this balance she would have an immediate right of action against him. The direction in the telegram of March 13th, "sign papers mailed you by Robinson and return," did not purport to change the terms of the agreement already assented to by both parties, but was merely a provision for written evidence of the transfer, which would be complete without such writing. (Lewis v. Brass, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 667; Bonnewell v. Jenkins, 8 Ch. Div. 70, and cases cited in note o to section 40a of Benjamin on Sales.) It was not necessary that the sale should be evidenced by any written assignment. Section 1052 of the Civil Code declares: "A transfer may be made without writing in every case in which a writing is not expressly required by statute," and there is no provision in the statute which requires the assignment of a judgment to be in writing for the purpose of passing the title thereto. The deposit of the draft in the postoffice was in accordance with Mrs. Gusha's directions to Hartley, and had the same effect as if he had on that day paid the two hundred dollars into her hands at Auburn. (Benjamin on Sales, sec. 710; see, also, Bennett's American note to same, 7th ed., p. 776, and cases therein cited; Tiedeman on Sales, sec. 154; Morgan v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 410; McCluskey v. National Life Assn., 77 Hun, 556.) By this deposit Hartley became the purchaser from her of the judgment on March 16th, and was thereafter its owner. It follows that on March 21st she had no interest in the judgment, and that her purported assignment to the plaintiff on that day gave him no right to the money that had been paid to the defendant. The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed. Garoutte, J., McFarland, J., Van Dyke, J., and Beatty, C. J., concurred. [S. F. No., 1658. In Bank.-May 5, 1900.] MARGUERITE D. HARRIGAN, Administratrix, Appellant, v. HOME LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. LIFE INSURANCE-PAYMENT OF FIRST PREMIUM BY NOTE-CONDITION— DELIVERY OF POLICY-WAIVER.-Where the note of the insured was given for the first annual premium upon a life insurance policy, for which a receipt was given by the general agent specifying that if the application was accepted the policy should be in force from the date of acceptance, and the note was forwarded by such agent to the home office, and its amount was there charged to the agent, and the policy was issued and delivered to the insured, it must be held that the first premium was paid by the note, and the delivery of the policy is evidence that cash payment was waived in so far as it may have been a condition precedent to the delivery of the policy. ID.-NONPAYMENT OF PREMIUMS-NOTICE REQUIRED BY NEW YORK STATUTE-FORFEITURE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.-A policy issued at the New York office by a New York life insurance company, and which is a contract to be performed in that state, is to be read as if the New York statute, requiring thirty days' written notice to be given after nonpayment of a premium before the policy can be declared forfeited, were incorporated in the policy; and there can be no forfeiture of such policy unless the company alleges and proves nonpayment after due service of the notice required by law. ID.-LIMITATION OF POWER-WAIVER OF NOTICE NOT PERMISSIBLE.-A New York life insurance company has no power to declare a forfeiture in the absence of the notice required by law; and the statute being a limitation upon its power, the statutory notice cannot be waived, though an express waiver of the notice is inserted in the policy. ID.-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-POLICY EXECUTED OUT OF STATE.—An action upon a policy of insurance executed out of this state is barred after the lapse of two years from the time of the accrual of a cause of action thereupon, under subdivision 1 of section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ID.—Place of EXECUTION OF POLICY-DELIVERY.-A policy of insurance which does not expressly stipulate that the policy shall not be in force until actual payment of the premium in cash, and which has been issued in consideration of a note for the premium, given to the general agent under a contract which expressly stipulated that the policy should be in force from the date of the acceptance of the application by the company, the note having been charged by the company to the agent when the policy was issued, and which policy purports to be signed and delivered in the state of New York, is a binding policy from the date of its execution and transmission from New York, and is to be deemed executed out of the state. ID.-LAPSE OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION-ABSENCE OF NOTICE, PROOF, AND DEMAND.-Where the covenant of the policy was to pay within sixty days after notice and proof of death and the interest of the party giving the notice, the covenant is practically for a demand of payment, and, in the absence of any notice, proof of death, or demand of payment within the period of limitation, the claim is stale, and no action can be maintained thereupon. ID.-RUNNING OF STATUTE-ACCRUING OF CAUSE OF ACTION-POSSIBLE ACTS OF CREDITOR MAKING CLAIM PAYABLE.-A cause of action is deemed to have accrued in such case, for the purpose of setting the statute of limitations in motion, as soon as the creditor by his own acts could make the claim payable, in spite of the debtor. He cannot prevent the statute from running by failing to make a demand required to establish his right of action. ID.-RIGHT OF FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY TO PLEAD STATUTE-ArPOINTMENT OF AGENT-GENERAL STATUTE-SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF CODE.-The general act of 1872, in relation to foreign corporations, precluding the plea of the statute of limitations, unless the name of a person residing in the county of its principal place of business upon whom process may be served shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state, has no application to a foreign insurance company doing business in this state, which is controlled by the special provisions of the Political Code requiring foreign insurance corporations to file in the office of the insurance commissioner their designation of the principal agent or chief manager of the business of such corporation in the state, giving his name and place of residence as the one on whom process may be served. ID.-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS OF SPECIAL STATUTEACTS IN PARI MATERIA-CONTROL OF GENERAL STATUTE.-All amendments made by the legislature to the special provisions of the statute regulating foreign insurance corporations must be construed together with the original provisions thereof as being in pari materia, and the intention of the legislature must be gath ered from the consideration of all the special provisions enacted on that subject; and those special provisions must govern in relation to that subject matter as against general provisions elsewhere, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provisions relate. ID.-CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONER.-The certificate issued by the insurance commissioner pursuant to section 595 of the Political Code, showing that a foreign life insurance company named has fully complied with the laws of the state and has appointed and commissioned a person designated therein as agent, and that said life insurance company and its agent are authorized to do business in this state, is prima facie evidence of the compliance of such insurance company with the special provisions of the Political Code. ID.-LOCALITY OF FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY DOING BUSINESS IN THIS STATE-RIGHT TO PLEAD STATUTE OF LIMITATION.-A foreign insurance company which is lawfully doing business in this state, and has duly submitted itself to the jurisdiction of its courts, must be deemed to be in the state, both for the purpose of suit against it and for the purpose of its right to plead the statute of limitations to an action brought against it in this state. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying a new trial. J. C. B. Hebbard, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinions of the court in Bank and in Department. Sullivan & Sullivan, and J. T. Houx, for Appellant. law of New York, as the place (Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65; 244; Newman v. Kershaw, 10 The policy is governed by the of performance of the contract. Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 238, Wis. 333; Central Trust Co. v. Burton, 74 Wis. 329; Hyatt v. Bank of Kentucky, 8 Bush, 193; De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 Har. & J. 191; 3 Am. Dec. 535; Harrison v. Edwards, 12 Vt. 648; 36 Am. Dec. 364; Hall v. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116.) The statute of New York as to notice before a forfeiture can be declared is the law of the contract, and is part of it, which remained in force until the death of the insured. (Greisemer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 202; Baxter v. Brooklyn Ins. Co., 119 N. Y. 450; De Frece v. National Life Ins. Co., 136 N. Y. 144; Griffith v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Cal. 627; 40 Am. St. Rep. 96; Jurgens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal. 165, 166.) The policy was executed in California because delivered here, and is not barred by the two years' statute, but falls under section 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Griffith v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra; Ivey v. Kern County Land Co., 115 Cal. 196.) The delivery of the policy was a waiver of any condition of prepayment. (Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 121 Cal. 451.) The place of delivery is the place where the last act is performed to give effect to the contract. The first delivery was to defend ant's agent in California, and the policy did not leave the custody of the insurance company until delivered in California to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1933; Civ. Code, sec. 1626; Ryer v. Oesting, 119 Cal. 564; Giddings v. Insurance Co., 102 U. S. 108; Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 375; 28 Am. Rep. 241; Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85; Northampton Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 40 N. J. L. 476; Shuenfeldt v. Junkermann, 20 Fed. Rep. 357; Whiston v. Stodder, 8 Mart. (La.) 95; 13 Am. Dec. 281; Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406; McFarland v. Sikes, 54 Conn. 252; 1 Am. St. Rep. 111; State v. Young, 23 Minn. 560; United States v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73, 76, 77; Ford v. Buckeye State Ins. Co., 6 Bush, 133; 99 Am. Dec. 633.) Kindred questions are decided in insurance cases. (Hoyt v. Mutual Ben. etc. Co., 98 Mass. 539, 543, 544; Real Estate etc. Ins. Co. v. Roessle, 1 Gray, 336, 337; Weinfeld v. Mutual etc. Assn., 53 Fed. Rep. 208; Wainer v. Milford Mut. elc. Ins. Co., 153 Mass. 335; Meyer v. Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 121 Mass. 339, 343; Markey v. Mutual Ben. Ins. Co., 118 Mass. 178, 194; McClave v. Mutual etc. Assn., 55 N. J. L. 187; New York etc. Co. v. People's Fire Ins. Co., 96 Mich. 20.) Limitation does not begin to run until the loss is due and payable, and the cause of action has accrued. (Case v. Sun Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 473; Spare v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Saw. 142, and cases there cited; Collins v. Driscoll, 69 Cal. 550; Jefferson v. Wendt, 51 Cal. 573, 575; Leonard v. Flynn, 89 Cal. 542; 23 Am. St. Rep. 500.) The statute of limitation does not apply because the act of 1872, requiring the filing of the designation of an agent on whom process may be served with the secretary of state was not complied with. (Wood on Limitations, 599; Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co., 120 Cal. 161.) Elliott McAllister, and F. D. Madison, for Respondent. The policy was executed out of the state, and was governed by section 339, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contract was complete when the company accepted the risk, and signed and mailed the policy unconditionally. (Bliss on Life Insurance, 2d ed., 215; 1 May on Insurance, 3d ed., 97; Ford v. Buckeye State Ins. Co., 99 Am. Dec. 671, note; Yonge v. Equitable Life Assn., 30 Fed. Rep. 902; Hallock v. Commercial Ins. Co., 26 N. J. L. 268; Commercial Ins. Co. v. Hallock, 27 N. |