times to enlarge, at other times to leffen; as when we fay, it is a greater chance if it doth happen, than if it doth not. At other times we feem to suppose chance to be an invariable expreffion of a degree of uncertainty. Thus it is five chances to one that the die falls lefs than fix, and an equal chance, or a chance of one to one, that a piece of coin falls head." The doctrine of chances has furnished a field of demonftrative ́ reasoning of great extent, although the events about which this reafoning is employed, be not certain but probable. In the mathematical reafonings about chances, the conclufion demonftrated, is not, that fuch an event shall happen, but that the probability of its happening bears fuch a ratio to the poffibility of its failing; and this conclufion is neceffary upon the fuppofitions on which it is grounded."

From the representation of contingence and chance, I think it is evident, that contingence has nothing to do with power, so far from it that it feems in its conception removed much farther from it than the mere negation or non-existence of power; and that chance in its best acceptation cannot otherwise be related to power than as it may respect an approach towards the existence of a degree of evidence respecting an uncertain

event.

SECTION

SECTION VI.

Objections and Replies.

IDO not know that any perfon will raise fuch objections to my thoughts on power as I am going to state but as I can conceive of none more likely to be raised by prejudiced people. who cannot pay due attention to any thing which jars with their former habits of thinking; I fhall propose them and reply.

First Objection. An objector ftates thus, I have hitherto judged power to be a quality, and confiftent therewith alfo confidered the fubject of this quality to be a cause, and that this is the true notion of caufe: confequently if I have been right you are wrong. Suffer me to endeavour a reply.

That power may exift without the exiftence of fubftantial being is admitted to be a wrong conception, yet I do not judge power to be a quality. I judge power, confidered as a subject of ontology, to be an affection of being, and therein to agree with duration and immenfity, cause and effect but cannot admit power, or either of the others, to be a quality of being. All qualities are affections of being, but all affections of being

are

are not qualities. Power is not, in my apprehenfion, a quality of any individual being, no not of God himself, notwithstanding, he is the only being to whom, with philofophical precifion, power can be attributed.

Any quality, and every quality of any and every individual being involves dependence on power in respect of its exiftence, enduring, and continuance: But those qualities, or any of them, are not the power on which they effentially depend. Any and every quality we intuitively judge to depend for existence, abiding, and enduring, on power, and with equal evidence, judge they cannot be the thing which their existence, abiding, and enduring effentially involve, as an object of dependence. Every attribute of the bleffed God, power excepted, involves power respecting exiftence, enduring, and continuance : but these other attributes are not his power.

Again, Every good quality immediately depends on power for its exiftence: but power does not immediately depend on power, but on ability, capacity, and fuitable circumstances, and but remotely on the power on which the ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances depend.

the

Again, Examine a quality in respect of producing a valuable change. A quality may abide and endure; but although it abide and endure to eternity, it produces no valuable change. Operation and influence are effential to a valuable

change.

change. No quality is effentially connected with immediate operation: but power is effentially connected with immediate operation: therefore no quality is power. Power is effentially connected with actual influence; but no quality is effentially connected with actual influence, therefore no quality is power.

The objector seems to owe this opinion to his confounding power with active property, which is a quality. I grant that he has undoubted right to call active property, power, if he pleases; but if he gives it the attributes of power, his notion is but a chimera, and its promulgation confufing to other people: he may alfo call the fubject of active property a cause; but if he gives it the attributes of cause, I think him highly cenfurable.

This notion of power feems that of children and favages, but, I think, is not the general notion of those who are much exercised in think. ing. We contemplate immenfity or infinite space, and know that it actually exists. We contemplate infinite duration and know that it exists, that eternity paft has been, and that eternity to come must be. We reflect on this knowledge in us, and enquire for the reafons of it, and know that it does not depend on immenfity nor eternity, but on a third object which we call operation. On ftarting the thought, we know that the origin, and the enduring, of every actually existing valuable,

valuable, but finite, thing effentially depends on operation of fome other thing, or of the thing itfelf; and can demonstrate that the operation of a being cannot be effential to its own origin, although it may be to its enduring. Pursuing it further, we ask, What is the reason of operation? And we find this operation is the effential refult of a fourth thing, which, found or not found, we agree to call power. We look about and enquire for power in the object that operates, and find active property. Some I find rest here, and confider active property and power to be the fame thing. The more difcerning who rest here, have invented various fubftitutes, like the cycles and epicycles of Ptolemy, to help their hypothefis, fuch as contingence and allodial liberty, which their inferiors readily lay hold of. Some other philofophers do not rest here, but pursue the enquiry, and find, that in order to the operation of the fubject of active property, there muft be a related paffive property in some other being on which it operates, or that no operation will ever take place. If the enquirer refts here, he will conceive of power, whatever it be, as coexifling with active property and related passive property, or perhaps, go into the erroneous notion of active and paffive power. But if the discovery is purfued, we find that fuitable circumftances of the two fubjects of properties must also exist before operation can exift. Ar