ance on the part of the enemy, and it was not until half-past 1 o'clock that the bridge was carried. By 3 o'clock General Burnside's whole command had crossed and taken position on some elevated ground just above the bridge. He was then ordered to take the heights commanding the town of Sharpsburg, which was done after desperate fighting. By that time the enemy on our left had been re-enforced by withdrawing some of their troops from opposite our right, where our advance had been checked, and General Burnside was com pelled to give up some of the ground he had succeeded in occupying. He had sent to General McClellan for re-enforcements, but received in reply that there were none to be had, but he must hold the bridge at all hazards.

The corps of General Fitz John Porter, in the centre, was not brought into action at all. General Hooker testifies that he had been given to understand that there were to be attacks made simultaneously on the right, centre, and left of our army. He attacked at dawn; but General Burnside on the left was not ordered to attack until 10 o'clock, and there was no attack made in the centre by General Porter.

In regard to the manner of conducting the attack at Antietam, General Sumner testifies :

"I have always believed that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets as they were sent, if General McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the left flank of the enemy, we could not have failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army on our left-Burnside's, Franklin's, and Porter's corps. As it was, we went in, division after division, until even one of my own divisions was forced out. The other two drove the enemy and held their positions. My intention at the time was to have proceeded entirely on by their left and move down, bringing them right in front of Burnside, Franklin, and Porter.

"Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been impossible? "Answer. I think so."

The battle closed at dark, our army having gained some little advantages, at a heavy loss, but nothing decisive. The attack was not renewed the next day, the two armies occupying the positions held by them at the close of the yesterday's battle.

In relation to the policy of renewing the attack on the day after the battle General McClellan testifies :

"The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about 15,000 men. As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect the returns of the first corps-General Hooker's-made the morning of the 18th, by which there were about 3,500 men reported present for duty. Four days after that the returns of the same corps showed 13,500.

"I had arranged, however, to renew the attack at daybreak on the 19th, but I learned some time during the night or early in the morning, that the enemy had abandoned his position. It afterwards proved that he moved, with great rapidity, and, not being encumbered by wagons, was enabled to get his troops across the river before we could do him any serious injury. I think that, taking into consideration what the troops had gone through, we got as much out of them in this Antietam campaign as human endurance would bear."

The testimony of General Burnside, on the subject of renewing the attack upon the enemy the day after the battle, is as follows:

"Question. Did you express any opinion to General McClellan, or to any

one at headquarters, in relation to renewing the attack the next day; and if so, what opinion did you express?

"Answer. I did express an opinion to General McClellan on the subject. After my command was all in position-say half-past 8 o'clock at night-I went over to General McClellan's headquarters, at Keedysville, and expressed the opinion to General Marcy, his chief of staff, that the attack ought to be renewed the next morning at 5 o'clock. I also expressed the same opinion to other members of General McClellan's staff. General Marcy told me that I ought to see General McClellan and tell him what I thought of the matter. I went into General McClellan's tent, and in the course of the conversation I expressed the same opinion to him, and told him that if I could have 5,000 fresh troops to pass in advance of mine, I would be willing to commence the attack on the next morning. He said that he had been thinking the matter over and would make up his mind during the night, and if I would send a staff officer to his headquarters, to remain there over night, he would send me orders early in the morning; and if he concluded to renew the attack, he would send me the necessary men. I did send the staff officer over, but General McClellan concluded not to renew the attack the next day.

Question. Would there have been any difficulty in furnishing the 5,000 fresh troops which you desired, as the corps of General Fitz John Porter, some 15,000 or 20,000 men, had not been engaged?

"Answer. There would have been no difficulty in furnishing the 5,000 fresh troops. In fact, General McClellan did send General Morell's division, of quite that strength, to report to me, but not with orders to me to renew the attack." General Franklin testifies:

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Question. Were you consulted in relation to renewing the attack the next day?

"Answer. When General McClellan visited the right in the afternoon, I showed him a position on the right of this wood I have already mentioned, in which was the Dunker church, which I thought commanded the wood, and that if it could be taken, we could drive the enemy from the wood by merely holding this point. I advised that we should make the attack on that place the next morning, from General Sumner's position. I thought there was no doubt about our being able to carry it. We had plenty of artillery bearing upon it. We drove the enemy from there that afternoon, and I had no doubt that we could take that place the next morning, and I thought that would uncover the whole left of the enemy.

"Question. If that had been made, and that point had been carried, what would have been the effect upon the enemy?

"Answer. It would have been very disastrous to them.

Question. What reasons were given for not making the attack the next morning?

"Answer. I did not hear the direct reason of the general commanding, but I have understood that the reason was, that he expected some fifteen thousand new troops-those which would make the thing a certain thing-and he preferred to wait to make this attack on the right, until these new troops came.

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Question. And that delay gave the enemy an opportunity to escape?

"Answer. I think it did."

On the night of the 18th of September the enemy abandoned their position and retired across the Potomac into Virginia, without molestation. Our army slowly followed, and took up a position along the Potomac, on the Maryland side, occupying Maryland Heights on the 20th, and Harper's Ferry on the 23d. General McClellan, on the 29th of September, reports our losses at South Mountain at 2,325; at Antietam, 12,469-total losses in both battles, 14,794

In relation to the losses of the enemy in both those battles, in killed, wounded, prisoners, and stragglers, General McClellan says:

"It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops in their brief campaign in Maryland."

After the battle of Antietam General McClellan called for re-enforcements, and announced his determination to fortify Maryland Heights, making a requisition on General Wadsworth, then in Washington, for 2,000 contrabands for that purpose. On the 27th of September he writes to General Halleck :

"My present purpose is to hold the enemy about as it now is, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche; but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and then acting according to circumstances, viz: Moving on Winchester if, from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so; or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at once.

*

"My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else available to re-enforce this army. The railroads give us the means of promptly re-enforcing Washington, should it be necessary. If I am re-enforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington."

On the 7th of October General Halleck replies. After referring to the draft expected in some of the northern States, he says:

The con

"But you cannot delay the operations of the army for these drafts. It must move, and the old regiments must remain in their crippled condition. valescents, however, will help a little. The country is becoming very impatient at the want of activity of your army, and we must push it on.

"I am satisfied that the enemy are falling back toward Richmond. We must follow them and seek to punish them. There is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too much immobility, and we must try to remedy the defect. A reduction of baggage and baggage trains will effect something; but the real difficulty is they are not sufficiently exercised in marching; they lie still in camp too long.

average

"After a hard march, one day is time enough to rest; lying still beyond that time does not rest the men. If we compare the distances marched per month by our troops for the last year with that of the rebels, or with European armies in the field, we will see why our troops march no better. They are not sufficiently exercised to make them good and efficient soldiers."

On the 1st of October General McClellan asked for authority to build a double track suspension bridge and a permanent wagon bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, which General Halleck declined to give. About that time the President visited the army. After his return to Washington the following order was sent to General McClellan by General Halleck:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, "Washington, D. C., October 6, 1862.

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good.

"If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and where you intend to cross the river; also to what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges or repairing railroads. "I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

"Major General MCCLELLAN."

"H. W.

To this General McClellan replies on the same day:

HALLECK, "General-in-Chief.

"It is important, in making my decision regarding the route to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, what description of troops I am to be reenforced with upon the Shenandoah route, and also upon the other route between the enemy and Washington; whether they are to be old or new troops, or what proportion of each. If possible, I should be glad to have Peck's division sent to me, if it can be got here within a reasonable time.

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Second. Will you inform me what the present condition of the Alexandria and Leesburg railroad is; also the Manassas Gap railroad; and what time it would require to put them in working order? It is believed that the Harper's Ferry and Winchester railroad is not materially injured."

To this General Halleck replies on the 7th:

"The Manassas Gap road can be repaired in a few days. The Leesburg road is much more injured. You can reach the former in less time than would be required to repair the latter. The troops to be sent you will be partly new and partly old-mostly new."

On the same day General McClellan telegraphs:

"After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for immediate operations against the enemy now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement between the Shenandoah and Washington. "I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Shenandoah valley as important for ulterior objects. It is important only so long as the enemy remains near Winchester. And we cannot follow that line far beyond that point, simply because the country is destitute of supplies, and we have not sufficient means of transportation to enable us to advance more than 20 or 35 miles beyond a railroad or canal terminus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon Staunton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that

route, and we must then take a new line of operations based upon water or railway communication.

"The only possible object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat we have nothing to gain by pursuing them, and, in fact, cannot do so to any great distance. The objects I proposed to myself are-to fight the enemy, if they remain near Winchester; or, failing in that, to force them to abandon the valley of the Shenandoah, there to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike at the heart of the rebellion.

"I have taken all possible measures to insure the most prompt equipment of the troops. But, from all that I can learn, it will be at least three days before the first, fifth, and sixth corps are in readiness to move from their present camps. They need shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents, &c. I beg to assure you that not an hour shall be lost in carrying your instructions into effect.

"Please send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. I would prefer that the new regiments be sent as regiments not brigaded, unless already done so with old troops. I would again ask for Peck's division, and, if possible, Heintzelman's corps. If the enemy give fight near Winchester, it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our resources. I hope that no time will be lost in sending forward the re-enforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible." On the 10th of October the rebel General Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania, returning into Virginia, having made the entire circuit of our army. On the 13th General McClellan reported to General Halleck the result of the raid, and ascribed its success to the deficiency of our cavalry, and urged "the imperative necessity of at once supplying this army, including the command of General Banks, with a sufficient number of horses to remount every dismounted cavalry soldier within the shortest possible time. If this is not done we shall be constantly exposed to rebel cavalry raids."

To this General Halleck replies: "Your telegram of 7 p. m. yesterday is just received. As I have already informed you, the government has been and is making every possible effort to increase the cavalry force. Remounts are sent to you as rapidly as they can be procured. The President has read your telegram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would not be so likely to make raids north of it." On the 13th of October the President wrote to General McClellan concerning the operations of the army. And on the 17th of October General McClellan wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the reply of General McClellan are as follows:

"MY DEAR SIR: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

“As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.