CHAP. V. THE ADVOCACY OF SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES. 87

tuents had not detected his impartial faculty, and as soon as they did perceive it they would turn him

out.

What we find represented and advocated in Congress are sectional differences rather than broad and comprehensive principles based upon considerations of the general good of the people.23 This is of less consequence in America than it would be in England, since the States by their own laws can provide for the social well-being of their inhabitants. They can regulate their own affairs, and place the means of education within the reach of all. Except, therefore, when a question arises which affects all the States, and which no single State, or number of States less than the whole, can control, it is not important that a deputy should do more than protect the interests

23 In the New York Convention which assembled to ratify the Constitution Mr. Hamilton said,-"In my experience of public affairs I have constantly remarked, in the conduct of members of Congress, a strong and uniform attachment to the interests of their own State. These interests have, on many occasions, been adhered to with an undue and illiberal pertinacity, and have too often been preferred to the interests of the Union. This attachment has given birth to an unaccommodating spirit of party which has frequently embarrassed the best measures.' (Elliot's Debates,' ii. 266.) Hamilton was, in some respects, a man of greater sagacity and foresight than almost any of his contemporaries. Few besides him

self acknowledged that there was anything to be regretted in the attachment of a member to his locality regardless of the interest of the Republic. Talleyrand told Mr. Martin Van Buren that "he regarded Hamilton as the ablest man he became acquainted with in America-he was not sure that he might not add without injustice, or that he had known in Europe."(See Van Buren's 'Political Parties,' p. 124.)

of his own constituency. But when a crisis does arise which requires the united action of all the members, they have localities so much in mind and the welfare of the community so little, that agreement can only be arrived at by that device which has received the humourous name of "log-rolling." One member votes for his friend's proposition to-day upon the understanding that his friend will return. the civility to-morrow. But as the idea of a nation' grows upon the people sectional affairs will be more and more confined to State Legislatures. And as a natural consequence, power will accumulate in the hands of Congress, and the States must sacrifice some portion of their former functions in order that they may be welded together in a solid body, and thus reveal an unbroken front to the rest of the world.

CHAP. VI.

THE JUDICIARY.

89

CHAPTER VI.

THE JUDICIARY.

THE absence of a well-organised judicial power in the old Confederation was one of its most obvious defects. There was no supreme tribunal to which questions arising between States, or affecting the construction of treaties, could be referred. Each State interpreted as it pleased a compact which assumed to be binding upon all. The derangement of public affairs which such a want of system produced may easily be imagined. There was no certainty that an arrangement entered into between the States would be honcurably observed, because, when any of the parties to it became dissatisfied, it was easy to put a new construction upon the agreement, and there was no recognised authority by which the dispute could be adjusted. This deficiency must have been a constant source of inconvenience and embarrassment to each of the members in turn. "The treaties of the United States," said Hamilton, "under the present Constitution are liable to the infiaction of thirteen different Legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority

of those Legislatures." The result was that nothing was settled-nothing secured. A covenant was only binding so long as every State chose to acknowledge its validity.

To remedy these inconveniences a Supreme Court was established by the Constitution, and authority was given to Congress to create inferior courts from time to time as occasion demanded.2 In each State there exist courts intrusted with the administration of the local, or State, laws, and a Supreme Court is established over all. The State tribunals decide a cause in the first instance, and if it involves a question which comes within the province of the Federal Supreme Court it may be carried there upon appeal. The system works in a circle-the State Courts, the Supreme Court of the State to decide appeals, and the Federal Supreme Court, which is clad with the exclusive authority to pronounce final judgment on all questions affecting the Constitution, the construction of laws, the interpretation of treaties, and other subjects expressly designated in the Constitution itself. In the appointment of the State judges the principle of conferring office for a short period only is adopted, and thus the control of the Bench has practically fallen into the hands of the majority. In vain the thoughtful class of Americans have warned their countrymen against the mischiefs which must. accrue from this degradation of the judicial office.

1 'Federalist,' No. 22.

2 Art. III. sec. 1.

CHAP. VI.

THE PLAN OF ELECTING JUDGES.

91

The judges, it is contended, should be the servants of the people, and remain subject to their supervision and control. In the state of New York the election of judges by universal suffrage has created a scandal which is keenly felt by the nation. With some honourable exceptions, the judges in the State, but especially in the city, are notoriously corrupt or incapable, and owe their election to the very class against which the protection of the law is most needed by peaceable citizens. The most shameful offences are constantly committed by men placed upon the Bench by the popular vote. They listen privately to one or other of the suitors in a case which is afterwards to be brought before them, and openly take bribes for their decisions. It was well known that one judge received ten thousand dollars for giving judgment in a case, and he still remained upon the Bench. Their language is sometimes coarse and profane to the last degree. "If," remarks an American writer, "we were to relate half the rumours which are afloat, and which are fully credited, too, by the most intelligent and discreet members of the bar, we should draw a picture as appalling as anything to be found in the books of the prophets Amos and Micah."3

3 See the North American Review,' for July, 1867 (pp. 148-176), where any one interested in this subject may find a story of corruption unparalleled in the modern judicial annals of any country. The statements made by the writer, although they so seriously affected the character of many judges, were never contradicted in New