wisdom to profit by the lessons of history, and in framing a state constitution, to be cautious in creating a vast central power, not necessary for the energetic and faithful administration of the affairs of the commonwealth.

"The governor shall," says the constitution, "appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose appointment is not herein otherwise provided for." Sheriffs and coroners are elected by the people, the state treasurer is appointed by the legislature, "and all other officers in the treasury department ;-attorneys at law, election officers, officers relating to taxes, to the poor and highways, constables and other township officers," shall be, says the constitution, "appointed in such manner as is or shall be directed by law." Notwithstanding the exceptions contained in the constitution, there is left in the hands of the governor an immense power-covering the whole of the judiciary, justices of the peace, and various subordinate offices, necessary for the transaction of public business. The power of removal, although not equally great with that, of appointment, is sufficiently extensive to give to the executive a vast influence. The judges and justices of the peace may be removed by him, on the address of both houses of the legislature, a majority of two thirds of each branch being requisite for the removal of the former. The secretary of the commonwealth is "appointed and commissioned during the governor's continuance in office, if he shall so long behave himself well." A multitude of other officers are removable at the pleasure of the governor. There are two points connected with the exercise of these powers, deserving of consideration; the ability of the governor judiciously to execute so extensive an authority, and its influence on the administration of the affairs of the state. With regard to the more prominent stations, such as judges, and officers whose duties concern the whole commonwealth, no officer is more competent to make suitable selections, or whose appointments will be less liable to be influenced by unworthy motives. The candidates for such places are mostly men whose characters and qualifications are extensively known. The intelligence and opportunity of observation possessed by the executive will, in a majority of cases, guard him from deception. That governor will wilfully err, and merit the condemnation which he will receive, who, passing the ranks where talents and intelligence are arrayed before him, shall indulge his personal partiality or interest, by elevating the incompetent to important stations. But to guard against a result so pernicious to the public service, and so degrading to the commonwealth, a check upon the executive power can advantageously be introduced into the constitution. The power of appointment is a delicate

duty, and with every precaution which can be devised, is still liable to great abuses. In whatever quarter it may be deposited, it can never produce entire satisfaction, nor be completely protected from improper administration. Selfishness will sometimes gain the ascendancy; fawning sycophants will surround the depositories of political power; the incense of flattery, the claims of party friendship, and the clouds of misrepresentation, which continually obscure the political atmosphere, are obstacles in the way of a pure and independent administration of public affairs, against which no regulations however wisely framed can entirely guard. This should not however prevent the establishment of a salutary system, which although imperfect, may furnish a strong reliance against the inroads of abuses, and facilitate an escape from their consequences. All that can be accomplished by any constitution will be imperfect, since it must be carried into operation by fallible men, in whom confidence must be reposed. The virtues and intelligence of the people must after all be the bulwarks of any system which can be devised.

There is a natural point of division in offices, which may advantageously be looked to, as affording the means of lessening the accumulation of power in the governor; and that arises from the distinction which apparently exists between state and county officers. There are strong reasons for separating them in regulating the appointing power. There are numerous offices whose functions relate exclusively to the counties, and the appointment to which can appropriately be made, within the sphere in which their duties are to be fulfilled, and where the merits of applicants are known. The extent to which this course should be pursued, depends upon the nature of the offices, and upon the ability of the convention to select or create a suitable appointing power within the counties. A defective arrangement may be the means of substituting new evils for those which are removed. The difficulties which the convention will have to encounter, are duly appreciated. If it succeed in overcoming them, it will confer a lasting benefit on the community, for few subjects of greater importance can occupy its attention. We shall at present confine our attention to the qualifications of the executive. The governor can have but a very limited personal knowledge of the competency of candidates for local offices, and in a large majority of cases must be entirely ignorant of it. His information necessarily proceeds from the representations made by others. As he will naturally repose confidence in his political friends, it is apparent that their recommendations will influence, if they do not entirely control, the appointments. A few partisans in the counties thus actually exercise the appointing power. What

seems to be the act of a highly responsible officer, is in reality the work of irresponsible individuals, destitute of the confidence of the people, and wielding an extensive influence by party management. The motive which induces the appointment is seldom apparent, and unfortunately too many cases occur in which conjecture would assign any other reason as plausible than the merit of the successful candidate.

That the governor is liable to gross imposition, as to the characters and qualifications of applicants for subordinate or local offices, we have unfortunately too many proofs. The means which are taken to procure recommendations from private citizens, have not always been of the most praiseworthy description; and in fact so entirely illusory is this mode of communicating to him the sense of respectable people, who from their localities, and opportunities, are presumed to be competent judges of fitness for office, that this source of information can seldom be relied upon. Papers are circulated, fraught with encomiums upon the incompetent, which are signed by some from a reluctance to disoblige, by others from selfish motives, and by many from deceptive information communicated by those who have enlisted in the service of the aspirant. Sincerity is one of the least of the features of a great majority of these recommendations, however imposing they may appear with a large appendage of respectable names. Their insincerity is perhaps an incurable evil, and the obscurity in which they involve the executive can only be corrected by depositing the power of appointment in those who will from their situation be better able to ascertain the truth. Gross frauds have also been perpetrated. The names of respectable citizens have without their knowledge been annexed to petitions. To what extent, or in what variety of forms, attempts have been made to impose on the governor, it is unnecessary to enquire. His great exposure to deception is sufficient to show the propriety of making a modification of the power of appointment so far as regards local offices, if it be practicable, without incurring other dangers equally to be dreaded. Residing at the seat of government, it is apparent that his opportunities of acquiring information from the numerous and sometimes distant counties, to which his authority extends, and who are vitally interested in the faithful and judicious exercise of it, are very limited. Whilst the mass of the people are occupied with their vocations, and ignorant of the proceedings at the capital, the interested few surround him with their importunity, and offices are distributed without reference either to public opinion or the propriety of the selection. With most patriotic intentions, the governor may be misled. The sentiments of the people reach

him too late to correct the errors into which he is forced by circumstances.

The mere necessity of announcing the proposed appointment, would in many cases guard the executive from making improper selections, and the public from the injury produced by them. Private arrangements, the management of cabals, and the delusive influence of the interested, would in no inconsiderable degree be checked by the condemnation of public opinion. To require the concurrence of the senate, might contribute to preserve this important power from abuse. If, as has been urged, a senatorial check on the power of appointment would render it still more subordinate to party purposes, it would at least lead to an improvement in the mode of party action, by requiring its accomplishment through the instrumentality of an assembly subject to a variety of restraints, instead of the secret influence of a combination of party leaders in the counties and in the legislature, who struggle to maintain their ascendency by the distribution of the fruits of executive power, as the reward of party subserviency. Whatever might be the private inclination of public functionaries, it appears to us to be evident, that the formal announcement of the candidate, the opportunity furnished for the free discussion of his merits, the uncertainty as to the concurrence of that body in the views of the executive, and the responsibility devolving on each senator in giving his vote, if they did not impair party or selfish considerations, would at least impose on the party which meant to sustain its power, the necessity of requiring a higher grade of qualifications, than when the appointment is made in silence, and the difficulty or impracticability of procuring a change requires acquiescence, and even expressions of approbation, as essential to party discipline. From the nature of the senatorial tenure, it is not probable that that body and the governor would always be of the same party denomination, and thus those revolutions which follow a governor's election would be mitigated in their deleterious influence on the public service. Changes would be more gradual, the fitness of the applicant more closely examined, the influence of public opinion. greater, and the probability of official stations being filled with men who would bear the ordeal to which they would be subjected, would be increased. The power of temporary suspension from ministerial offices should be vested in the governor. But the power of removal, for reasonable causes, should only be exercised with the concurrence of the senate. Thus the two-fold benefit would be gained, of preventing injury by the continuance in office of a man who was abusing his trust, and the prevention of the improper use of the power of removal.

Advocates may be found of vesting the power of appointment in the legislature; a course liable to serious, if not insuperable, objections. Too much caution cannot be observed in diverting the attention of the members of that department of the government from the important duties which are assigned to them. A power so foreign from the ordinary routine of legislative business, would disturb its harmony, and produce the most injurious effects. Procuring appointments for political and personal friends, would become the primary object of the representatives, and the legitimate objects of legislation would be subservient to more exciting and selfish considerations. The responsibility, by being so extensively divided, would cease to be a check upon the improper use of the power. Bargains between members from different sections of the state would supersede the independent and unbiassed operation of judg ment. The motives which dictated the appointments would be screened from observation by the secret-keeping ballot-box, or the plausibility which would invent an apology for a viva voce vote. The illustration derived from the appointment of commissioners for the sale of stock, and the organisation of corporations, affords no encouragement to making the legislature the depository of the power of appointment on an extensive scale. Even by the necessary and highly important duty enjoined by the constitution of the United States, of electing senators, where no pecuniary interest exerts an influence, and when citizens of elevated character are from the nature of the station brought forward, the ordinary business of the session is affected, sometimes to the detriment of other duties. A legislative assembly possesses no peculiar fitness for making selections for office; to confer on it the power would be to impair its usefulness, and involve it in intrigue; as the senate, in acting on the nominations of the governor, would be confined to the simple act of adoption or rejection, and to the investigations essential to the performance of that duty, it would not be liable to these objections. The unqualified power of the executive in making appointments, has made that office the prize of party victory. There can be no doubt but that a great portion of the excitement which has attended the gubernatorial elections, has proceeded from that cause.

In reviewing the party contests which have agitated this commonwealth, it is not possible to avoid condemning the undue excitement which the selfishness and intrigues of partisans have produced. But in censuring the artifices which have been resorted to, to inflame and mislead the people, and in regretting the violence which has been sometimes displayed, we should be cautious against running to the other extreme. Supine indifference is more pernicious than the most formidable