interpose between Thomas's right and Schofield's left, near what was known as 'the Kulp house.' The blow fell on Williams's division of Gen. Sherman, in his report, defends this assault as follows: "Upon studying the ground, I had no alternative but to assault or turn the enemy's position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank. An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan that promises success. I wished, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault on the enemy behind his breastwhich I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim that it produced good fruits; as it demonstrated to Gen. Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head works. * * * above them." Failure as it was, and for If these be sound reasons, they at least as fully justify Grant's order to assault at Cold Harbor: Kenesaw being a palpable Gibraltar, which Cold Harbor is not. Sherman did not choose to rest on this bloody repulse; but, waiting only |