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such persons as are thought fitting, who are also compellable to take them Apprentices to trades may be discharged on reasonable cause, either at their own or their masters' request, at the quarter sessions, or by one justice, with appeal to the sessions. By the equity of the statute, they may, if they think it reasonable, direct restitution of a proportion of the money given with the apprentice; and parish apprentices may be discharged in the same manner by two justices.
A third species of servants are labourers, who are only hired by the day or the week, and do not live intra moenia, as part of the family. Concerning whom good regulations have been made in various acts of parliament: 1. Directing that all persons who have no visible effects may be compelled to work. 2. Defining how long they must continue at work in summer and winter. 3. Punishing those who leave or desert their work. Empowering the justices at the sessions, or the sheriff of the county, to settle their wages. And, 5. Inflicting penalties on such as either give, or exact, more wages than are so settled.
There is a fourth species of servants, if they may be so called, being rather in a superior or ministerial capacity; such as stewards, factors, and bailiffs, whom the law considers as servants pro tempore.
II. The manner in which this relation, of service, affects either the master or servant. And first, by hiring and service for a year, or apprenticeship under indenture, a person gains a settlement in that parish wherein he has served forty days. In the next place, persons serving an apprenticeship of seven years to any trade, have an exclusive right to exercise that trade in any part of England.
A master is permitted by the law to correct his apprentice for negligence or other misbehaviour, so it be done with moderation; though if the master or his wife beat any other servant of full age, it is a good cause of departure. But if any servant, workman, or labourer, assaults his master or his wife, he shall suffer one year's imprisonment, and other open corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb. By service all servants and labourers, except apprentices, become entitled to wages: according to their agreement, if menial servants; or according to the appointment of the sheriff or county quarter sessions, if labourers or servants in husbandry.
III. Let us inquire how strangers may be affected by the relation of master and servant, or how a master may conduct himself towards others on behalf of his servant, and what a servant may do on behalf of his master.
In the first place, then, the master may maintain, that is, abet and assist, his servant in any action at law against a stranger. Whereas, in general, it is an offence against public justice to encourage suits and
animosities, by helping to bear their expense, and is called in law, maintenance. A master may also bring an action against any man for beating or maiming his servant. But in such case he must assign, as a reason for so doing, his own damage by the loss of his service; and this loss must be proved upon trial. A master may likewise justify an assault in defence of his servant, and a servant in defence of his master. The master, because he has an interest in his servant-the servant, because it is part of his duty, for which he receives his wages, to stand by and defend his master.
All those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, seem naturally to proceed on this principle, that the master is answerable for his servant's acts, if done by his command either expressly given or implied; for what he does by the agency of others, he is held to have done himself. Therefore, if the servant commit any trespass by his master's command or encouragement, the guilt lays on the master, who will also suffer the punishment due. But the servant is not thereby excused. For as he is a reasonable being, and accountable to God for his conduct, he is to obey his master only in all his lawful commands. If an innkeeper's servant rob his guests, the master is bound to restitution, as there is a confidence reposed in him, that he will take care to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied consent to the robbery. So likewise, if a waiter at a tavern sells a man bad wine, whereby his health is injured, he may bring an action against the master. Although the master did not expressly order the servant to sell it to that person in particular, yet his permitting him to draw and sell it at all, is, by implication, a general command.
In the same manner, whatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course of his business, is equivalent to a general command. If I pay money to a banker's servant, the banker is answerable for it. But if I pay it to a clergyman's or physician's servant, who does not usually receive money for his master, and he embezzles it, I must pay it over again. If a steward lets a lease of a farm, without the owner's knowledge, the owner must fulfill the bargain, for this is the steward's business. A wife, a friend, a relation, who transact business for a man, are quoad hoc his servants; and the principal must answer for their conduct. For the law implies, that they act under a general command; and without such a doctrine as this, no mutual intercourse between man and man could subsist with tolerable convenience. If I usually deal with a tradesman by myself, or constantly pay him ready money, I am not answerable for what my servant takes upon trust; for here is no implied order for the tradesman to trust my servant. But if I usually send him upon credit, or sometimes upon credit. and sometimes with ready money, I am answerable for all that he takes
up. For the tradesman cannot possibly distinguish when he comes by my orders, and when upon his own authority.
Lastly, if a servant by his own negligence, does any damage to a stranger, the master must answer for his neglect. If a blacksmith's servant lame a horse while he is shoeing him, an action lies against the master, and not against the servant. But in these cases the damage must be done while he is actually employed in the master's service, otherwise the servant shall answer for his own misbehaviour.*
THE UNITED CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND IRELAND.
THE British constitution is composed of two distinct establishments. The one civil and the other ecclesiastical. Of the civil establishment we have already given copious details; and we now proceed to explain the ecclesiastical branch. Of the latter there are three established churches; the churches of England and Ireland, which the 5th article of the Union declares to be for ever united, and the church of Scotland, of which we propose to treat separately. These ecclesiastical establishments, but especially the former, are so closely interwoven with the state, that the destruction of either must prove alike fatal to both. The connexion of the church with the state, is not designed to make the church political, but to preserve the state religious.
The government of the united church of England and Ireland is episcopal. She considers that a hierarchy in the church, like monarchy in the state, preserves a due gradation of rank and authority, and conduces to order and peace. That the episcopal government preserves the purity of the faith. That the authority of a bishop keeps heresy in awe, or speedily checks its progress. That ecclesiastical, like republican equality, obviously leads to contention and confusion. The clergy are the whole body of clerks or ecclesiastics, who are taken out from among the people as the Lord's lot or share, as the tribe of Levi was in Judea, and are separated from the noise and bustle of the world, that they may have leisure to spend their time in the duties of the Christian religion. The preservation of both the civil and religious establishment is, therefore, the interest of every member of the community, and the especial duty of those to whose superintending care the general welfare is intrusted. But these establishments, though all persons have a common interest in their preservation, differ much in respect of the claims which they severally possess. The civil establishment has a legal title to duty and submission from every
* Blackstone's Commentaries.
subject in the realm. Disaffection towards this part of the constitution when manifested by outward acts, is a crime punishable by the severest pe alties of the law. In return for the protection afforded by the civil govern ment, the obligation of allegiance is contracted; an obligation which nothing can discharge, but the payment of the great debt of nature-which ca not be superseded by change of residence, or by the formation of new engagements--and which binds every one to whom it attaches, without exception, to submission, fidelity, and even to active exertion, whenever his exertions are wanted for the protection of his lawful government, or the security of his native soil. In a word, allegiance to the civil gover ment is the positive and permanent duty of every person, whom birth has placed in a state of subjection to that government. To insinuate, there fore, that any one is deficient in a sense of this duty, or reluctant in its performance, is to cast a reproach upon him of the most disgraceful nature. But the case is very different with regard to the ecclesiastical part of the constitution. The law of the land leaves every one at liberty to separate from the established church, without being subject to any kind of penalty, censure, or reproach. That church has indeed high and transcendent claims, but they are not of a temporal nature, nor are they supported by temporal sanctions. Considered merely as a national establishment- -as a part of the constitution-it claims only to be entitled to provision for its worship and its ministers, and to protection against all other religious professions. This is the extent of its engagement with the civil magistrate; who, on his part, on entering into such an engagement, has no other object but to keep alive a sense of religion, with a view to the well-being of society. Beyond this the province of the civil magistrate does not extend. It is his duty to support a religious establishment, in order to preserve his people from the fatal effects of irreligion. An established church carries religion to the most remote corner of the land. It carries it into the palace of the monarch, and the cottage of the peasant. The land pays the expense, and the poor man enjoys the benefit without money and without price. But it is also his duty to remember, and in this country he does remember, that religion is a concern between God and the soul, in which he is not made an arbiter; and that it does not belong to human authority to judge for man in such matters, or to restrain him from worshipping God according to the dictates of his own conscience.
But the established church of England possesses a far higher character than that of an establishment. A character which seems to be entirely overlooked by those persons who separate from her communion, who frequently explain and attempt to justify their separation, on the ground that they vindicate their religious freedom by dissenting from a church, which, being established by the authority of the civil magistrate, presumes,
they say, under that authority, to prescribe a common standard of faith d worship. Whilst, however, to such persons the established church >pears only as a temporal institution, as a mere creature of the state, e is essentially a spiritual society, and as such, she claims to be a part * that kingdom, which its founder and sovereign declared to be "not of is world." To be a genuine branch of that church, which for ages ter its institution subsisted independently of the civil power, and which as the assurance of its divine Master and Head," that the gates of hell all not prevail against it." It is in this character, that is to say, as a hurch and not as an establishment, that she offers herself as a guide to aith and worship. She claims, for that purpose, the authority of a piritual commission from Christ himself. Her alliance with the state is Durely incidental. That alliance is, indeed, marked by internal symbols of an imposing nature. It invests her superior clergy with rank and lignity. It seats her bishops among the peers of the realm. It allots the most durable and magnificent edifices to the celebration of her worship. It binds the very soil to furnish a provision for her clergy. It not only endows her with revenues, but invests her with temporal authority in her ecclesiastical courts. But these are merely adventitious circumstances, indicative indeed of her character as an establishment, but wholly independent of her character as a church. They may cease to exist, nay, her alliance with the state may be entirely dissolved, while her faith and worship, her ordinances and discipline, which are her essentials as a church, will undergo no change. Such was the case at the time of the grand rebellion under Cromwell, when the church establishment was overthrown, but the church itself continued to exercise, as before, all her spiritual functions, though under circumstances of great embarrassment, and after a while she was reunited to the state, and was again invested with secular appendages. An exact model of what she was, during this period of separation, and of what she would again be, were such a separation to occur, may be seen at the present day in the episcopal churches of Scotland and North America. Each of which acts under the same authority, professes the same faith, maintains the same discipline, and observes the same liturgical forms, as the established church of England.
When, therefore, the established church promulgates a rule of faith and worship, it is to be remembered that she acts, not in her temporal and incidental character, as an establishment, but in her spiritual, appropriate, and permanent character, as a church. In which character she claims to be a divinely appointed guide, duly authorized by virtue of an apostolical commission, to show to the people of this land "the way to salvation." Surely then, it behoves those who separate from her communion, to examine well the grounds on which such a claim is founded.