PREFACE. This compilation represents the first systematic attempt to present in complete and available form the vast quantity of judicial interpretation and construction of the meaning of words and phrases found in the reported decisions of the American appellate courts. It has been over ten years in preparation, and has involved enormous editorial labor and research. The effort has been made to secure all the words judicially defined and all the definitions of each word. In collecting the material recourse has been had in all cases to the opinions of the courts as the original sources, and the work is the result of a page-to-page examination of the reported American cases. A careful search for definitions for words and phrases has also been made in all the latest codes and revisions of statutes, state and federal. Its scope and purpose can perhaps be best shown by explaining at the outset what it is not. It is not a dictionary, in the ordinary sense, and it does not undertake to give the general or accepted meaning of all words and phrases; nor does it concern itself directly with their orthography, derivation, or pronunciation. It is not even intended to be a complete compendium of legal terminology. It does not, therefore, take the place of a law dictionary or a general lexicon. It includes legal or nonlegal terms only so far as they have been the subject of interpretation or definition in the decisions of the American courts or in the acts of the American legislatures. It is not a digest, and it does not undertake to present the legal principles which have been enunciated and applied by the courts in their decisions. The interpretation and definition of particular words and phrases is a function quite apart from the presentation and discussion of the points of law and doctrine set forth in the decided cases. To find and state the latter is the prerogative of the digester, the text-writer, and the commentator. Sometimes, it is true, the judicial definition of words is intimately connected with the discussion of questions of law, and there are many instances in these pages where the two will be found in inseparable combination. But it has been the aim of the compilers to include legal questions only where they were incidental to definitions. When the question was "What constitutes" some legal term (as "contributory negligence," "burglary," "cruelty as a ground for divorce," etc.), the rule has been to omit it as belonging in the digest or text-book. So far as such matter has come into this compilation, it has been because of the difficulty of "drawing the line" closely, and from a desire to give all the matter that might reasonably be looked for in such a work as this. "WORDS AND PHRASES," therefore, seeks to fill a field of its own, and to render a service to the legal profession which is fully performed by no other existing publication. This service is the setting out in available form of all the (iii) judicial and statutory definitions which are to be found in American reports and statutes, whether the words and phrases defined are legal and technical or nonlegal and general. Some of these definitions have been given in digests, some of them have been given in text-books, many of them have been collected and presented in more or less abridged form in the various “encyclopedias of law," but nowhere before have they been brought together with any attempt at exhaustiveness, nor given in such form as to make them practically available for direct use as authorities. The fact that some 132,000 separate definitions and constructions are here included shows at once how vast is the field and how incompletely it has been covered heretofore. It also shows how constant and universal must be the need in the legal profession of the information which is here given. The judicial interpretation and definition of language has all the peculiar weight of authority which attaches to the judicial function, at least equally with the determination of technical legal issues. The question is not as to the meanings of a word in general, but as to its exact significance in some particular context or in connection with some particular statement of facts. In a doubtful case the previous construction of the disputed word by an appellate court will be of determining value as against the more generalized definitions of the lexicographer. These questions are determined by usage, common consent, agreement; and the searching examination of a court will most conclusively establish such usage as to any word used in any particular connection. For obvious reasons no attempt has been made to limit the words defined to the technical terms of the law. Legal maxims have been excluded, except those that are so short as to resemble phrases, and where the courts have actually construed, and not merely translated, them. A comparatively small number of English cases have been included, but there has been no effort to bring these in exhaustively. The plan has been to follow the language of the court, so that the definitions in the book will be authoritative, and to set out enough of the context or statement of facts in connection with which the word was used to enable the reader to see how far the definition is applicable to his own case. The reasoning of the court has also been incorporated so far as practicable. The idea has thus been to give the definitions themselves, carefully differentiating them where there are a number covering the same word, and not reducing them to any inferential statements of the "results" of the interpretation. Where the same definition is given ipsissimis verbis in several different cases, however, the cases are cumulated. Statutory definitions are as a rule given in full. The arrangement of this material is of course alphabetical, and is made as simple as possible, with the one purpose of rendering all the matter easily accessible. An abundance of cross-references has therefore been provided to bring the words into connection with their synonyms and derivatives as well as analogous terms. Where there is no distinction in meaning between a verb and its derivative noun, these are treated together under a single head, as "AbandonAbandonment"; but if the noun has also a distinctive meaning as a noun, this meaning is treated under the noun in addition to its treatment under the verb; thus, "Accept." "Acceptance." The same rule is followed in regard to ad jectives and adverbs. Wherever any large number of paragraphs are given under a single general heading, subclassification is given with appropriate subheadings. In the arrangement of the black-letter lines under the several words different methods have been followed, according to the varying requirements of the material. Sometimes words have a number of quite different meanings, regardless of the connection in which they are used. In such cases the paragraphs are arranged alphabetically according to these different meanings. Thus: "ACCRUE. As arise or become enforceable. As become absolute or vested. Sometimes the meaning of the word varies according to the connection in which it is used, in which case paragraphs are arranged alphabetically according to these several uses. Thus: "ABATE-ABATEMENT. Of action. Of freehold. Of legacy. Of nuisance." When it has been necessary to follow both these methods under one word, the general definitions are placed first. Thus: "ADVANCE-ADVANCES. Advancement distinguished. Loan equivalent. As pecuniary advances. By factor. By owner. In marine insurance. On crops." Some technical terms have developed a large number of meanings, and each meaning contains a number of separate elements, some definitions emphasizing one element and others other elements. These definitions have been arranged alphabetically, according to the elements so emphasized, which are indicated in black-letter lines. Thus: "ADVERSE POSSESSION. Actual occupation. Color of title. Continuousness. Disseisin. Good faith. Hostile character." |