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fay to which they originally and properly belonged. In calling these, therefore, by the fame names, we fay we ufe no figure; whereas the term figure begins to be applied when, however commonly a name may be applied to any thing, it is well known to have been applied to fomething elfe originally. For example; it is equally proper and literal to fay the foot of a man, or the foot of a beaft, though they differ confiderably in form; but the moment we attend to it, we perceive that the foot of a chair, or the foot of a moun→ tain, is a figurative expreffion, though it be as common as the other; and we use it a thousand times without being fenfible of the figure. In this cafe the figure is faid to be evanefcent.

When any term is conftantly applied to a variety of objects, and it is impoffible to fay to which of them it belonged originally, though they be confiderably different, the definition of that term must be framed fo as to comprehend all those ideas. Thus if we define the terms, head, mouth, eye or foot, we must exprefs our definition in such a manner, as to be equally applicable to the heads, the mouths, the eyes, or the feet of brute or other animals, as well as to thofe of men; for the literal meaning of thofe terms extends to both. But the definition of the words must not be extended to take in the figurative applications. Thus, it is not neceffary that the term foot fhould be defined fo as to be applicable to the lower part of a moun

tain, though the lower part of a mountain be univerfally called the foot of it.

In many cafes, however, it will not be easy to determine where the literal fenfe of a word ends, and where the figurative fenfe begins; as in the terms face, voice, checks, and many others, which have been applied to men and brute animals fo promiscuously, that some perfons may be inclined to call the application of them to brute animals figurative, while others will contend that it is literal: whereas, in other cafes, the analogy is fo faint, that the fame term cannot, without a fenfible harshness, be applied to the different objects; as when trees are called the hair of mountains, or the walls of cities their cheeks.

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This harsh metaphor is by philofophers called Catachrefis. Of this kind we may term that expreffion of Milton's denoting the paffage of Satan from hell to this world, fails between world and world.

From this it appears that there is a gradation in metaphors, proceeding from thofe in which the analogy between two objects is fo great, that the figure is evanefcent, through all the different degrees of refemblance, till we come to thofe in which the analogy is fcarce perceptible, and confequently the metaphor is harsh and unnatural: and all the rules concerning the use of metaphors must have respect to this gradation..

It is worth while, however, to take notice, how much it is in the power of cuftom to foften the harfhness of metaphors. And in nothing, perhaps, is the authority of cuftom more arbitrary and capricious. In fome cafes the application of the fame name to things is quite familiar, where the refemblance is very obfcure; and, in other cafes, where there is the ftrongest resemblance between the two things, it would give the greateft offence to an ear formed by custom to hear them called by the fame name. Who would not make himself ridiculous by confounding the terms appropriated by ufe to the voices of different animals; as the lowing of the ox, the bleating of sheep, and the barking of the dog? And yet who ever calls a part of the fea running up into the land by any other name than that of an arm of the fea, though the resemblance it bears in shape, or use, to the human arm is extremely faint? In like manner, have we any other name for the two rextremities of an army than the figurative one of wings, though they resemble wings no more than they do horns, by which, indeed, the Greeks and Romans moft frequently expreffed them?

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In arranging figures, therefore, according to their feveral degrees, between the extremes of what hath been termed evanefcence on the one hand, and what is called bold and harsh on the ether, we muft by no means be governed by a regard

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regard to the analogy of things only; but myst, along with this, confider the arbitrary decifions of custom, in the idioms of particular languages. Thus we must say, that fuch expreffions as an arm of the fea, and the wings of an army, are nearly liferal, and fearce deferve the name of figures, though the resemblance be very fmall; as well as the wings of the flying fifb, and the horns of an altar, where the resemblance is very great; but that fuch phrases as the wings of the wind, and the boJom of the fea, are highly figurative, though they have a much better foundation in the analogy of nature. The cafe is, that the former are used fo frequently, that, whether the resemblance be greater or lefs, they are little more than common names of things, and when we use them, we never think whence they were borrowed; whereas the latter are seldom used, and never without our perceiving whence they were borrowed. And it was observed before, that it is effential to the pleafure we receive from a metaphor, that we, at the fame time, perceive diftinctly the two different applications of the fame term.

LECTURE

LECTURE XXIII.

Rules for the Use of METAPHORS; and of ALLEGORIES.

HAVING explained the nature of metaphors,

and traced the fources of the pleasure we receive from them, I proceed to lay down rules for the proper use of them. These will be easily deduced from the preceding account of their nature and end.

Since metaphors are used to give ftrength and colour, as it were, to ideas, we naturally use them when our own ideas are peculiarly vivid, and when, confequently, we wish to communicate the fame ideas, in the same strength, to the minds of others. They are, therefore, very properly put into the mouth of a person under any emotion of mind, and the stronger are his emotions, the bolder figures he naturally uses. The truth of this observation may be verified every day: for, if we take notice we shall find that we never hear any man either speak with vehemence, or converfe when his mind is in a gay and lively humour, without using frequent metaphors. When our own ideas are very vivid, they naturally, by affociation, fuggeft ideas

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