had not been able to find during the that his line was weak; that the divisions night of the 28th, dated at Manassas of Schurz and Steinwehr were much cut Junction, requesting that King's division up, and ought to be drawn back from the might not be taken from his command. I front. I informed General Sigel that immediately sent a joint order to Gen- this was utterly impossible, as there erals McDowell and Porter, directing were no troops to replace them, and that them, with their two corps, to march he must hold his ground; that I would with all speed toward Gainesville, on the not again push his troops into action, as direct road from Manassas Junction. the corps of Porter and McDowell were Sigel attacked the enemy about daylight moving forward from Manassas Junction, on the morning of the 29th, a mile or two on the road to Gainesville, and must very east of Groveton, where he was soon soon be in position to fall upon the enjoined by the divisions of Hooker and emy's right flank, and probably upon his Kearney. Jackson fell back several rear. I rode to the front of our line, and miles, but was so closely pressed by these inspected it from right to left, giving the forces that he was compelled to make a same information to Generals Heintzelstand, and to make the best defence pos- man and Reno. The troops were, acsible. He accordingly took up a position cordingly, suffered to rest in their posiwith his left in the neighborhood of Sud- tions, and to re-supply themselves with ley Springs, his right a little to the south ammunition. From twelve until four of Warrenton turnpike, and his line cov- o'clock very severe skirmishes occurred, ered by an old railroad-grade, which constantly, at various points on our line, leads from Gainesville in the direction and were brought on at every indication of Leesburg. His batteries, which were the enemy made of a disposition to renumerous, and some of them of heavy treat. About two o'clock in the aftercalibre, were posted between the ridges noon several pieces of artillery were disin the open ground on both sides of the charged on the extreme right of the eneWarrenton turnpike, while the mass of my's line, and I fully believed that Genhis troops were sheltered in dense woods erals Porter and McDowell had reached behind the railroad embankments. I ar- their positions and had become engaged rived on the field from Centreville about with the enemy. I did not hear more noon, and found the two armies confront- than three shots fired, and was at a loss ing each other, both considerably cut up to know what had become of those two by the sharp action in which they had corps, or what was delaying them, but I been engaged since daylight in the morn- received information shortly afterward ing. Heintzelman's corps occupied the that General McDowell was advancing to right of our line, in front or west of the join the main body by the Sudley Springs Sudley Springs road. General Sigel was road, and would probably be up with us on his left, with his line extended a short in two hours. At half-past four o'clock, distance south of the Warrenton turn- I sent a peremptory order to General pike; the division of General Schenck Porter to push forward at once into acoccupying the high ground to the left of tion on the enemy's right, and, if possithat road. The extreme left was occu-ble, to turn his rear, stating to him genpied by General Reynolds. General Reno's corps had reached the field, and the most of it had been pushed forward into action, leaving four regiments in reserve, and in rear of the centre of our line. Immediately after I reached the ground General Sigel reported to me erally, the condition of things on the field in front of me. About half-past five o'clock, when General Porter should have been coming into action in compliance with this order, I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to attack the enemy. The attack was made with great STRICTURES ON GENERAL PORTER. 545 fore he could have been, by any possi bility, sufficiently reinforced to have made an effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given General Porter an order toward the enemy, in a particular direction, to send him, in addition, specific orders to attack, it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action wherever he en gallantry, and the whole of the left of the enemy was doubled back towards its centre, and our own forces, after a sharp 'conflict of an hour and a half, occupied the field of battle, with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands. In this attack Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet-charge, breaking two of the enemy's lines and penetrating to the third before it could be checked. By this time General McDow-countered the enemy, when a furious batell had arrived on the field, and I pushed his corps immediately to the front, along the Warrenton turnpike, with orders to fall upon the enemy, who was retreating toward the pike from the direction of Sudley Springs. The attack along the turnpike was made by King's division at about sunset in the evening; but by that time the advance of the main body of the enemy, under Longstreet, had begun to reach the field, and King's division encountered a stubborn and determined resistance at a point about threefourths of a mile in front of our line of battle. "While this attack was going on, the forces under Heintzelman and Reno continued to push back the left of the enemy in the direction of Warrenton turnpike, so that about eight o'clock in the evening the greater portion of the field of battle was occupied by our army. Nothing was heard of General Porter up to that time, and his force took no part whatever in the action, but were suffered by him to lie idle on their arms, within sight and sound of the battle during the whole day. So far as I know he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders, or to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to eight o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jackson's force be tle with that enemy was raging during the whole day, in his immediate presence. I believe, in fact, I am positive, that at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet, and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character. Our losses during the 29th were very heavy, but no separate returns of killed and wounded for that day have been made to me. I believe, from all I could learn from corps commanders, and so reported, that our loss during that day was not less than six or eight thousand killed and wounded, and I think this estimate will be confirmed by the general reports, which cover the losses during the battles of the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th August, and the 1st of September. My estimate of the loss of the enemy, reported to the Department on the morning of the 30th, was based upon the statements made to me by Generals Hooker and Kearney, who had been over the whole field on the left. General Hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least two to one, and General Kearney as at least three to one of our own. "Every indication, during the night of the 29th, and up to ten o'clock on the morning of the 30th, pointed to the retreat of the enemy from our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken on the evening of the 29th, and who came into our lines on the morning of the 30th, reported the enemy retreating during the whole night in the direction of and along the Warrenton turnpike. Generals McDowell and Heintzelman, who reconnoitred the positions held by the enemy's left on the evening of the 29th, confirmed this statement. They reported to me that the positions occupied by the enemy's left had been evacuated, and that there was every indication that he was retreating in the direction of Gainesville. On the morning of the 30th, as may be supposed, our troops, who had been so continually marching and fighting for so many days, were in a state of great exhaustion. They had had little to eat for two days previous, and artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and saddled continuously for ten days, and had had no forage for two days previous. It may easily be imagined how little these troops, after such severe labors, and after undergoing such hardship and privation, were in condition for active and efficient service. I had telegraphed to the General-in-Chief, on the 28th, our condition, and had begged of him to have rations and forage sent forward to us from Alexandria with all dispatch. I informed him of the imminent need of cavalry horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the army to perform any service whatever. About daylight of the 30th, I received a note from General Franklin, written by direction of General McClellan, and dated at eight o'clock P. M., on the 29th, informing me that rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons and cars at Alexandria, as soon as I would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. Such a letter, when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have had provisions, or have fallen back in the direction. of Washington. Nor do I yet see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged; but I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the desperate condition of my command, from great fatigue, from want of provisions and forage, and from the small hope that I had of any effective assistance from Alexandria, to hold my position at all hazards and under all privations, unless overwhelmed by the superior forces of the enemy. I had received no sort of information of any troops coming forward to my assistance since the 24th, and did not expect, on the morning of the 30th, that any assistance would reach me from the direction of Washington; but I determined again to give battle to the enemy on the 30th, and, at least, to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay, as long as practicable, any further advance toward the capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the engagement. At that time, my effective forces, greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing, and brokendown men, during the severe operations of two or three days and nights previous; the sharp actions of Hooker, King and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 29th, were estimated by me and others as follows: McDowell's corps, including Reynolds' division, 12,000 men; Sigel's corps, 7,000; Reno's corps, 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, 7,000; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at men. about 12,000 men, including the brigade was begun by Heintzelman and Reno on of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis' the right, it became apparent that the division, and the only portion that ever enemy was massing his troops as fast as joined me. But, of this force, the bri- they arrived on the field, on his right, gades of Piatt and of Griffin, numbering, and was moving forward from that direcas I understood, about five thousand men, tion to turn our left; at which point it had been suffered to march off at day- was plain he intended to make the main light on the 30th to Centreville, and were attack. I accordingly directed General not available for operations on that day. McDowell to recall Ricketts' division imThis reduced Porter's effective force in mediately from our right, and post it on the field to about seven thousand men, the left of our line. The attack of Porter which gave me a total force of 40,000 was neither vigorous nor persistent, and Banks' corps, about 5,000 strong, his troops soon retired in considerable was at Bristow station, in charge of the confusion. As soon as they commenced railroad trains, and of a portion of the to fall back the enemy advanced to the wagon trains of the army, still at that assault, and our whole line, from right to place. Between twelve and two o'clock left, was soon furiously engaged. The in the day I advanced the corps of Por- main attack of the enemy was made upter, supported by King's division of Mc- on our left, but was met with stubborn Dowell's corps, to attack the enemy along resistance by the divisions of General the Warrenton turnpike; at the same Schenck, General Milroy, and General time I directed Heintzelman and Reno, Reynolds, who, shortly after the action on our right, to push forward to the left began, were reinforced on their left and and front toward Warrenton turnpike, rear by the whole of Ricketts' division. and attack the enemy's left, in flank, if The action raged furiously for several possible. For a short time, Ricketts' hours, the enemy bringing up his heavy division, of McDowell's corps, was placed reserves, and pouring mass after mass of in support of this movement on our right. his troops upon our left. So greatly su"It was necessary for me to act thus perior in number were his forces, that, promptly, and make the attack, as I had while overpowering us on our left, he was not the time, for want of provisions and able to assault us, also, with superior forage, to await an attack from the ene- forces on our right. Porter's forces were my, nor did I think it good to do so un- rallied and brought to a halt as they were der the circumstances. During the whole retiring to the rear. As soon as they night of the 29th, and the morning of the could be used, I pushed them forward to 30th, the advance of the main army, un- support our left, and they there rendered der Lee, was arriving on the field to re- distinguished service, especially the briinforce Jackson, so that by twelve or one gade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan. o'clock in the day, we were confronted Tower's brigade, of Ricketts' division, by forces greatly superior to our own; was pushed forward into action, in supand these forces were being every mo- port of Reynolds' division, and was led ment largely increased by fresh arrivals forward in person by General Tower of the enemy from the direction of Thor- with conspicuous skill and gallantry. The oughfare Gap. Every moment of delay conduct of that brigade, in plain view of increased the odds against us, and I there- all the forces on our left, was especially fore advanced to the attack as rapidly as distinguished, and drew forth hearty and I was able to bring my forces into action. enthusiastic cheers. The example of this Shortly after General Porter moved for- brigade was of great service, and infused ward to the attack by the Warrenton new spirit into all troops who witnessed turnpike, and the assault on the enemy their intrepid conduct. Reno's corps was rear. also withdrawn from its position on our tember 2d. Before leaving the field that right centre late in the afternoon, and night, I sent orders to General Banks, at thrown into action on our left, where it Bristow station, to destroy the railroad behaved with conspicuous gallantry. | trains, and such of the stores in them as Notwithstanding these great disadvan- he was unable to carry off, and join me tages, our troops held their ground with at Centreville. I had previously sent the utmost firmness and obstinacy. The him orders to throw into each wagon of losses on both sides were very heavy. the army trains as much as possible of By dark our left had been forced back the stores from the railroad cars, and to about a half or three-quarters of a mile, be sure and bring off with him from but still remained firm and unbroken, Warrenton Junction and Bristow station, and still covered the turnpike in our all the ammunition, and all the sick and wounded that could be transported, and for this purpose, if it were necessary, to throw out the personal baggage, tents, etc., from the regimental trains. At no time during August 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st, was the road between Bristow station and Centreville interrupted by the enemy. The whole of the trains of the army were on that road, in charge of General Banks, and covered and protected by his whole corps. If any of these wagons were lost, as I believe none were, it was wholly without necessity. I enter thus specifically into this matter, and submit the orders sent to General Banks, and his subsequent report to me, because no part of the misrepresentation of this campaign has been greater than the statement of our heavy loss of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted. will show conclusively that every arrangement was made, in the utmost detail, for the security of our trains and supplies, and I am quite convinced that General Banks is not the man to neglect the duty with which he was charged. "About six o'clock in the afternoon, I heard, accidentally, that Franklin's corps had arrived at a point about four miles east of Centreville, and twelve miles in our rear, and that it was only about eight thousand strong. The result of the battle of the 30th, the very heavy losses we had suffered, and the complete prostration of our troops from hunger and fatigue, made it plain to me that we were no longer able, in the face of such overwhelming odds, to maintain our position so far to the front; nor could we have been able to do so under any circumstances, suffering, as were the men and horses, from fatigue and hunger, and weakened by the heavy losses incident to the uncommon hardships which they had suffered. About eight o'clock at night, therefore, I sent written instructions to the commanders of corps to withdraw leisurely toward Centreville, and stated to them what route each should pursue, and where they should take post. General Reno was instructed, with his whole corps, to cover the movement of "I arrived at Centreville between nine the army toward Centreville. The with- and ten o'clock on the night of the 30th. drawal was made slowly, quietly, and in On the same night I sent orders to the good order, no pursuit whatever having corps commanders to report to me in been attempted by the enemy. A divi- person, as early after daylight as possible sion of infantry, with its batteries, was on the morning of the 31st, and on that posted to cover the crossing at Cub Run. morning the troops were directed to be The exact losses, in this battle, I am up- posted as follows: Porter was to occupy able to give, as the reports received the intrenchments on the north or right from the corps commanders only exhibit of Centreville; Franklin on his left, in the aggregate losses during the whole of the intrenchments; in rear of Centrethe operations from August 22d to Sep-ville, between Franklin and Porter, as a |