on his own account. The plaintiff testified that he thought the car belonged to Mr. Backus, and charged everything he did with reference to the car to him, and rendered every bill for the two years that the car was in his garage to him, including the bill in dispute in this case. This controversy arose over a secondhand battery furnished by the plaintiff which it is the claim of Mr. Backus proved unsatisfactory, and he refused to pay for it. The plaintiff commenced suit against Mr. Backus and garnished the Cass Avenue garage, which he had sold, for the purpose of tying up the car. When the disclosure was filed showing that the car belonged to Mrs. Backus, the plaintiff discontinued the suit against Mr. Backus and commenced the present litigation. After the plaintiff rested his case, a motion was made by the defendant's counsel for a directed verdict for the reason that there was no evidence of any kind or nature to connect the defendant with the bill here involved. The trial judge submitted the case to the jury on the theory that they might be warranted, under all the circumstances of the case, in finding that Mr. Backus had been acting as agent for his wife in the transaction. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the sole question here presented is whether or not, under the undisputed evidence, the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant.

The defendant testified that she never contracted with the plaintiff nor authorized any person to contract on her account, which testimony seems to be uncontradicted. It conclusively appears from the plaintiff's testimony that he dealt entirely with Mr. Backus. Supposing that it was his car, he charged the account to him, and subsequently started suit against him to collect the claim. It seems to be the well-settled law in this State that the wife is not liable for bills contracted by her husband for repairs and improvements

to her property, unless it is affirmatively shown that the wife authorized the husband to contract on her account. The law is thus stated in Fechheimer v. Peirce, 70 Mich. 440 (38 N. W. 325), by Justice CAMPBELL:

"We think there was nothing to go to the jury against defendant. It is the law of this State that a married woman can make no obligation except on account of her own property, and that any one seeking to hold her must make out an affirmative case. It is also well settled that there can be no presumption of a husband's authority to act for his wife, and that a person seeking to hold her for acts done by another must show affirmatively full authority to bind her. See Willard v. Magoon, 30 Mich. 273; Newcomb v. Andrews, 41 Mich. 518 (2 N. W. 672); Morrison v. Berry, 42 Mich. 389 (4 N. W. 731, 36 Am. Rep. 446); Holmes v. Bronson, 43 Mich. 562 (6 N. W. 89); Kenton Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 43 Mich. 564 (6 N. W. 88).

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"In the absence of any proof that there were any understood contract relations between her and plaintiff or Amberg, the jury had no right to draw any presumptions against her. Neither could they disregard her own uncontradicted testimony."

See, also, Gero v. Abbott, 157 Mich. 573 (122 N. W. 307). In this case Justice OSTRANDER, writing the majority opinion, said:

"It seems to me that the testimony, all of which appears in the bill of exceptions, tends to establish one fact, which is that defendant's husband purchased from the plaintiff an automobile in his own behalf upon his own credit. There was no testimony tending to prove that in purchasing the automobile he was acting as agent for his wife. The fact that he told the vendor he proposed to give the automobile to his wife as a present has no probative force in establishing agency. The fact that at the request of the husband a statement was made on a billhead used by plaintiff, reading, 'Mrs. S. G. Abbott * to Benjamin Gero, Dr.,' etc., is not significant of agency, in

196-Mich.-47.

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view of the further fact that the bill was receipted by the plaintiff. The fact that the wife, to the vendor's knowledge, knew of the transaction, is, in view of other testimony, conclusive of the other fact that plaintiff sold the machine to the husband, and not to the wife, and not to the husband for the wife."

It is our conclusion that the trial judge erred in submitting the question to the jury under the facts of this case.

The judgment is reversed, and no new trial granted, with costs to the appellant.

STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, and FELLOWS, JJ., concurred.

GEER v. FINN.

1. RECEIVERS-PENDENTE LITE-ACCOUNTING-DISCRETION Of Court. In a suit for an accounting, appointment of a receiver pendente lite and to enjoin the collection by defendant of money on outstanding land contracts on portions of certain real estate purchased, subdivided and improved, where title was taken to the land in defendant's name and the latter claimed that he was the owner of the property and entitled to all the profits arising from the purchase of the land and that a partnership and equal division of profits applied only to the construction of houses upon the land, and the trial court found that plaintiff and defendant were joint owners of all the property, land and houses, and were tenants in common of the land, there was no abuse of discretion in authorizing the appointment of a receiver pendente lite.

2. SAME.

The expenses of a receivership should be borne by defendant where a tenant in common of land purchased for pur

poses of subdivision, improvement and resale is compelled to file a bill for an accounting, appointment of a receiver pendente lite and to enjoin the collection by the other tenant of installments on land contracts and appropriation of them to his own use, and the court finds the equities are with plaintiff.

Cross-appeals from Wayne; Collingwood, J., presiding. Submitted April 11, 1917. (Docket No. 70.) Decided June 1, 1917.

Bill by Harrison Geer against Matthew Finn for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite and for an accounting. From a decree awarding compensation to the receiver, both parties appeal. Modified.

Geer, Williams, Martin & Butler, for plaintiff.
Selling & Brand, for defendant.

The bill of complaint in this case was filed on February 11, 1914, against the defendant Matthew Finn and other nominal defendants, and prayed for an accounting, the appointment of a receiver pendente lite, and for an injunction restraining said Matthew Finn and his agents from collecting any money on outstanding land contracts specified in the said bill of complaint. Pursuant to an order to show cause, on February 14, 1914, William H. Hockaday was, by an order of the court, appointed receiver pendente lite, and a restraining order was issued as prayed for in the bill. Mr. Hockaday filed a bond in pursuance of the order and entered upon the duties of a receiver thereunder.

The bill filed was one for a partition, and the dispute between the parties arose out of the purchases of certain real estate described as outlots Nos. 17 and 18 in the township of Grosse Pointe, Wayne county, Mich. It is the claim of the plaintiff that, in buying this property and subdividing it into lots, laying out

the streets, constructing the sewers and sidewalks, and building houses on some of the lots, the parties were jointly interested as equal partners. It was the contention of the defendant that Mr. Geer had loaned him one-half the initial cost of the purchase of these two outlots, and that he took the entire title thereto in his own name as security for the money thus advanced, and that the partnership and equal division of profits applied only to the construction of the houses upon the lots, and the profits arising from the purchase of the land themselves belonged to Mr. Finn alone. The case was heard in due course of time upon its merits, and the trial judge, by his decree determined that Mr. Geer and Mr. Finn were joint owners of all the property, land, and houses, and were tenants in common of the land, each owning an undivided one-half interest, and that the improvements on the lots were made by them as tenants in common. The matter was referred by the court to a circuit court commissioner to determine the amount or amounts due. After the report of the commissioner was filed Mr. Geer filed a petition for a division and distribution of the funds in the hands of the receiver and for his removal. The receiver filed an answer, and upon the 23d of October, 1916, the circuit judge allowed the account and determined that the amount asked for by the receiver, $1,000, for his expenses as such, was a reasonable amount, and it should be borne equally by each of the parties to the action. It was from this order that appeals were taken by both parties, the plaintiff claiming that the receiver is entitled to no compensation, or, if to any, that such compensation should be paid by the defendant, Mr. Finn, and it is Mr. Finn's contention that the order appointing the receiver was improvident and unnecessary, but that the amount asked for by the receiver was reasonable, and that it should be paid by the plaintiff.