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Miller, First Cavalry, reached me with the howitzers, a well-selected and very efficient gun-detachment were handling them to the infinite delight of the volunteers. They would not have remained a day longer than January 6, had it not have been certain that the guns were coming. Now our artillery pack train and howitzer details are admirably drilled, we leave for Captain Jack's Gibralter to-morrow morning, and a more enthusiastic, jolly set of regulars and volunteers I never had the pleasure to command.

If the Modocs will only try to make good their boast to whip a thousand soldiers, all will be satisfied. We leave our horses here under guard. They would be a constant source of anxiety in the lava-beds, and might be difficult to manage. Our scouts and friendly Indians in sist that the Modocs will fight us desperately, but I don't understand how they can think of attempting any serious resistance, though, of course, we are prepared for their fight or flight. Ranchmen, far and near, have been notified, aud the volunteers will probably muster one hundred and fifty all told. Lieutenant Ross arrived to-day with nineteen men. The infantry battalion will muster ninety-five muskets, including seventeen of F Company, from Klamath. Bernard will take one hundred men into the lava to-morrow from the east side. Perry, here, will take in forty-five men with Spencer carbines. During our tedious delays, the entire force has been constantly drilled, and practiced at targets, and they needed it.

No effort on our part can prevent the Modocs from crawling out and scattering; we will do all we can to prevent it, and are to hunt and pursue them. I hope in forty-eight hours to be able to send you satisfactory information.

From Portland and Jacksonville we hear frightful rumors of Modoc depredations. No one hears such reports in the section that will really be menaced if the Modocs should scatter.

I will keep you constantly advised, and write by regular mails, and every other opportunity.

Inclosed please find a copy of the order under which we move to-mor row. I would not have gone into details so fully, but Green asked me te place and arrange the movements. All works well. The regulars and volunteers harmonize wonderfully.

I am, general, your obedient,

Maj. Gen. E. R. S. CANBY,

FRANK WHEATON,

C. 8. A.

Commanding Department, &c., Portland, Oreg.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE LAKES

AND OF THE TROOPS OPERATING IN THE MODOC COUNTRY, Camp near Van Bremer's, California, January 19, 1873. GENERAL: We attacked the Modocs on the 17th with about four hun dred good men, two hundred and twenty-five of them regulars. We fought the Indians through the lava-beds to their stronghold, which is in the center of miles of rocky fissures, caves, crevices, gorges, and ravines, some of them one hundred feet deep. In the opinion of any experienced other of regulars or volunteers, one thousand men would be required to dislodge them from their almost impregnable position, and it must be done dela erately, with a free use of mortar batteries. The Modocs were scarcely

exposed at all to our persistent attacks; they left one ledge to gain another equally secure. One of our men was wounded twice during the day, but he did not see an Indian at all, though we were under fire from 8 a. m. until dark.

No troops could have fought better than all did in the attack, advancing promptly and cheerfully against an unseen enemy, over the roughest rock-country imaginable. It was utterly impossible to accomplish more than to make a forced reconnaissance developing the Modoc strength and position. It is estimated that one hundred and fifty Indians opposed us. The Pitt River Indians are believed to be

with them.

The troops have been withdrawn to their camps. The volunteers will probably go out of service very soon. We will use our force to endeavor to cut off raiding Modocs and operate against them in every way possible until re-enforcements arrive. Our loss in killed and wounded is about forty, among them two officers, Bvt. Col. David Perry, Troop F, First Cavalry, painfully wounded in left shoulder; Lieut. John G. Kyle, First Cavalry, Troop G, wounded in left arm, not seriously.

Please send me three hundred foot-troops at the earliest date. If they come from San Francisco, they can reach me, via Shasta Valley, at any time; the road is always open.

We are indebted to Gen. John E. Ross for the gallant co-operation of the Oregon volunteers. Capt. J. A. Fairchild brought twenty-eight brave California volunteer riflemen, who joined us in time to participate in the attack. I am obliged to move this temporary depot back to a more central location on Lost River.

Can the governor of California send volunteers to protect the threatened portion of his State, which is open to Modoc raids?

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK WHEATON,

Bvt. Maj. Gen. U. S. A., Lieut. Col. Twenty-first Infantry,
Commanding District of the Lakes.

Gen. E. R. S. CANBY,

Commanding Department of the Columbia, Portland, Oreg.

[ Indorsements, covering Colonel Wheaton's two reports.] HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC,

San Francisco, California, January 30, 1873. Respectfully transmitted to the Assistant Adjutant-General Headquarters of the Army, for the information of the General of the Army. ED. R. S. CANBY,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., February 8, 1873.

Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War.

W. T. SHERMAN,

General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, February 17, 1873.

SIR: I have the honor here with to transmit, for your information, copy of a letter from Lieut. Col. Frank Wheaton, Twenty-first Infantry, of the 15th ultimo, reporting the efficiency and readiness of his com

mand for an attack upon the stronghold of the Modoc Indians, and of another dated the 19th ultimo, reporting an attack on the same on the 17th.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. W. BELKNAP,

Secretary of War,

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

CAMP WARNER, OREGON,

May 5, 1873.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit herewith copies of reports forwarded by me to Gen. E. R. S. Canby, commanding Department of the Columbia, of operations in the lava-beds in January last, and ot the battle of the Modoc Caves fought January 17th, 1873, by troops op erating under my direction.

I also have the honor to submit a certified copy of a letter addressed to General Canby by his excellency the governor of Oregon, in which reference is made to my conduct of operations in the Modoc country and the Lake Basin.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
FRANK WHEATON,

Brt. Maj. Gen. U. S. A., Lieut. Col. Twenty-first Infantry.

Gen. E. D. TOWNSEND,

Adjutant-General U. S. A., War Department, Washington, D. C.

[Inclosures.]

STATE OF OREGON, EXECUTIVE OFFICE.
Salem, February 6, 1-73

MY DEAR SIR: Allow me to make you acquainted with Gen. John F. Miller. General Miller was with Lieutenant-Colonel Wheaton during the late attack upon the Modocs, and I desire that he may make some representations to you, touching the diżculties of their position and the services of Colonel Wheaton.

From reports to me of volunteer officers and of reliable citizens, I have become fn `v impressed with the opinion that Colonel Wheaton, since he took the field in the Lake Basin, has so conducted his command as to accomplish all that any officer could have accomplished in his place.

It is but justice to Colonel Wheaton to say that he has the confidence of the offy*** and men of the Oregon volunteers who lately served under him, and of the settlers whose families are most exposed to Indian hostilities on our southern frontier. Asto his mode of attack on the 17th ultimo, I am able to say that it was approved by al of our most experienced frontiermen who were present. And it is their opinion that the incident of fog during the most of the day was not an unfavorable circumstance It answered the conditions of a night attack with the benefits of daylight; nearly al losses in killed and wounded occurred after the fog cleared up.

Please permit these suggestions as an indication of my desire to express my appre ciation of the services of Colonel Wheaton, and of my confidence in his skill as an officer.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

Geu. E. R. S. CANBY.

L. F. GROVER.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE LAKES AND OF
TROOPS OPERATING IN THE MODOC COUNTRY,
CAMP ON LOST RIVER FORD,
Jackson, Oreg., February 7, 1978

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward the accompanying report of Brt. Col. and Maj. John Green, First Cavalry, commanding the Modoc expedition and the troops

engaged in the battle of the Modoc Caves, January 17, 1873, and with it the report of Bvt. Col. and Maj. Edwin C. Mason, Twenty-first Infantry, commanding a battalion of two companies Twenty-first Infantry, and also the report of Bvt. Col. and Capt. R. F. Bernard, First Cavalry, who, in the operations in the lava-beds south of Tule Lake, Cal., and in the battle of the Modoc Caves of January 17, 1873, commanded the troops operating east of the Modoc position, viz: Two troops of cavalry and twenty enlisted Klamath Indian scouts.

On the 12th of January, immediately after the arrival of the mountain-howitzer section that had been forwarded from Vancouver arsenal, the order for the movement of the troops to attack the Modoc position was issued as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE LAKES AND
TROOPS OPERATING IN THE MODOC COUNTRY,
CAMP NEAR VAN BREMER'S RANCH, CAL.,
January 12, 1873.

[General field-order, No. 3.]

I. The troops will move from their present camp east and west of the lava-beds on Thursday the 16th of January, 1873, and take positions for the attack on the Modoc camp at suurise on the following morning.

II. At 4 a. m. on Thursday next, Maj. John Green will detach Captain Perry's Troop F, First Cavalry and order it to clear the bluff southwest of Tule Lake of Îndian pickets and scouts, and cover the movement of the main force to a camp some three miles west of the Modoc position.

III. Maj. E. C. Mason's Battalion Twenty-first Infantry, (2 companies,) C, commanded by Capt. F. H. Burton, and B, commanded by Second Lieut. H. D. Moore, and a detachment of twenty men of F Company, under First Sergt. John McNamara.

Gen. John J. Ross, Oregon volunteer militia, A, Capt. Hugh Kelly's, and B, Capt. O. C. Applegate's and Lieut. W. H. Miller's Battery or section of mountain-howitzers will march from Van Bremer's ranch to camp on the bluff west of Tule Lake, in time to reach the designated camp not later than 3 p. m. on the 16th instant.

The camp will be so located and arranged as to be secure from observation by the Modocs, and every precaution taken to prevent the Indians from discovering our numbers and precise location.

IV. District headquarters will accompany the troops.

V. Early on the 17th of January the troops above-named will move into the lavabeds to attack the Modoc camp, and in the following order: Maj. E. C. Mason's Battalion Twenty-first Infantry leading, followed by Gen. John E. Ross's Oregon militia, the section of mountain-howitzers packed.

Capt. D. Perry's Troop F, First Cavalry, will follow the howitzer battery.

VI. When the troops have reached a position near the Modoc camp the main force will be deployed on the right of the infantry battalion in close skirmish order, and a left half-wheel of the whole line will be executed in order to enclose the southern side of the Modoc position, and connect the right of the main force with the left of Captain Bernard's troops, who are simultaneously to attack on the east.

VII. All the troops operating against the Modocs are to move from their camps with three days cooked rations, in haversacks, two blankets, one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person, and fifty rounds in close reserve. Canteens will be filled at Little Klamath Lake by the troops moving from Van Bremer's ranch, and care taken to water every horse and pack-mule at that point, as there is no water on the bluff where the main force will encamp on the night of the 16th instant.

VIII. Maj. John Green, First Cavalry, is charged with the execution of the move

ments and the details of the attack.

IX. Lient. W. H. Miller, First Cavalry, commanding the howitzer battery, will report to Major Green for orders and instructions as to when and where to prepare his guns for action in the proposed attack.

X. The troops on the east side of the lava-beds, at Land's ranch, G, Capt. R. F. Bernard's, and B, Capt. James Jackson's, First Cavalry, and the Klamath Indian scouts, under Dave Hill, will move from camp on the 16th instant to a point not more than two miles from the Modoc position. At sunrise on the 17th this force will attack the Modoc camp, with their right resting on or near Tule Lake, and, when sufficiently near to render the movement advisable, a right half-wheel will be executed, in order to connect the left of this force with the troops attacking from the west. In his advance Captain Bernard will take steps to capture any canoes the Modocs may have near their camp, or at least use every effort to prevent the Indians from escaping by water. Capt. R. F. Bernard, First Cavalry, will execute these movements under such detailed instructions as he may receive from Maj. John Green, First Cavalry.

XI. After the first three shots have been fired from the howitzer battery, as a signal to the troops attacking on the east side of the Modoc camp, firing will cease for fifteen

minutes, and an Indian scout directed to notify the nearest Modocs that ten minutes will be allowed them to permit their women and children to come into our lines. Any proposition by the Modocs to surrender will be referred at once to the district commander, who will be present.

XII. Lieut. W. H. Bayle, Twenty-first Infantry, acting field-quartermaster and commissary subsistence, and a guard of ten men, will remain at this camp in charge of the temporary field-depot until further orders.

XIII. Lieut. John Q. Adams, First Cavalry, A. A. G. District of the Lakes, and commanding detachment of H Troop, First Cavalry, will furnish from his command such details as may be required for the howitzer battery, and accompany the district commander. Lieutenant Adams will be prepared to communicate, by signals, with the sergeant who has been detailed for signal-duty with the troops operating on the east side of the Modoc position.

XIV. Asst. Surg. Henry McElderry, U. S. A., will give the necessary directions and instructions to the medical officer with the different commands and detachments in the field. By order of

FRANK WHEATON,

Brt. Maj. Gen., U. S. A., Lieut. Col. Twenty-first Infantry,
Commanding District of the Lakes.
JOHN Q. ADAMS,

First Lieut. First Cavalry, A. A. 4. G.

The troops moved from their respective camps east and west of the lava-beds promptly as ordered, and at 1 p. m. on the 17th, after skirmishing with and fighting the Modocs over rocky ridges and a very difficult country, reached a position about three hundred yards from the Modoc stronghold, or Captain Jack's camp.

This position was on an almost inaccessible ridge, flanked on the east and west by ravines and gorges, and in the midst of a mass of boulders and irregular fissures, rocky elevations and depressions, evidently the result of a volcanic upheaval that had rest and torn a belt of country ranging in width north and south from five to eight miles and in length from sixteen to twenty-two miles, and reported by surveyors who had partially explored it to cover about one hundred square miles of country, lying be tween Tule Lake on the north and the snow mountains on the south.

Though this extraordinary region had been described as being very broken and difficult to operate in by the few white men who had passed over the narrow trail leading from the precipitous bluffs three miles west of the Modoc stronghold to the vicinity of Land's ranch east of it, a distance of sixteen miles, their descriptions had failed te convey an adequate idea of the strength of the enemy's camp, or the difficulties to be overcome in attacking it.

At 14 p. m. Major Green informed me that unexpected obstacles on the right of our west line had been encountered, and that this portion of his command rested near a deep gorge occupied by the enemy, that could not be flanked or carried without at immense sacrifice, and that up to this late hour in the day, though Bernard had eve dently been warmly engaged on the east side since 8 a. m., his bullets frequently passing over us, there seemed little or no hope that we could connect the right of er west with the left of our east line, thus enveloping the enemy, as had been intended by investing the east, south, and west points of his position.

I moved with Major Green to the right of our west line, and, after consulting with senior officers and learning the nature of the obstacles encountered, authorized a change in the original plan. Major Green suggesting that as we could not without a larger force connect our lines south of the Modoc stronghold, we would possibly et counter fewer obstacles by moving our west line by the left near the lake shore, north of the Modocs, and thus connecting with the right of Bernard's force, assault the enemy's position from the north or lake side.

This movement was gallantly made, the enemy desperately contesting every inch of ground and fighting behind their natural fortifications, firing only through cracks and crevices in the rocks as our troops crawled toward them, exposing nothing but a pož of smoke for our men to fire at, and picking off our most advanced with deadly aim.” It was found impossible with the force engaged to carry the enemy's position by direct attack unless more artillery was employed, and at 5 p. m. it was determined to withdraw the troops to their camps, send for more men and guns, and renew the attack as soon as they should arrive.

The invariable fog that almost daily overhangs all, or a large portion, of the lavabeds at this season of the year was, during the morning of the 17th, and until 2 p. 2. unusually dense. It had been generally remarked, after weeks of observation, that though this region, and often half the lake, was enveloped in fog long after sunres. and frequently until noon, it was ordinarily clear before 2 p. m. At this hour, during the fight, fearing that the continued fog might add to the difficulties Major Green Woul. encounter in the proposed attack from the lake side, I authorized him to withdraw the troops until the fog lifted, unless he felt confident the proposed attack would succeed.

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