which she had felt at the performance of good and bad music, and the nice discriminations she had made between chords and discords, had induced herself and others to suppose that she had the same perception of sounds in common with her more favored friends. Having been well educated, she had written about musical sounds, chords and discords, good and bad musical performances, as things of which she knew as much as othBut when hearing was restored to her, she asserted that she had never before had any thing like a true idea of sounds. She had had an idea of them, but not a true idea not a knowledge of them. Other similar instances are on record.

ers.

ONLY KNOWLEDGE OF SOUNDS BY THIS SENSE.

The only office which the ear can claim is that of being a vehicle of sounds. All other sensuous knowledge comes through one or more of the other senses. It would seem from this that the sense in question is not very important; and indeed it may better be dispensed with than some of the others. Still its office will not appear insignificant, if we consider the great number and variety of sounds of which the ear is the organ, and their vast importance to the improvement and happiness of mankind.

NUMBER AND VARIETY OF SOUNDS.

The following remarks are so much to my purpose, that I am induced to insert them at length: "The ear is capable of perceiving four or five hundred variations of tone in sound, and probably as many different degrees of strength; by combining these, we have above twenty thousand simple sounds, that differ either in tone or strength, supposing every one to be perfect. But it is to be observed, that, to make a perfect tone, a great many undulations of elastic air are required, which must all be of equal duration and extent, and follow one another

with perfect regularity; and each undulation must be made up of the advance and recoil of innumerable particles of elastic air, whose motions are all uniform in direction, force, and time. Hence we may easily conceive a prodigious variety on the same tone, arising from irregularities of it, occasioned by the constitution, figure, situation, or manner of striking the sonorous body; from the constitution of the elastic medium, or its being disturbed by other motions; and from the constitution of the ear itself upon which the impression is made.

"A flute, à violin, a hautboy, and a French horn may all sound the same tone, and be easily distinguishable. Nay, if twenty human voices sound the same note, and with equal strength, there will be some difference. The same voice, while it retains its proper distinctions, may yet be varied many ways by sickness or health, youth or age, leanness or fatness, good or bad humor. The same words spoken by foreigners and natives, nay, by persons of different provinces of the same nation, may be distinguished." *

A certain writer on ornithology speaks of a single bird that gives utterance to more than two hundred distinct modulations. Now, when we think of the myriad voices filling the air around us, each of which has its own peculiarities and its almost endless varieties of tone, all of which become such to the mind by the sense of hearing, the office of that sense appears no sinecure.

ENDLESS VARIETY OF HUMAN TONES.

Every human being has a tone peculiar to himself, as is evident by his being known by his voice. Even though he speak or sing on the same key with another, yet his voice is different. Now, if each individual of the eight hundred millions of human beings could only raise the eight notes, we should have sixty four hundred millions of tones, of all which the ear is competent to take

*Reid's Works, vol. i. p. 220.

*

cognizance. The varieties of sound in the human language, as read and spoken by mankind, baffle all enume

ration.

In some respects, the sense of hearing seems to bring us nearer the spirit world than either of the others. So refined and elevated are the charms of music, that divine inspiration has through it largely symbolized the enjoyments of the heavenly state.

* The terms sound, tone, modulation, are of course here used merely to indicate those atmospheric vibrations which, to those who have the sense of hearing, occasion or produce sound.

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER I.

What
What

What is the distinction between primary and acquired knowledge? How many kinds of primary knowledge? Define each. What is the origin of all our knowledge? Repeat the distinction between mere ideas and knowledge. What are entities? Illustrations. What are cognitions? To which do the senses pertain, the mind or the body? Name the senses, as usually classed. What senses are here added? What is said of objects being recognized by one or more senses? What is the first sense noticed? Its organ? Describe it. What is said of the frequent defectiveness and relative importance of this sense? What knowledge is obtained only by this sense? What is said of odors? Their varieties? Illustrations? Define the organ of Taste. What is necessary in order that the organ may act? provision for this purpose? What are the qualities of taste? knowledge is obtained only by taste? What is said on this point? What illustrations of terms having different meanings, as applied to smell or taste ? Is the sense of smell often wanting? What is mentioned as a striking instance of the Creator's care? What is said of the varieties of flavors? Of the competency of taste to recognize them? Illustrations? What is the organ of Hearing? Describe. What knowledge is wholly due to this sense? How is it shown that a knowledge of sounds cannot be obtained by the sense of touch? Objections to this view? How answered? What facts sustain it. How many offices does the ear perform? What is said of the number and variety of sounds? Of human tones? In what respect does the sense of hearing seem to bring us near the spirit world?

CHAPTER II.

IV. THE SENSE OF TOUCH.

THE organ of this sense is extended over the entire surface of the nervous system. In this respect, it differs from the senses hitherto noticed, whose organs are restricted to a small compass. It not only spreads over the outer surface of the body, but it is, to some extent, diffused over the internal cavities, particularly those of the mouth, ears, nostrils. But physiologists assign its most special seat to the hand, on account of the peculiar adaptation of its form, joints, flexibility, and delicate nerves to the purpose of touching. The fingers are by far the most discriminating and important organs of touch.

THIS SENSE NOT IDENTICAL WITH THAT OF

TEMPERATURE.

It seems to me that the philosophy of Reid and Brown, on this point, is incorrect.* They identify the sense of touch with that of temperature. Now, is there not as much difference between the touch and the temper-. ature of an apple, as between the taste and the temperature of it? We do not touch heat and cold. We touch bodies which have heat and cold; it is only the bodies that we touch; the heat and cold we feel. True, we feel when we touch; and so we feel when we taste.

But

*Reid's Works, vol. i. p. 226. Brown's Philosophy, vol. i. p. 212. Professor Upham copies from Reid, and adopts his error.

The way in

yet, feeling and tasting are not the same. which Reid came to make the mistake was probably this: When we touch a body, we not only have the sensation of touch, but also that of heat or cold, if the body is in a state to produce it. This led him to refer the latter sensation to touch, especially as in his analysis he had no other sense to which to refer it. Brown seems to have adopted Reid's analysis, without stopping to inquire whether it was correct.

We may with as much propriety speak of tasting heat as of touching it: our sense of temperature is as specific and marked as our sense of taste, and both are equally distinct from that of touch. The sensation of feeling is generic; it does not pertain exclusively to any one sense. We feel, when we taste, when we touch, when we smell, when we see. The sensation of feeling, like life itself, is all-pervading. It of course relates to touch, as well as to the other senses. But we may have the sensation of touch without that of temperature; so also we may have the sensation of temperature without that of touch. These are entirely distinct. I hence infer distinct senses.

RESISTANCE LEARNED BY TOUCH.

The first idea obtained by touch is that of resistance. We thus learn that there is really something without us. The eye could not of itself teach us this, since it is only as assured by the touch we can be certain that what

* Reid endeavors to clear his way by reference to primary and secondary qualities of matter. This distinction was first held by Democritus, Epicurus, and their followers. Aristotle, and all the pupils of the Peripatetic school, discarded it. It was again revived by Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke. The Bishop of Cloyne again abolished it. Reid called it again from its ashes, declaring that it had a foundation in the principles of our

nature.

The primary qualities of matter are such as are essential to its existence, such as extension, gravity, &c. The secondary qualities are accidental, such as temperature, taste, &c. It is merely the distinction between the essential and the accidental. But we have specific senses, to teach us the accidental as well as the essential properties of matter; for instance, those of taste and smell. Hence, to dispense with the sense of temperature because we feel when we touch, and because heat and cold are subjects of feeling, is unphilosophical.