66 Spain had discovered and explored America; she 15 had discovered, explored, taken possession of, and settled Guiana; she held undisputed control of the Orinoco, and of that coveted interior whose famed wealth had been the cause of so many foreign expeditions uselessly undertaken, and of so much blood 20 uselessly spilt; the key to that interior was in her hands alone; into the great interior Cuyuni-Mazaruni basin she had pushed her roads and extended her conquests; and the entrance-the only entrance-to it, over the gentle rolling savannahs of the Orinoco, was 25 in her keeping; the Essequibo itself she had settled, cultivated, and fortified; for the moment she had left. its mouth unoccupied, thus permitting the Dutch to trade there; upon the restoration of peace she gave them a title to territory which up to that time they had 30 held as mere trespassers." "The extent of this grant cannot be difficult to define the entire Dutch Colony, if indeed it might be dignified by such a name, consisted of a body of two or three dozen unmarried employés of the West India 35 Company, housed in a fort on a small island, and engaged in traffic with the Indians for the dyes of the forest at the time when the Treaty was signed, they were not cultivating an acre of land. This and an establishment on the Berbice were the only Dutch 40 Settlements in Guiana in 1648. Neither then, nor at any time prior thereto, had the Dutch occupied or settled a foot of ground west of their Essequibo Post." : Venezuelan Proposition. Venezuelan Case, 5 With regard to early Dutch relations with Guiana, the Venezuelan Case is quite incorrect in asserting that the sole object of those relations was the capture of Spanish booty and quiet trading with the natives at places from which the Spaniards were for the moment absent. At the time of the truce in 1609 the Dutch maintained their right to found settlements in any part of South America not actually occupied and possessed by Spain, and never abandoned that 10 position. It was maintained by them in all the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Münster, and received sanction once again in the definite terms established by that Treaty. With regard to the Treaty of Münster, Her 15 Majesty's Government, for the reasons given in the next chapter, submit that this Treaty cannot possibly be regarded as a "grant" by Spain to the Dutch of their Settlements, and that there was nothing in that Treaty to limit the 20 expansion of the Dutch Settlements, provided they did not encroach upon territory actually held and possessed by Spain. The relative positions of the parties to that Treaty were not such as is represented in the 25 passages above cited from page 74 of the Case for Venezuela. The statements that Spain had pushed her roads and extended her conquests into the great interior Cuyuni-Mazaruni basin, and had 30 settled, cultivated, and fortified the Essequibo itself, are, as has already been shewn, entirely contrary to the evidence. On the other hand the statement that the Dutch had not either in 1648 or at any time prior 35 thereto occupied or settled a foot of ground west of their Essequibo Post is contradicted by the evidence of Spanish official documents. In the Report of the Marquis de Sofraga to the King of Spain, dated the 8th July, 1631, it is 40 stated that after the sack of Santo Thomé in 1629 the Dutch fortified themselves in the arms and creeks of the Orinoco. In 1637, it was reported that since the previous year ten Dutchmen had been waiting for reinforcements in the chief 45 mouth of the Orinoco, in order to fortify themselves; and the forces which in 1637 again sacked Santo Thomé and raided Trinidad are described as issuing from Dutch Settlements in the Amakuru, Essequibo, and Berbice. The Settlement on the Amakuru is one which is frequently mentioned in the Spanish despatches. Forces were sent from Santa Fé to Santo Thomé by Don Martin de Saavedra y Guzman, 5 the Governor of the New Kingdom of Grenada, expressly to destroy the Settlements of Amakuru and Essequibo; but the Governor of Santo Thomé, Don Diego Lopez de Escovar, was unable or unwilling to make the attack. The troops were 10 employed in slave-raiding, and a large number deserted. The Governor himself retired to Trinidad to sell the slaves which had been collected. British CounterCase, App., pp. 12-19. British Counter pp. 15-17. British Counter- In 1640 Don Diego was relieved, and Don 15 Martin de Mendoza appointed in his place. Case, App., Don Martin undertook to find troops, if the Government found others, with arms and transport. The Dutch were to be expelled, and the Indians who had assisted them were to be 20 reduced to obedience to the King of Spain. It appears, however, from a Report of the Council in 1653 that the King had not found it possible to perform his part of the bargain with Don Martin, Case, App., and that the latter had not performed and could 25 not be called upon to perform his. This was the state of affairs at the time when the Treaty of Münster put an end to the war. British Counter Pp. 24, 25. 66 12. By the Treaty of Münster the Dutch engaged 25 to neither sail to nor trade in any places held and possessed by the King of Spain." 13. By the same Treaty the Dutch engaged to respect the sovereignty of Spain over all lordships, towns, castles, fortresses, commerce, and countries at 30 that time held or possessed by Spain, and to do nothing which might be an infraction of the Treaty." The argument based upon the above extracts and propositions would appear to be that, prior to the Treaty of Münster in the year 1618, the 35 Dutch had no title to any possessions in Guiana, and that their title to anything which they then occupied, or which they subsequently acquired, is derived from that Treaty. A consideration of the facts, and of the argu- 40 ments which are contained in this chapter will show that such a view is wholly unfounded, and that, on the contrary, for forty years before the Treaty of Münster the right of the Dutch to acquire possessions in the West Indies had been recognized by Spain, that the Dutch had 5 many years before the Treaty acquired such possessions, and that the true effect of the Treaty of Münster was, first, to confirm the Spanish and the Dutch respectively as equal sovereign powers in the right to hold undisturbed and without molestation 10 the possessions which they respectively held in Guiana at the time of the Treaty; secondly, to control the trade relations between the two countries as regards their respective possessions; and thirdly, to specifically recognize the right of 15 the Dutch to acquire by conquest or otherwise further possessions in Guiana from Portugal or from the native tribes, an undertaking being given by the Dutch not to infringe upon or interfere with any territory actually occupied 20 and possessed by Spain. The subject will be considered under the following heads: 1. The language of the Treaty itself. 2. The position of Spain and Holland antece25 dently to the signature of the Treaty, including the actual negotiations. V. The navigation and trade of the East and West Indies shall be maintained according to and in conformity with the Charters given or hereafter to be given therefor; for the security of which the present 40 Treaty and its ratification, to be procured from both sides, shall serve. And there shall be comprised under the above-mentioned Treaty all potentates, nations, and peoples with whom the said Lords States, or those of the Company of the East and West Indies in their 45 name, are within the limits of their said Charters in friendship and alliance, and cach Party, to wit, the above-mentioned Lords, the King and States respec tively shall remain in possession of and enjoy such lordships, towns, castles, fortresses, commerce, and British Counter Case, App., p. 353. |