give us, immediately, the idea of resistance, of solid, of body, we should never have the idea of space. Without doubt, the idea of body could never be found and completed in the mind, if we had not already there the idea of space; but still, the former idea springs up first in time; it precedes in some degree the idea of space, which immediately follows it."

The amount of it all is, that, while we arrive at the knowledge of body by the senses, we intuitively perceive that body cannot exist without space to exist in.

3. IDENTITY. Identity implies sameness of being. A man of fifty is the same being to-day that he was forty years ago. No man ever doubts this. The belief of identity is universal. It is more than belief; it is knowl edge. Whence the origin of this knowledge?

In the first place, it cannot evidently be given us directly by the senses. These furnish evidence of only present physical facts. Identity respects the past as well as present. Here, then, is work for memory. But memory alone cannot impart the knowledge of identity; it only recalls past experiences and events. It is not its office to decide whether it is the same being who experiences certain feelings to-day who experienced certain feelings ten years ago.

Nor, in the second place, can consciousness alone give us the knowledge in question. Consciousness is concerned only with present experiences. And yet, without memory and consciousness, there can be no knowledge of identity. Here Locke fails to discover his wonted clearness. "Since consciousness," he says, "always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i. e., the sameness of a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self, now, it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it that that action was done." †

*See Cousin's Psychology, by Dr. Henry, p. 95.

† Essay, vol. ii. chap. 27, p. 229, New York edition, 1818.

Here is a confounding of consciousness with identity. consciousness makes identity, then a man loses his identity, is no longer the same man, the moment he ceases to be conscious. Locke could not have meant to say this. If he meant to say that it is by consciousness and memory that we get our idea of identity, he still fails to reach the exact point. I may have been conscious of certain emotions ten years ago, and may to-day remember that I was then conscious of them; but then the question returns, How do I know that the SELF- -the I-is the same identical being that he was ten years ago? Am I conscious of it? But I can be conscious of only present experience. Do I remember it? But I remember only what is past. Here all must see that something more is wanting to give the knowledge in question.

I do not first remember certain experiences in past years, and hence infer my identity. So changed are my feelings, and so treacherous is my memory, that I might well distrust this evidence. The evidence of identity rests on no such precarious basis. The case rather stands thus: KNOWING myself to be the same being to-day that I have been from the first, whatever may have been the changes in my experience, and however treacherous my memory, of this I am certain, that the joys and sufferings which I experienced twenty or forty years ago, and those which I experience now, belong to one and the same being.

Thus, while the knowledge of our identity springs into the mind along with consciousness and memory, it comes not in the relation of a dependent effect, but of an absolute and irresistible intuition. There is no reasoning, inferring, judging in the premises; it is, from the first, knowledge. Ask the uneducated child how he knows that he is the same being to-day that he was last year, and he is wont to reply, Because I am; which with him means much the same as to say that he knows it by intuition.

With these specimens of intuitive facts and illustrations of the manner in which they are shown to be such, the reader may easily identify all others, Among these some would place infinity, eternity, unity, design, sub

stance, cause, &c. Such facts are not subjects of sense, neither can they be demonstrated by any mere reasoning process. But at certain periods of mental development they are intuitively perceived, and perceived at once as absolute facts, about which no question can be raised. The importance of not admitting as intuitive knowledge what is not strictly so, and of drawing the line distinctly between what are and what are not proper subjects of logical proof, cannot be too deeply impressed upon the mind.

QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER IX.

What is intuition? Remarks. What is said in the note? Why do we use the term intuition in this connection? What objections to suggestion? Remarks Suppose that a mere conjecture, doubt, query, be considered as knowledge, does the reader so consider it? What is here always meant by the term knowledge? What is said of intuition as to degrees of assurance? Is intuitive knowledge acquired? Remarks? Do intuitive truths admit of proof? What is said here? What is the nature of the teachings of intuition? Remarks ? What has philosophy to do with subjects of intuition? Remarks? What is said of mathematical axioms? Illustration? What are moral axioms? What is said of them? What distinction does Coleridge make? On how many subjects many men make themselves fools? Illustrations of this? State some of the moral axioms. Is the reader convinced of their being strictly intuitive truths? What is the custom of all effectual moral reasoners? What is the effect of mere attempts to prove them? What are metaphysical axioms? State some. What remarks are made respecting intuitive propositions? What is the apology for propositions involving intuitive truths, which are little else than truisms? Have any of the received axioms been debated? Give an instance. What is the reply? What is the first mentioned intuitive fact? Can existence be proved? Why not? What have some supposed? What have others said? Others still? What is said of space? What says Cousin of it? The amount of it all? What is identity? Remarks? Is the knowledge of it by the senses? Why not? By memory alone? Why not? By consciousnes alone? Views of Locke? Objections and remarks? What must all here see? How stands the case, then? Concluding remarks?

CHAPTER X.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE second source of our primary rational knowledge is consciousness. This is the power of knowing whatever is passing in one's mind. We can be strictly conscious of nothing else, unless it be our existence itself. The term implies knowing inwardly, and its etymology is expressive of the exact idea attached to it in mental philosophy. We cannot, therefore, be at the present time conscious of any thing past, of any thing future, nor of any thing pertaining to the material world; of any thing passing in the mind of another; of any thing above, beneath, around us.

Most philosophers suppose that we are not strictly conscious of our own existence; that this is a subject of intuition; that we can only be conscious of what is taking place within us. Our personal mental phenomena, not our personal being, are supposed to be the precise and only subjects of our consciousness.*

CONSCIOUSNESS REFERS TO ENTITIES.

All the proper subjects of consciousness are actual entities or realities; and when we become conscious of

*On this point the most accurate thinkers differ. Francis Bowen, author of the excellent work on Metaphysical and Ethical Science, supposes that we know our existence by consciousness. "This apperception, as Leibnitz calls it, or direct consciousness of self, seems to me an invariable concomitant of mental action." "Self is an indivisible unit-a monad, in technical phrase, endowed with intelligence and activity; and we are directly conscious of it in itself, and in its passing into thought and act, without

them, they become subjects of absolute knowledge. For instance, a state of mental anxiety is an entity, a fact; and a man's being conscious of it makes him know it as a fact. It does not remain to be proved; his consciousness of it is a proof of it, of the highest possible kind.

SUBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS SPECIFIED.

Let us here indicate some of the classes of mental phenomena which we know by consciousness.

1. ALL OUR INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS such as thinking, reasoning, comparing, judging, multiplying, dividing, reckoning, planning. It is not contended that men may not, through the power of habit, sometimes do these things without being conscious of them. It is simply maintained, that, whatever men directly know of them, they learn only by consciousness.

2. OUR MENTAL EMOTIONS. Among these are included emotions awakened by whatever is grand, awful, terrible, beautiful, ludicrous, disgusting, charming. We know ourselves to be subjects of such emotions only as we are conscious of experiencing them.

3. OUR SOCIAL AND MORAL AFFECTIONS. Our filial, fraternal, conjugal, paternal affections; our affections towards our fellow-beings in general, and towards God, are all made evident to us by personal consciousness.

4. OUR MORAL EMOTIONS. Emotions of gratitude towards man and towards God, in view of favors; emotions of fear, reverence, humility; emotions of anger, jealousy, envy; emotions of hatred and revenge.

5. OUR VOLITIONS AND PURPOSES. We know that we will, choose, purpose; that we designedly avoid this, and incline to that; that we have objects in view, and strive to obtain them; because we are conscious of so doing.

6. OUR PAINS AND PLEASURES. rience of suffering, anguish, joy, delight,

Whatever we expewhether we are

being compelled to infer its existence from these manifestations."- p. 55. Whether our existence be considered a subject of consciousness or intuition, or both, is not a very material point.