mental units of the State, without any valid grounds for distinction, discriminating unjustly between steam vehicles and those propelled by other power, a method of generating power which is not a legal basis of distinction, since steam engines are lawful vehicles, and it is incumbent upon townships to construct their bridges to reasonably accommodate them as one of the expected modes of travel; and that said Act No. 71 of 1903 is repealed by the general highway law of 1909, Act No. 283, Pub. Acts 1909 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 4287).

Act No. 145, Pub. Acts 1887, of which Act No. 71 of 1903 is an amendment, is entitled.

"An act to regulate the use of steam engines, steam wagons or other vehicles, which are in whole or in part operated by steam, on the public highways of this State, and to prohibit the blowing of steam whistles upon the public highways of this State."

Early in the development of steam tractors it was held that their use upon highways was not in itself a nuisance and unlawful, since restrictions upon the use of a highway could only be such as are calculated to secure to the general public the largest practicable benefit from the enjoyment of the easement. Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212 (22 Am. Rep. 522). The right of steam tractors to travel the highways under reasonable restrictions having been determined, followed by several years' experience with that means of transportation, the legislature deemed it expedient to enact the above law regulating their use, by which their owners were prohibited from leaving them standing upon bridges or culverts and from blowing or sounding their whistles on highways, were required to send persons along the highway ahead of them to give warning of their approach, to stop them and shut off steam on the approach of horses or other domestic animals, etc. A violation of any of the provisions of

the act is made a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment.

Act No. 71, Pub. Acts 1903, only amends section 1 of the original act, while section 3, which provides the penalty, remains as before. We are referred to no authority in support of plaintiff's claim that because the original act was in its provisions penal, or a "criminal act," the amendment, which prohibits recovery against a municipality where breakage of a bridge resulted from the use of a steam tractor exceeding a stated weight, is unconstitutional. We see little force in this contention, where the scope of the title covers the provision in question, which it is held to do in Westgate v. Township of Adrian, 161 Mich. 333 (126 N. W. 422). That case fully quadrates in its essential facts with this. Westgate was also engaged in threshing, and while moving from one farm to another with his steam tractor engine outfit, weighing approximately 8 tons, he attempted to cross over a highway bridge of defendant, which collapsed, causing damage to his steam tractor. Recovery was denied him under the provision of Act No. 71 in question here. The ruling was brought to this court for review, and reversal sought on the ground that the act was unconstitutional, because its title was not broad enough to cover the amendment. This court there held the law constitutional, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court on a directed verdict for defendant. So far as the questions then passed upon are now renewed, we find no occasion to reconsider them.

This law was passed while the Constitution of 1850 was in force, and any possible questions which might arise under our present Constitution as to whether it should be technically regarded as local, special, or general legislation are of minor significance. Unquestionably the act is special in the object sought to be obtained and the extent of its application, which might

be said in a sense of the greater part of our general laws; but it is an act public in its character and general in its application to every township in the State, and to every owner of a steam tractor of a certain weight within the State. It is not required that all general laws be equally general, and a law relating to a class requiring legislation peculiar to itself, if in the public interest and limited to the requirements of such class, is usually regarded as a general public law.

The constitutionality of such laws, if otherwise unobjectionable, has too often been discussed in decisions and by text-writers, and is too well settled, to require citation of authorities now. This law is uniform in its operation upon all persons and things of the class to which it applies. Plaintiff's most serious contention appears to be that the law is constitutionally objectionable in principle and provisions, because it is pernicious and unwarranted class legislation, in that it manifestly discriminates unjustly between vehicles propelled by steam and those using other power, and gives townships a defense not available to other governmental units. Class legislation is unconstitutional only when shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. If reasonable and for a beneficial public purpose, it is constitutional. The contention that the method of generating power is an unreasonable and illegal basis of legislative action carries the inquiry into the realm of facts and existing conditions at the time of enacting this legislation. Whether at that time, or even when the accident occurred, vehicles of that weight propelled by other power than steam were customarily traveling township highways is not shown. It can be surmised that various differences might exist between vehicles propelled by steam and others, which demanded different legislative treatment, or that the requirements of traffic on city streets and trunk line thoroughfares, built and maintained by

larger, and perhaps wealthier, governmental units, would reasonably warrant imposing upon them different and greater requirements than those exacted for the country roads, built and maintained by townships. But, however that may be, unless upon its face convincingly arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, it is not for the courts to debate the policy and wisdom of such legislative treatment. It was early said by this court, and has been reiterated, that:

"In cases of doubt, every possible presumption, not clearly inconsistent with the language and subjectmatter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act." Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 259; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 323; Attorney General v. Preston, 56 Mich. 179 (22 N. W. 261).

In Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557 (19 Sup. Ct. 281), the court thus spoke of classification by legislation:

"We said in that case [Magoun v. Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283 (18 Sup. Ct. 594)], that 'the State may distinguish, select, and classify objects of legislation, and necessarily this power must have a wide range of discretion.' And this because of the function of legislation and the purposes to which it is addressed. Classification for such purposes is not invalid, because not depending on scientific or marked differences in things or persons or in their relations."

In Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (8 Sup. Ct. 1161), sustaining an act depriving railroads of the fellow-servant's negligence defense, claimed to be unreasonable and capricious class legislation, the court said it was

"Simply a question of legislative discretion whether the same liabilities shall be applied to carriers by canal and stage coaches and to persons and corporations using steam in manufactories."

This law relates to the use of township highways, a matter of public interest, is both uniform and general

in its application to the class and localities upon which it operates, and we think by well-settled rules of construction its provisions were reasonably questions of legislative discretion not inhibited by any constitutional provision.

In support of plaintiff's contention that Act No. 71, Pub. Acts 1903, was repealed impliedly by Act No. 283, Pub. Acts 1909, it is urged that the latter is a general highway law enacted, as indicated by its title and contents, to cover the whole subject, re-enacting or embracing the substance of meritorious old laws, and otherwise repealing all former highway statutes; and certain provisions of that act not consistent with those of Act No. 71 indicate such intent as to it, particularly that portion of section 15, chapter 2, of the 1909 act, requiring that "all bridges shall * be capable of carrying a ten-ton moving load." This section deals with "all work hereafter done upon roads and bridges, except such work as may be required for repairs," etc., by adverb of futurity manifesting an intent that the act shall be operative on subsequent construction, and will not render unlawful that already done in harmony with then existing laws. Act No. 283, Pub. Acts 1909 (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 4287), is entitled:

*

"An act to revise, consolidate and add to the laws relating to the establishment, opening, improvement, maintenance and use of the public highways and private roads, the condemnation of property and gravel therefor," etc.

It ends with the familiar concluding clause:

"All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with or contravening the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."

It nowhere makes reference to Act No. 71, or the act of which it is an amendment. It makes no mention of and contains no provisions regulating "the use