ers by the rebel authorities the condition of the apparel of the soldiers, just from an active campaign, can be easily imagined. Thousands are without pants or coats, and hundreds without even a pair of drawers to cover their nakedness.

To these men, as indeed to all prisoners, there is issued three-quarters of a pound of bread or meal, and one-eighth of a pound of meat per day. This is the entire ration, and upon it the prisoner must live or die. The meal is often unsifted and sour, and the meat such as in the North is consigned to the soapmaker. Such are the rations upon which Union soldiers are fed by the rebel authorities, and by which they are barely holding on to life. But to starvation and exposure, to sun and storm, add the sickness which prevails to a most alarming and terrible extent. On an average one hundred die daily. It is impossible that any Union soldier should know all the facts pertaining to this terrible mortality, as they are not paraded by the rebel authorities. Such statements as the following, made by -, speaks eloquent testimony. Said he:-"Of twelve of us who were captured, six died; four are in the hospital, and I never expect to see them again. There are but two of us left.' In 1862, at Montgomery, Alabama, under far more favorable circumstances, the prisoners being protected by sheds, from one hundred and fifty to two hundred were sick from diarrhoea and chills, out of seven hundred. The same percentage would give seven thousand sick at Andersonville. It needs no comment, no efforts at word painting, to make such a picture stand out boldly in most horrible colors.

Nor is this all. Among the ill-fated of the many who have suffered amputation in consequence of injuries received before capture, sent from rebel hospitals before their wounds were healed, there are eloquent witnesses of the barbarities of which they are victims. If to these facts are added this, that nothing more demoralizes soldiers and develops the evil passions of man than starvation, the terrible condition of Union prisoners at -Andersonville can be readily imagined. They are fast losing hope, and becoming utterly reckless of life. Numbers, crazed by their sufferings, wander about in a state of idiocy; others deliberately cross the "dead line," and are remorselessly shot down.

In behalf of these men we most earnestly appeal to the President of the United States. Few of them have been captured except in the front of battle, in the deadly encounter, and only when overpowered by numbers. They constitute as gallant a portion of our armies as carry our banners anywhere. If released, they would soon return to again do vigorous battle for our cause. We are told that the only obstacle in the way of exchange is the status of enlisted negroes captured from our armies, the United States claiming that the cartel covers all who serve under its flag, and the Confederate States refusing to consider the colored soldiers heretofore slaves as prison

ers of war.

We beg leave to suggest some facts bearing upon the question of exchange, which we would urge upon your consideration. Is it not consistent with the national honor, without waiving the claim that the negro soldiers shall be treated as prisoners of war,

to effect an exchange of the white soldiers? The two classes are treated differently by the enemy. The whites are confined in such prisons as Libby and Andersonville, starved and treated with a barbarism unknown to civilized nations. The blacks, on the contrary, are seldom imprisoned. They are distributed among the citizens, or employed on government works. Under these circumstances they receive enough to eat, and are worked no harder than they have been accustomed to be. They are neither starved nor killed off by the pestilence in the dungeons of Richmond and Charleston. It is true they are again made slaves, but their slavery is freedom and happiness compared with the cruel existence imposed upon our gallant men. They are not bereft of hope, as are the white soldiers, dying by piecemeal. Their chances of escape are tenfold greater than those of the white soldiers, and their condition, in all its lights, is tolerable in comparison with that of the prisoners of war now languishing in the dens and pens of secession.

While, therefore, believing the claims of our Government, in matters of exchange, to be just, we are profoundly impressed with the conviction that the circumstances of the two classes of soldiers are so widely different that the Government can honorably consent to an exchange, waiving for a time the established principle justly claimed to be applicable in the case. Let thirty-five thousand suffering, starving, and dying enlisted men aid this appeal. By prompt and decided action in their behalf thirty-five thousand heroes will be made happy. For the eighteen hundred commissioned officers now prisoners we urge nothing. Although desirous of returning to our duty, we can bear imprisonment with more fortitude if the enlisted men, whose sufferings we know to be intolerable, were restored to liberty and life.

The exposure to artillery fire of officers who were prisoners was resorted to on two or three occasions as acts of retaliation, but it quickly led to explanations, and no injuries were the result. Arrangements were made by each party, on the approach of winter, to furnish their soldiers with blankets and other absolute necessities. Articles for Federal prisoners were sent to City Point from the North, and distributed as directed by agents of the rebels to prisoners in their hands. At the same time a thousand bales of cotton were shipped from Mobile to New York and sold. With the money thus obtained, blankets and other necessaries were provided for the rebel prisoners in Federal prisons. A contribution was also made up in England, and sent over for Confederate prisoners; but permission to deliver it was refused.

In November an exchange was resumed beginning first with the invalids and the sick, and carried forward very rapidly, on the basis of man for man, and officer for officer.

THE severe weather of the winter months caused no cessation in army operations. Maj.Gen. Thomas, after pursuing the retreating forces of Gen. Hood from Tennessee, collected his troops at Eastport. Thence a considerable body of his men, consisting of the 23d corps under Gen. Schofield, were moved by railroad to the Atlantic coast and landed on the North Carolina shore. Another small portion was sent to Gen. Sherman at Savannah. To Gen. Thomas was now assigned the defence of that extended portion of the country from Atlanta north and westward, which belonged to the department under Gen. Sherman, when he commenced his march upon Savannah. The large garrisons which had been required at Memphis and other places on the Mississippi River, also in Tennessee and Kentucky, had been set free by his new position, and were able to join his forces. At the same time, the army of Gen. Hood had been fatally reduced. The situation of Eastport, on the Tennessee River, near the junction of the lines of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama, placed the northern portion of the two latter States at the mercy of Gen. Thomas.

On Jan. 16th, 1865, Gen. Croxton, with a division of the 16th corps and the 1st division of cavalry, reconnoitred from Eastport toward Corinth, passing through Iuka and Brownsville. It appeared that a small force of Gen. Hood's army held Corinth, while the main body was at Tupelo. Thirty-five of the enemy were.captured at the depot, and a hotel at Corinth burned. Deserters, averaging from thirty to fifty daily, were coming within Gen. Thomas's lines, from Hood's army. Subsequently a part of Gen. Hood's forces were marched by Land eastward across the State of Georgia, to assist in opposing Gen. Sherman. This movement left Gen. Thomas free in the latter part of February to cooperate with Gen. Canby against Mobile, and Southern Alabama, and Mississippi. Thus far the quiet of the Army of the Potomac, since its operations last described, had been undisturbed, except by those incidents usual to hostile armies when near each other. No important movement had been attempted. Under the call for troops in December, 1864, large numbers were going forward to fill its ranks. The withdrawal of a portion of the fleet and of the forces of the Army of the James for the second attack on Wilmington, tempted the enemy at Richmond to make a demonstration for the purpose of breaking the pontoon bridges over the James, and cutting the communication

between the Federal forces on the two banks. If successful, it was undoubtedly the purpose to follow it up by an attack on the forces on the north bank. A fleet, consisting of the Virginia, Fredericksburg, and Richmond, ironclads carrying four guns each, and the wooden vessels Drewry, Nansemond, and Hampton, with two guns each, the Buford, one gun, the steamer Torpedo, and three torpedo boats, left Richmond on Jan. 23d. About midnight, the fleet passed Fort Brady, and began to pass the obstructions. A fire was now opened by the fort, to which the enemy replied, dismounting a hundred pounder in the fort, and escaping beyond its range. The chain in front of the obstructions beyond the lower end of the Dutch Gap Canal was cut, and the Fredericksburg passed through. But the Richmond, Virginia, and Drewry, in attempting to follow, grounded. The Drewry could not be got off, and was abandoned as daylight appeared, and was blown up subsequently by a shell from the battery on shore. The report of the affair by the enemy is as follows:

The flagship of the expedition was the Virginia, commanded by Lieutenant Dunnington. The Richmond was commanded by Lieutenant Bell, who was First Lieutenant on the Alabama at the time of her fight with the Kearsarge. The Fredericksburg was commanded by Lieutenant Sheppard. The latter vessel, being of light draught, passed clean through the obstruction, but the others found a lower tier of obstructions deeply submerged, and which had not been moved by the freshet; the depth of water over them being impassable by vessels of their draught. The Virginia received a shot in the centre by a three hundred pounder Parrott shell, fired from a Yankee Monitor, being struck when trying to get off sunken obstructions in the river. The shot displaced a few of her bolts, and killed five of her crew. No other damage was done, but it was found that her engines were fouled, not in consequence of the shot, and that she was not in fighting order; in the mean time the fire of our vessels had completely silenced the Yankee shore batteries, and a number of shots is not known. In consequence of the condition of were exchanged with the monitor, with what effect the Virginia's engine, it was decided, on a consultation of the officers of the flotilla, to withdraw all ves sels, which was done without further casualty. It great extent on account of the enemy's picket fire, had been impossible to survey the channel to any and the submerged obstructions of the river were found to be more effectual than they were supposed to be.

This was followed by shelling between the hostile batteries on the river throughout the day, and during the night the fleet returned to Richmond.

On the night of Jan. 31st, marching orders

From Reams' station the cavalry_advanced in the direction of Dinwiddie Court House, and encountered at Rowanty Creek, a tributary of the Nottoway, a portion of Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and sheltered by breastworks on the opposite bank, but commanding the bridge. After a short skirmish the bridge and the works were carried with a loss of about twenty men, and the capture of twenty-two prisoners. In a few hours two bridges were built for the troops and trains to cross. Meanwhile a portion of the cavalry advanced to Dinwiddie Court House, and captured some empty wagons, a mail, &c. Scouting parties also advanced up the Boydton road, and captured a few wagons. At night the force returned to Rowanty Creek, where Gen. Gregg bivouacked.

were issued to the entire army at Petersburg, consisting of the 2d, 5th, 6th, and 9th corps. This was preparatory to another movement by the left, the plan of which was to throw a strong flanking column far beyond the right of the enemy's works, along Hatcher's Run, so that it might pass behind them and take them in reverse, and then, if possible, turn north and march upon the Southside Railroad. Meanwhile the rest of the army would form a connection between this corps on the left flank and press the enemy gradually back as far as possible toward the railroad. During the day and night following the issue of the orders, the usual preparations for a forward movement went on; troops and baggage were moved to the proper places, hospitals were cleared, the sick sent to City Point, and four days' rations distributed to the troops. Meanwhile a heavy fire was opened upon the enemy's lines at different points, to conceal the preparations on foot. This was kept up during portions of some nights in which the cars were kept incessantly running to mass troops and supplies on the right. The preparations for the movement were not completed until Sunday morning, the 5th. Gregg's division of cavalry had been ordered to move at 3 o'clock in the morning. The 5th corps, under General Warren, was to march at five, and the 2d corps under Gen. Humphreys, at six o'clock. The flanking column consisted of the 5th corps with Gregg's cavalry. The cavalry column moved down the Jerusalem plank road, and reached Reams' station soon after daybreak. The 5th corps moved along the Halifax road at 5 o'clock, with Gen. Ayres's division in advance, Gen. Griffin's next, and Gen. Crawford's in the rear. On the Vaughan road were the 2d and 3d divisions of the 2d corps, under Gen. Humphreys, who were expected to move directly upon the works at Hatcher's Run, while the 5th corps advanced around the right.

Meanwhile Gen. Humphreys, with the 2d and 3d divisions of the 2d corps continued his advance up the Vaughan road, encountering and driving in the enemy's pickets, and reaching the Run. The intrenchments of the enemy on the opposite bank were not very strongly manned, but the obstructions in the stream were such that the cavalry were driven back in an attempt to cross. The brigade of Gen. De Trobriand was then drawn up in line of battle, and the 99th Pennsylvania sent across in skirmish order, who carried the works at once with a small loss, and secured the fording of the stream. The enemy's small force were now driven back rapidly to the woods, and the brigade took a position on a hill beyond the ford, and throwing up intrenchments rendered itself secure. Previously, however, the 2d division, under Gen. Smyth, when within half a mile of the Run, turned off to the right on a path leading northeasterly toward Armstrong's mill and pond. After advancing three-fourths of a mile, the enemy were found in a strong position. Their pickets were driven in after a sharp encounter, and a line was formed connecting the left of the division with the right of the 3d,

which Gen. Mott commanded. Temporary earthworks were thrown up and preparations made to resist an attack. Some skirmishing ensued between the pickets until 2 o'clock P. M., when a heavy artillery fire commenced, and an attack from the Under enemy was apparent. cover of the artillery fire the enemy pressed through the difficult swamp, and rushed upon the rifle-pits, which now partly covered the right of Gen. Smyth's division. He was received with such a sharp fire as forced him to fall back to the woods. A second and third attempt was made to carry tho works, and turn the flank of Gen. Smyth, but each was repulsed. At dusk the fighting was over, and the lines re

mained secure. The loss of Gen. Smyth was about three hundred, and that of the enemy who made the attack somewhat larger.

During the night the 5th corps was brought into connection, on the left of the 2d corps, with the left of the 5th, covered by the cavalry of Gen. Gregg. The 6th and 9th corps were also so disposed as to render assistance to the 5th and 24. In the morning the position of the troops was strengthened by constant work until noon. At this time Gen. Crawford's division of the 5th corps was sent toward Dabney's mills, in order to reach the Boydton plank road. The country through which the route lay was covered with woods, swamps, and ravines, cutting it up in all directions. At the same time the enemy, believing the Federal force had recrossed Hatcher's Run and abandoned the advance, had sent out Gen. Pegram with his division. About two miles above the Vaughan road his skirmishers met those of Gen. Crawford, and after a sharp contest were forced back toward his original position. The division of Gen. Evans came to the assistance of Pegram, and the advance of Gen. Crawford was checked. The division of Gen. Ayres was now sent to support Gen. Crawford, and a brigade of Griffin's to support Gen. Gregg, who was on the left, and had been engaged for some time with Lee's cavalry, which pressed his rear heavily. During a lull which happened, his force threw up breast works. But toward evening they were attacked with great force by the enemy, and his pickets driven with his force into the works. The battle increased, and many of his officers were wounded. While this was taking place on the left of the Vaughan road, the infantry had again become furiously engaged on the right of the road by repeated attacks of the enemy along the line. Finally Gen. Gregg was driven out of his breastworks, and his line forced back to Hatcher's Run, where he soon found that a similar misfortune had happened to the infantry. It was not until the intrenched lines on the Vaughan road and Hatcher's Run, thrown up on the previous day, were reached, that the routed troops could be rallied. The enemy dashed forward with great elation, but were met by such a sharp fire from the intrenchments as caused them to fall back rapidly to the woods. Night put an end to the conflict. The following is a report by Gen. Lee of the operations of the day:

HEADQUARTERS Army Northern VIRGINIA, Feb. 6, 1865. General S. Cooper:

The enemy moved in strong force yesterday to Hatcher's Run. Part of his infantry, with Gregg's cavalry, crossed and proceeded on the Vaughan road, the infantry to Cattail Creek, the cavalry to Dinwiddie Court House, where the advance encountered a portion of our cavalry and retired.

In the afternoon parts of Hill's and Gordon's troops demonstrated against the enemy on the left of Hatcher's Run, near Armstrong's Mill. Finding him intrenched, they withdrew after dark. During the night the force that had advanced beyond the creek returned to it, and were reported to be recrossing.

This morning Pegram's division moved down to the right bank of the creek to reconnoitre, when it was vigorously attacked. The battle was obstinately contested several hours, but Gen. Pegram being killed while bravely encouraging his men, and Col Hoffman wounded, some confusion occurred, and the division was pressed back to its original position. Evans's division, ordered by Gen. Gordon to support Pegram's, charged the enemy and forced him back, but was in turn compelled to retire. Malone's division arriving, the enemy was driven rapidly to his defences on Hatcher's Run.

The Union loss during the day was estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 men. The loss of the enemy was estimated as exceeding 1,000 men, including Gen. J. Pegram and Col. Hoffman, as killed.

During the night the works were strengthened, and early in the morning of the 7th the enemy made a demonstration on the skirmish lines of the cavalry and infantry on the right and left of the Vaughan road, but were repulsed. At noon the division of Gen. Crawford was sent out to make a reconnoissance, supported on the left by the division of Gen. Wheaton. The pickets of the enemy were encountered after an advance of about half a mile, and driven back to their works higher up the run between Armstrong's and Burgess's mills, and about two miles beyond the latter. A sharp fire of musketry ensued; but as Gen. Crawford was not prepared to force the lines, he drew his men back again to Hatcher's Run. The fighting by this column was kept up until night. During the day, the cannonading between the lines had been constant. The next day, the 8th, was devoted to throwing up intrenchments, and strong defensive works soon indicated the points at which the permanent lines were to be located. The enemy made no attempts to force the new positions, but appeared satisfied to give up the lower part of the run if no attempt was made by the Union forces on the Boydton plank road. The result of the entire movement had been to gain an advanced position on the enemy's right, which was held firmly, by completing the lines to Hatcher's Run, and extending the City Point railroad thither. Affairs now continued quiet for some time. Artillery duels were frequent along the lines before Petersburg, but no important movement was made. Large numbers of deserters from the enemy were constantly. coming into the lines of Gen. Grant, often exceeding seventy a day for many days successively, and increasing to two hundred.

In the Shenandoah valley, small expeditions by one or the other party served to prevent a quiet state of affairs. Further west, the enemy captured Beverly on Jan. 11th. This was done by Gen. Rosser, who crossed the mountains, and early on the morning of Jan. 11th entered the place, making prisoners of four hundred of the garrison, consisting of seven hundred men, and dispersing the rest. They were asleep in their winter quarters, with no pickets out further than three hundred yards from their camp. A large amount of commissary and quartermasters' stores, with a great number of horses, were also taken. Again, on

the 21st of February, a body of the enemy's cavalry, under Lieut. McNeil, dashed into Cumberland before daylight, surprised and captured the pickets, and carried off Maj.-Gens. Kelly and Crook. They were quietly seized in their beds with their staff officers, and taken to Richmond, and subsequently exchanged.

The success which attended the march of Gen. Sherman through Georgia, both in disheartening the Southern people and in destroying the communications between different parts of the Confederacy, determined the nature of the approaching campaign. The field of decisive operations was now reduced to three States, and if South and North Carolina were overrun it would not only cut off the resources of Gen. Lee's army at Richmond, but also result in concentrating an overwhelming force against him. Both combatants therefore prepared to put forth their final efforts. At Richmond, Gen. Lee was appointed as General-in-Chief; Gen. Johnston was ordered to the command in South Carolina; Gen. Hood was supplanted by Gen. Taylor in Alabama and Mississippi; Gen. Breckinridge was brought into the Cabinet as Secretary of War, which had already undergone a change by the displacement of Mr. Memminger as Secretary of the Treasury, and the appointment of Mr. Trenholm of South Carolina. On the Federal side Gen. Schofield, with a strong force, was placed in command in North Carolina, to prepare the way for the approach of Gen. Sherman, and Gen. Gillmore relieved Gen. Foster in the Department of South Carolina.

Immediately after taking possession of Savannah, Gen. Sherman began his preparations for a march through the Carolinas to Richmond; meanwhile Gen. Hardee with his command occupied Charleston. The first movement of Gen. Sherman was to send a part of Gen. Logan's 15th corps and Gen. Blair's 17th corps, both belonging to Gen. Howard's wing of his army, by transports to Beaufort, near Hilton Head. The important bridge where the railroad from Savannah to Charleston crossed the Pocotaligo, was the object of this movement. This bridge, 49 miles from Savannah and 55 miles from Charleston, being with the trestle work in the swamp a mile in length, was so necessary to the communication between the two cities, that frequent attempts had been made by the Union commanders of the department to destroy it. The force of the enemy had always proved strong enough to defeat these efforts. On Jan. 13th the advance from Beaufort began. The division of Gen. Hatch had taken a position near the bridge, with their guns turned on the railroad, when the 17th corps crossing the ferry at Port Royal on a pontoon bridge moved rapidly but cautiously to the railroad. The pickets of the enemy were driven away without difficulty. On the 15th an advance was made, the 17th corps being on the left, and Gen. Hatch on the right, and the railroad gained a little south of the bridge.

The skirmishers pushed forward, encountering those of the enemy, who were supported by light artillery, and quickly drove them off, thus gaining the bridge. A brigade of the 17th followed, and carried it and the earth works at the further end. The enemy seeing they would lose possession of the bridge, attempted to burn it, but were defeated in their efforts by the rapid movements of the troops. The Federal loss was about fifty. The force of the enemy consisted of a detachment from Gen. Hardee's command, under Gen. McLaws. They were driven out, and the 17th corps occupied the railroad from Coosawatchie to the the Tallahatchie. A depot of supplies was established near the mouth of the creek, with easy water communication back to Hilton Head.

At the same time the left wing, under Maj.Gen. Slocum, and the cavalry, under Maj.-Gen. Kilpatrick, were ordered to rendezvous near Robertsville and Coosawatchie, with a depot of supplies at Pureysburg on Sister's ferry on the Savannah River. Gen. Slocum caused a good pontoon bridge to be constructed opposite Savannah, and the "Union causeway" leading through the low rice fields opposite the city was repaired and "corduroyed." But before the time appointed for him to march, the heavy rains of January had swelled the river, broken the pontoon bridge, and overflowed the whole bottom, so that the causeway was four feet under water, and Gen. Slocum was compelled to look higher up for a passage over the river. He moved up to Sister's ferry, but even there the river with its overflowed bottoms was nearly three miles wide. He did not succeed in getting his whole wing across until during the first week in February.

Meanwhile the division of Gen. Grover of the 19th corps had been sent by Gen. Grant to garrison Savannah, and on Jan. 18th Gen. Sherman transferred the forts and city of Savannah to Gen. Foster, still commanding the Department of the South, and instructed him to follow on the coast the movements of the army under Sherman inland, by occupying Charleston and such other points as would be of any military value. The plan of Gen. Sherman was to strike direct for Goldsboro' in North Carolina, and open communication with the sea by the Newbern Railroad. For this purpose he ordered Col. W. W. Wright, Superintendent of Military Railroads, to proceed in advance to Newbern and to be prepared to extend the railroad out from that city to Goldsboro by March 15th. At the same time Gen. Sherman ordered his chief quartermaster and commissary, Gens. Easton and Beckwith, to complete the supplies at Sister's ferry and Pocotaligo, and follow the movement coastwise, and be prepared to open communication with him from Morehead City about the same time. Having completed his preparations, Gen. Sherman issued the order to march on January 19th. He left Savannah on the 22d