think that the writing can be called the hand, with

out a figure.

The general rule for the ufe of the metonymy is plainly this; that in all cafes, provided the sense be in no danger of being miftaken, a writer is at liberty to fubftitute, instead of a proper term, any word which, by its affociations, can bring along with it ideas that can ferve to heighten and improve the fentiment. But it follows from this obfervation, that when the fenfe doth not require to be heightened and improved, as in the ordinary forms of expreflion in converfation, on which no emphasis is ever laid, the figure is impertinent and useless: as when Profpero, in the Tempeft of Shakespeare, speaking to his sister Mirando, fays,

1

The fringed curtains of thine eyes advance,
And fay what feest thou.

To mention the eye-lids at all, much more to denominate them by fuch a figurative periphrafis, was quite fuperfluous.

This figure is worse than impertinent and uselefs, when the figurative expreffion exhibits any idea that is unfavourable to the fentiment; as when Æneas, in Virgil, fays,

Tres adeo incertos cæca caligine foles
Erramus pelago.

ENEID.

The poet ought by all means, in this place, to have contented himself with faying that they wandered

three

three days in darkness. To say that they wandered three funs in black darkness, hath too much the air of a contradiction, though, in many other fituations, the term funs might have a happy effect when put for days.

Periphrafes and epithets, as they ferve to denominate and characterise objects, come under this general rule, that nothing ought to be put for, or enter into the name of any object, or be used to distinguish it, that hath no relation to those properties of it which we have principally in view. The reason is, that, by this means, a writer would lead his reader from his own views and purpose. Thus it is improper to add the epithet mortal to man, unless man be confidered in the paffage in which it is introduced with regard to his mortality, and that idea would give ftrength to the sentiment. In every epithet a regard ought to be had to the general design or purport of the paffage in which it is introduced. For example, when Neptune is fpoken of as a person, no attribute ought to be afcribed to him which agrees to nothing but the fea; as in the following paffage of Pope's Odyffee:

Hear me, oh Neptune, thou whofe arms are hurl'd
From shore to shore, and gird the folid world.
ODYSSEE, B. IX. v. 617.

In like manner, in prayer, we ought not to invoke the Divine Being by the mention of any attribute, as almighty, infinitely wife, and gracious, promifcu

oufly;

ously; but chuse those which there is the greatest propriety in our having a view to, in the fubfequent petition.

There is almoft a tautology in epithets when they convey no idea that is not expreffed, or implied, in fome other words in the fentence. This is certainly faulty, as in the following line:

And impious fons their mangled fathers wound.

In the following, and perhaps in the preceding, there is an impropriety with refpect to the order of time, which is apparent upon a little attention to them:

Submerfas obrue puppes.

NEID I. 73.

And mighty ruins fall. ILIAD V. 411.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXVIII.

Of the HYPERBOLE and BOMBAST.

WHEN any thing that is afferted in a difcourfe

exceeds the truth, an hyperbole is faid to be used. In fact, in every fpecies of metonymy (and the fame may be faid of all the other figures) there is a departure from literal truth; but, as was explained in the cafe of Irony, it is in fuch a manner as that nobody can be imposed upon, or missed by it, and it is attended with advantages to the fenfe, which could not have been had by a rigorous adherence to truth.

The reason why the hyperbole is, in appearance, a greater violation of truth than most other figures, is only this, that in the hyperbole the untruth lies in the affirmation itself, whereas in most other figures it is concealed in an epithet, which howeever (were the fentence refolved into its conftituent parts) would also be a direct untruth in the affirmation.

The advantage of ufing an hyperbole, is, that the idea of one object may be heightened and improved by ideas transferred from other objects,

and

and affociated with it. Thus when the Divine Being fays to Abraham, "I will make thy feed as "the duft of the earth; fo that if a man could

number the duft of the earth, then shall thy feed "also be numbered," Gen. xiii. 16; the idea of a number almoft infinite is transferred from the duft of the earth to the children, or descendants, of Abraham; and by this means we are enabled to conceive a greater idea of them than we could have done by the help of any plain and literal expreffion. 1

This manner of expreffion, though not strictly agreeable to truth, is extremely natural when the imagination is raised, and a perfon is labouring for an expression adequate to his ideas. In fuch a fituation of mind, as no expreffions literally true fufficiently answer his purpose, a writer is obliged to have recourse to objects which can supply him with such as will do it. The expreffions to which thefe views give rife, are, however, fo circumftanced, that we inftantly enter, as it were, into the mind of the writer, we feel the difficulty he was under, and see the reason why he made choice of fuch hyperbolical language; and as we are led into no mittake by fuch terms, they are, in fact, to us who enter into his fituation and feelings, more true and juft expreffions of thofe feelings than any plainer terms could have been.

Besides, if we consider that, by reafon of the narrowness of our faculties, terms expreffing the greatest

U