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the fallacy that the soil, rain, air and sunshine make the Wheatstalk and its ear of corn, because they are the conditions under which alone the seed can develope itself;' and Biog. Lit. i. 94: 'The first book of Locke's Essays . involves the old mistake

of " cum hoc; ergo propter hoc".

17. Leibnitz Lex Continui. This law, 'la loi de la continuité' ('Natura non agit saltatim') is first laid down by Leibnitz in his Lettre à M. Bayle sur un Principe Général, &c. (Opera, ed. Erdmann, i. 104; ref. Biog. Lit. 1874).

29. let a man watch his mind while he is composing: cp. 'On Thinking and Reflection' (Miscellanies, p. 252): 'Who has not tried to get hold of some half-remembered name, mislaid as it were in the memory, and yet felt to be there?' and the opening paragraph of the 'Essay on Beauty' (Biog. Lit. ii. 250). What Coleridge here calls the passive faculty would in modern phraseology be termed the 'sub-conscious mind'.

PAGE 86 1. 8. an intermediate faculty, &c. Cp. Kant's definition of the 'productive imagination' (Kritik der r. Vernunft; Werke, ed. Hartenstein, iii. 126), and Schelling, Werke, I. i. 357.

9. In philosophical language, &c. This parenthesis seems out of place here, forestalling, as it does, the promised deduction of chapter xiii.

18. Nothing... can be more easy, &c. Coleridge's argument in this paragraph may perhaps be more briefly restated thus:-if any impression A recalls any other impression B, our consciousness of A is, necessarily, inseparable from our consciousness of B: that is, the act of association is one; but it does not, therefore, follow that originally the two impressions were co-temporaneous, or that only those impressions, which originally occurred in one moment of time, can recall each other.

PAGE 87 1. 5. The act of consciousness is indeed, &c. Cf. A. P. 1803 (p. 57): Free unresisted action, the going forth of the soul, life without consciousness, is, properly, infinite, that is, unlimited. For whatever resists limits, and whatever is unresisted is unlimited. This, psychologically speaking, is space, while the sense of resistance or limitation is time, and motion is a synthesis of the two.'

24. a debasement of the fancy. Cp. Coleridge's definition of fancy given to Crabb Robinson (Diary, &c., Nov. 15, 1810): Fancy is the arbitrary bringing together of things which lie remote, and forming them into a unity.' A system of training which relies upon such arbitrary and artificial associations cannot (such appears to be Coleridge's meaning) ensure an objectively true representation of things. It encourages fanciful connexions.

F. N. intensify. Coleridge, it seems, may fairly lay claim to the origination of this term: and usage has justified his choice.

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE 88 1. 8. Des Cartes was the first philosopher. See the Principia, ii, §1; and Cousin's introduction to his edition of Descartes, p. 26; Mahaffy's Descartes (Blackwood), pp. 156-7.

14. has been long exploded. Leibnitz (Lettre sur la question, &c.; Euvres, Erdmann, i. 113) defined matter as possessing not only mobility (the capacity of movement), but also resistance (which includes impenetrability and inertia). See Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 131. Sara Coleridge (ib.) compares this passage with Schelling, Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (Werke, I. i. 343; see especially pp. 375 foll.); and the System des transcendentalen Idealismus (ib. I. iii. 406-7).

PAGE 89 1. 5. Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre-established harmony. See Leibnitz's works passim; but esp. the Troisième Éclaircissement du nouveau Système, where occurs the famous comparison of the body and soul to two watches, which keep perfect time with each other. The conception of a pre-established harmony Leibnitz claimed as his own: and he here demonstrates its superiority over the rival theories of mutual influence and of occasionalism. (See also Sur le principe de la Vie, Théodicée, § 61.) But the idea had already occurred to Descartes' disciple Geulinx, who wavered between the theories of pre-established harmony and of occasionalism, and who, I believe, was the first to use the illustration of the two watches (or clocks).

6. which he certainly borrowed from Spinoza. Spinoza nowhere clearly formulates this doctrine. Even the principle of the parallelism of mind, as thought, and body, as extension, he seems to deny almost as frequently as he admits it. See Dr. Martineau's Study of Spinoza, pp. 135, 182, 239, 287.

7. Des Cartes's animal machines. In order to substantiate his distinction of soul and body, Descartes maintained that all the vital or bodily functions were purely mechanical, the result of heat and motion. 'I desire you to notice,' he writes (Tract on Man, concluding summary), 'that these functions follow quite naturally in the (animal) machine from the arrangement of its organs, exactly as those of a clock, or other automaton, from that of its weights and wheels; so that we must not conceive or explain them by any other vegetive or sensitive soul,' &c. It is doubtful, however, whether this doctrine furnished any hints to Spinoza. The animal spirits, it is true, he accepts from Descartes; but this hypothesis, so far from assisting the theory of parallelism, really assumes an interaction between body and mind. (Descartes, Passions, i, §§7-16; Mahaffy, ib. pp. 175–7; Martineau, ib. pp. 182–3; Kuno Fischer, ib. p. 415.)

12. Wolf, the admirer and illustrious systematizer. Christian

Wolf (1679-1754), founder of the German rationalistic school of philosophy. Although he owed much to Leibnitz, Wolf had not sufficient imagination to penetrate to the true meaning of his theories; and his own system is at once more and less than an exposition of that of Leibnitz.

16. The hypothesis of Hylozoism. Cp. A. P. (1800?), p. 14: 'Materialists, unwilling to admit the mysterious element of our nature, make it all mysterious-nothing mysterious in nerves, eyes, &c., but that nerves think, &c.! Stir up the sediment into the transparent water, and so make all opaque !'

29. But it is not either the nature, &c. In the following paragraph (as is pointed out Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 133), Coleridge has drawn upon Schelling's Transc. Id. (Werke, I. iii. 406-7), and the Abhandlungen, &c. (Werke, I. iii. 379). Sara Coleridge also compares the introduction to Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (Werke, I. ii. 25).

PAGE 91 1. 5. like a God by spiritual art. Slightly altered from Cowley's 'All over Love' :

But, like a God, by powerful art,

'Twas all in all, and all in every part.

21. the propensity so common among men. Cp. p. 74, 1. 25 and note; Letter to Wordsworth (1815), Letters, p. 649; and T. T., May 15, 1833.

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28. Even so did Priestley. This controversy was made public in the form of a printed correspondence in 1788. The two opponents were intimate friends, and both liberals in theology; but while Priestley was a materialist and necessitarian, Price upheld the free agency of man and the immateriality of the soul: anticipating in his ethical doctrines some of the fundamental ideas of Kant. (See Leslie Stephen, Eng. Thought in the Eighteenth Century, under 'Priestley' and 'Price'; Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals; Priestley, Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, &c.)

PAGE 92 1. 2. the PRODUCTIVE LOGOS human and divine. This work (Coleridge's magnum opus) is, according to Mr. Dykes Campbell, first mentioned in a letter of Sept. 1814, when Coleridge writes that his morning hours are devoted to a great work printing at Bristol at the wish of two friends. 'The title is Christianity, the one True Philosophy; or Five Treatises on the Logos, or communicative Intelligence, natural, human, and divine.' He adds, 'The purpose of the whole is a philosophical defence of the Articles of the Church, so far as they respect doctrine, as points of faith.' (Life, p. 207; Letters, p. 632.) There is, however, a prior public allusion in the Essays on Criticism, published in Bristol in Aug. 1814. (See Biog. Lit. ii. 230.)

In 1818 (Letters, p. 697) Coleridge speaks of 'the great philosophical work to which the best and most genial hours of the last twenty years of his life have been devoted'. Again, in 1821 he prays for tranquillity to carry out his 'noblest undertaking, which when completed will revolutionize all that has been called Philosophy or Metaphysics in England and France since the era of the commencing predominance of the mechanical system at the restoration of the Second Charles' (see Life, p. 247). And, in the last years of his life, his sole motive for wishing to live is that he may be able to complete this work (T. T., July 10, 1834).

In his undoubtedly sincere efforts to carry out this life-work, Coleridge received much assistance from his friend John Henry Green, the eminent surgeon and philosopher, whose acquaintance he made in 1817, and to whom on his death he gave sole power over his literary remains. Out of the philosophical material thus entrusted to him Green endeavoured to build up Coleridge's philosophical system. The result of his efforts is contained in the Spiritual Philosophy, founded on the teaching of the late S. T. Coleridge; 2 vols., 1865. But the materials at hand were insufficient for the task, and the Spiritual Philosophy is far from containing a complete statement of Coleridge's doctrines. It is more than doubtful, indeed, if this was ever clearly formulated in Coleridge's own mind-if the 'scraps and Sibylline leaves' of his speculations were ever gathered into a comprehensive whole. And the causes of his failure lay no doubt as much in the nature of the work as in the nature of the worker. In the free development of his philosophical views Coleridge was inevitably hampered by his desire to adopt them to a particular body of religious doctrines. Of actual contributions to the magnum opus the following are extant: (1) two large quarto volumes on formal logic, (2) a portentous introduction, (3) a commentary on the Gospels and some of the Epistles, (4) innumerable fragments of metaphysical and theological speculation. (See Letters, p. 632 n.; Life, p. 251.) For a brief account of the scope of the system, see T. T., Sept. 12, 1831; July 25, 1832; Letters, p. 715.

14. a dream world of phantoms, &c. Cp. Schelling's Abhandlungen, &c. (Werke, I. i. 362).

23. It would be easy to explain. Sara Coleridge compares the Introduction to Schelling's Ideen zu einer Phil. der Natur (Werke, I. ii.).

31. an answer to the whence? and why? is no answer to the how? &c. Cp. Goethe (Eckermann, Gespräche, Feb. 1831): To inquire after the purpose, to ask Why? is wholly unscientific. But the question How? may help us on a little,' &c. The same thought underlies Coleridge's distinction in the Theory of Life' (Miscellanies, pp. 379 foll.), between accounting for and explaining a fact of experience.

PAGE 93 F. N. And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin. From the Essay on Satire, occasioned by the death of Mr. Pope', by John Brown (published in vol. ii of Warburton's Pope), pt. ii,

1. 224.

CHAPTER IX

PAGE 93 1. 21. without Leibnitz's qualifying Praeter ipsum intellectum. 'On m'opposera cet axiome reçu parmi les Philosophes : que rien n'est dans l'âme qui ne vienne des sens. Mais il faut excepter l'âme même et ses affections. Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, excipe: nisi ipse intellectus.' Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, liv. ii, c. I (ed. Erdmann, i. 223: ref. Biog. Lit. 1847).

22. in the same sense in which the position was understood: i.e. in the sense that all intellectual processes are in their essence material.

23. what Hume had demonstratively deduced. (See the note to p. 83, 1. 27.)

PAGE 94 1. 8. the supposed error which it labors to subvert : i.e. the existence of innate ideas.

The

24. The early study of Plato and Plotinus. While yet at Christ's Hospital, Coleridge, according to Lamb, was deep in the Neo-platonists (see the famous passage in Lamb's essay Christ's Hospital five-and-thirty years ago). With Plato he no doubt became acquainted in the ordinary course of his studies. earliest reference to him which I have been able to find is a not highly complimentary allusion to his conception of life, in a letter to Thelwall in 1796 (Letters, p. 211): 'Plato says it (life) is harmony. He might as well have said a fiddlestick's end: but I love Plato, his dear, gorgeous nonsense.' It was, no doubt, his early conversion to Platonic idealism that carried Coleridge beyond the standpoint of the critical philosophy: cp. letter to J. Gooden in 1819 (Notes and Lectures, &c., ed. Sara Coleridge, 1849, p. 273).

26. the illustrious Florentine. Marsilius Ficinus (1433-9), author of Theologia Platonica seu de immortalitate animorum. The enthusiasm for Plato in Florence in the days of Cosimo dei Medici, due to the influence and teaching of Gemistius Pletho, led to the foundation of a Platonic academy, of which Marsilius was made president. He published a Latin translation of Plato's works. But his own system, developed in the Theologia, owes more to the later Platonists of the Alexandrian school.

27. Proclus (412-485 A.D.), the most famous of the Athenian Neo-platonists, from whom Neo-Platonism received its final expression. Cp. Crabb Robinson (Diary, &c., May 3, 1812): 'A long tirade in which Coleridge declared that when he first began to think on philosophy he set out from a passage in Proclus-at the R

COLERIDGE. I

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