county commissioners. 142.

See, also, Perry and H. Co. v. Selma Ry. Co. 65 Ala.

State v. Housatonic Ry. Co. 48 Conn. 44. Roads in the State taxed one per cent. on valuation of stock and funded and floating debt and bonds, less cash on hand and amount paid for taxes on real estate owned and not used for railroad purposes; this is the value of franchise, and in lieu of all other taxes. Where only a part of a railway is in the State, and part in another State or States, the tax is one per cent, on the company owning such road, on such proportion of value as the length of the road in the State bears to the entire length of the road. A road runs from the southern to the northern limit of the State, where it connects with two Massachusetts railways, which it leases and operates; it is not regarded as owning the Massachusetts railways, and is entitled to no deduction on that account.

Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. County of Kossuth, 41 Iowa, 57. Laws of 1872 directed the assessment of railway property should be made for that year in July; this rendered it impossible to extend the tax formally as required by statute; the tax is collectible notwithstanding this. (Pages 182, 183.)

Sioux City, &c., Ry. Co. v. Osceola Co. 45 Iowa, 168. The census board makes the assessment of railroad property in this State, and transmits to the board of supervisors a statement of assessed value per mile, and length of tract in the county. This is basis of tax by the township, and the tax is valid, though assessment is not on the books of the township.

Personal Estate, Where Taxed.-Appeal Tax Court v. Western Md. Ry. Co. 50 Md. 274; Philadelphia & Wilmg. Ry. Co. v. Appeal Tax Court, Ib. 397; Appeal Tax Court v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co. Ib. 417; Same v. Pullman Palace Car Co. Ib. 452. The rolling stock of a railway company, whether considered as personal property or movable fixtures, is taxable at the "home office" of the company.

Hudson River Bridge v. Patterson, 74 N. Y. 365. The statute directing the assessment of toll-bridge companies in the town or ward where tolls are collected, only applies to personal estate of the company. The bridge is real estate; assessed in town or ward where situate.

People v. McLean, 80 N. Y. 254. A foreign corporation, doing business in the State, and having a principal office, is to be assessed for all sums invested as a domestic corporation, in the town or ward of its place of business, without regard to the situs of the property.

Union Steamboat Company v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 351. A steamboat company organized under Act of April 15, 1854, is liable to taxation in the place where its certificate of incorporation designates as its principal office. It is not affected by Act of 1854, making corporations in Buffalo taxable the same as in other cities. 8. P., Pelton v. North. Transport Co. 37 Ohio St. 450. (Pages 185, 186.) In re Des Moines Water Co. 48 Iowa, 324. The land, buildings, machinery, and water mains are all real estate, liable to assessment in the township in which the machinery is situated which propels the water through the mains.

Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Lott, 54 Ala. 499. Statute, "all money loaned, solvents deducting indebtedness of the party," taxed. As to insurance of corporation, it includes deferred premiums, loan premium notes, and renewal pre

miums, and all other available assets (except State bonds, real estate taxed, real estate out of the State, and capital taxed), deducting therefrom reserve fund.

Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602. (1.) Capital stock of corporations is assessed by adding market value of shares of stock to market value of debts (exclusive of current expenses), and deducting from this sum the valuation of all its tangible property. This is proper, as showing capital stock over and above value of tangible property. (2.) The provision for deduction of value of tangible property in revenue law is merely to avoid double taxation. The State board of equalization is not bound by the valuations of the local assessor, nor is it essential to their valuation that the stock, including franchise, should be tested by the local assessor. (Page 188.)

Railroads in Illinois.-Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 454. (1.) In revenue law, the railroad track and right of way and structures, declared to be real estate for purposes of taxation; the rolling stock of railways designated as movable, this constitutes the tangible property of the corporation, and all other kinds, embracing the franchise of the corporation, and such other values inaccessible to local assessors, constitutes the intangible property; all of these embraced in the term capital stock. The cash value of the capital stock, less tangible property, is ascertained, as in 83 Ill. 602, just cited.

(2.) The board of equalization in assessing the capital stock of a railway corporation, part in Illinois and part in other States, adopted an amount bearing to the entire capital stock, the proportion borne by the length of the line in Illinois to the entire line. The value of the rolling stock was determined by the same rule. In a suit to restrain the collection of the tax, assessment held valid.

Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Paddock, 75 Ill. 616; Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. People, 88 Ill. 350. "Railroad track" must be assessed by the State board of equalization, otherwise, as to real estate, it is assessed by the local assessors. Two lots containing thirty-two acres, less 100 feet width of main track, were covered by tracks used all the time for the purposes of the company, running cars and engines over them, and for switching cars, making up trains, loading and unloading cars, and various other purposes in the company's business. These were also used for car shops, machine shops, foundry, round house, freight depot, &c. The whole of the lots constitute part of the company's right of way and its railroad track; not assessable by local assessors.

Wilson v. Weber, 96 Ill. 454. A formal order for the distribution among the counties of share of each of rolling stock and capital stock, need not be made by the board of equalization. It is a ministerial act; can be performed by the secretary after adjournment.

Huck v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co. 86 Ill. 352. For purposes of taxation, lines of railway leased under a charter providing that they shall be operated as a part of the main line of the lessee, are considered as the property of the lessee; a part of the main line. Tangible property assessed to lessee; distribution of capital stock among counties, in proportion of length of main line to whole length in State, including leased roads.

Railway Co. v. Vance, 96 U. S. 450. An Indiana railway company leased and operated a railway in Illinois; it was assessed (as in 96 Ill. 454), and charged to the Indiana company. It is valid.

Quincy Ry. & Bridge Co. v. Adams Co. 88 Ill. 615. A corporation for the

construction of a bridge across the Mississippi river at Quincy, created by legislature of Illinois, 1853, charter renewed in 1865. Missouri, in 1867, chartered a like corporation, and the Illinois legislature passed an act recognizing the consolidation of the two corporations, conferring all the privileges of charters of 1853 and 1865. It is a corporation of Illinois, subject to taxation there. The term "capital stock," in Illinois revenue acts, is a homogeneous unit, partaking of the nature of personalty, subject to tax at the domicil of the owner, where the corporate functions are exercised and business done. It is neither chattels nor lands. See Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island, &c., 76 Ill. 561.

The object of Illinois act as to "taxation of bridges across navigable waters on the border of the State" was to declare such structures real estate for the purposes of sales for taxes of the corporation. (Page 192.)

CHAPTER XI.

THE LEVY AND ASSESSMENT OF THE TAX.

Levy of the Tax.-Mayor, &c., of Brunswick v. Finney, 15 Fla. 317. Statute requires taxes to be laid specifically for each separate purpose; it is not illegal to assess a tax of a certain per cent. in gross, and then define in detail the percentage for each specific purpose.

Buck v. People, 78 Ill. 560. In a suit for taxes, if the municipal bodies do not return their certificates to the county clerk, of the taxes to be levied, in the time prescribed, or if they fail to describe themselves accurately as officers, not using the full name of the corporate bodies, the defect is cured, under a statute which provides that "no error or informality in the proceedings of any of the officers connected with the assessment, levying, or collection of taxes, not affecting the substantial justice of the tax, shall vitiate or in any manner affect the tax in the assessment thereof." See Mix v. People, 72 Ill. 241.

Spann v. Webster Co. Comrs. 64 Ga. 498. Counties have power to levy a tax not exceeding 100 per cent. of the State tax; they levy a tax of 142 per cent., 100 of which is recommended by the grand jury, but of this amount, 55 per cent. needed no recommendation; the residue does not exceed the limit of the law. (Pages 194, 195.)

Back Taxes.-Swinney v. Beard, 71 Ill. 27. Statute provides for the extension and addition of uncollected back taxes to those of the current year; it is silent as to the rate of interest; it should be computed at the legal rate of 6 per

cent.

So in Fairfield v. People, 94 Ill. 244. The city of Chicago having to collect taxes of 1873 and 1874 by reason of irregularities in the mode of procedure. Under the Act of 1877 these taxes might be extended on the State and county assessments for these years, and collected.

Wheeling v. Hawley, 18 West Va. 472. The authority of assessors to list omitted personal property, discussed. S. P., Vogel v. Vogler, 78 Ind. 353.

See, however, Town of Lebanon v. Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. 77 Ill. 539, holding that the levy of corporate taxes cannot be extended upon the assessment for a subsequent year, but must be extended upon the assessment of the year for which the levy is made.

Scheiber v. Kaehler, 49 Wisc. 291. Where the whole amount of a tax assessed in one year upon an entire tract is uncollected, and is re-assessed upon a portion of the tract in a subsequent year (there being no new valuation) such re assessment is void.

People v. Smith, 94 Ill. 226. The county clerk in making up the amount of the tax due for the State and county for the current year, on real property already forfeited to the State for taxes, must add to the amount of the current year the back tax, penalty, printer's fee, and interest for one year at 10 per cent. on the amount due. This by terms of statute.

Sudderth v. Brittain, 76 N. C. 458. Under power by statute to revise lists up to the time they are delivered to the sheriff, in case of decrease by accident or increase over 25 per cent. of value, the county commissioners have no power to assess additional taxes for previous years, after the taxes for such previous years have been paid, where there has been an understatement of the area of land listed.

Overing v. Foote, 65 N. Y. 263. In New York the assessment is made in accordance with facts existing on 1st of July; notice is given as soon as roll is completed for the correction of errors, on the third Tuesday in August; the roll must be completed by the 1st of August. When completed before that time and notice given, and mistake discovered before the 1st of August, notice may be countermanded, mistake corrected, and new notice given before 1st of August. In this case the roll was completed about middle of July; at that time the names of the Overings did not appear upon the roll; the names were placed upon the roll after this time, without countermanding the notice and giving a new one. It was error. Distinguished from Overing v. Foote, 43 N. Y. 290. (Page 197.)

Comrs. of St. Louis v. Nettleton, 22 Minn. 356. County boards of equalization when they meet must adjourn from day to day until the business is finished, otherwise their action is irregular. The tax for the sinking fund cannot be levied by the council until the amount is ascertained by the commissioners.

Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kossuth, 41 Iowa, 153. When the legislature authorizes the collection of a tax and does not impose the duty of extending the tax on the tax roll upon any one, the duty may be performed by the clerk of the board of supervisors.

Edwards v. People, 88 Ill. 340. The Illinois Statute, ch. 120, § 120, requiring the auditor annually "to compute and certify to the county clerk such separate rates per cent. as will produce the net amounts of State taxes authorized to be levied," does not make the tax void if producing a larger amount. The Constitution does not require the legislature to fix the rate per cent.

People v. Supervisors of Monroe, 36 Mich. 70. It had been the habit to charge the county with all taxes; to credit the county the amount returned and all unpaid taxes; the latter became the property of the State. In 1869, an act directed land bid off by the State to be sold, crediting the county with any excess, charging it with any deficiency. It is valid only as a prospective law; to construe it to be retrospective would be to shift on the county the bids of the State. (Page 198.)

Yelverton v. Steele,36 Mich. 62. (1.) Statute directs as to boards of equalization "that the amount added to or deducted from the valuation in each township shall be entered on their records." Informal action not recorded is not sufficient;

recorded action is a prerequisite to the levy of State and county taxes. (Page 198.)

(2.) The supervisor's certificate to the roll bears date the last day allowed for receiving objections; it will be presumed that it was affixed after business hours, and that full time had been allowed for objections. (Page 232.)

Assessment.-People v. Lathrop, 3 Colorado, 428. (1.) The duties of the State board of equalization may be performed by a majority of its members at a duly convened meeting, but all must be notified. (Page 199.)

(2.) Their duty is to adjust and equalize the valuation of real and personal property among the several counties of the State, but they have no power to increase the aggregate valuations above those returned by the clerks of the several counties. (Page 236.)

A party failed to give in party the board met the

Commissioners v. Carolina Central Ry. Co., 76 N. C. 123. The township board is required to return an abstract and tax list to the clerk of county com. missioners on or before first Monday in May, each year. his list to the board of trustees; at the request of the county commissioners in joint session, and assessed the property of the party for taxation, which was at once entered on the books of the commissioners. objection that the report to the commissioners was verbal is not good. Marshall v. Benson, 48 Wisc. 558. (1.) Affidavit to the roll by a majority of the assessors is sufficient.

(Page 199.)

The

(2.) A tax deed in form prescribed by statute is prima facie evidence of the grantee's title, although it fails to show the year for which the taxes are delinquent. (Pages 323 and 333.)

Smith v. Farrelly, 52 Cal. 77. (1.) An Act creating a district in Alameda county, and authorizing the supervisors to levy a tax upon property therein, to build a bridge. Such a tax is a tax in the meaning of the Constitution, requiring assessors to be elected by the voters of counties, towns, and townships, and is void. (Page 199.)

(2.) A tax paid under protest, after the delinquent list comes into the hands of the tax collector for collection, by sale of the property, and after publication of the list, is paid under duress. (Page 267.)

Hawkins v. Jonesboro' Intendant, 63 Ga. 527. The tax is to be assessed by three citizens of the town, appointed by the intendant and commissioners; an appointment from their own number is illegal; they are to appoint and revise. (Page 199.)

Lehman v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 219.

Statute directs the assessment without notice of "a person who has escaped the collector." L. had been assessed imperfectly; the collector was informed that he had escaped taxation as to some subjects and species of property for a number of years, and without demanding a list of L., he assessed him for the years from 1869 to 1876, and demanded the sum of $39,684 taxes. The assessment is erroneous; the statute does not embrace such a case. Application to abate assessment.

99 100

Roll or List.-Town of Tunbridge v. Smith, 48 Vt. 648; Ayres v. Moulton, 51 Vt. 115. (1.) The grand list must be sworn to by the listers, and where the act requires the oath to be taken before entering on their duties; an oath made on completion of the list is not sufficient. (Page 201.)