PAGE 71 1. 13. 'De Anima', 'De Memoria'. To Aristotle's chief psychological work, the De Anima, the Parva Naturalia forms a kind of appendix, where a number of subsidiary but important questions are discussed, which the De Anima left untouched. Among them occurs the De Memoria-'The little work on Memory and Reminiscence-in which the laws of association are laid down with a clearness scarcely to be looked for outside modern philosophy.' (Aristot. De Anima, ed. Wallace, Introd. xv.)

20. successive particles propagating motion like billiard-balls. There is no mention of billiard-balls in Hobbes's discussion of the subject (Human Nature, chs. ii, iii); but he speaks of objects producing motions in the brain, which are apparently indistinguishable from the thoughts or images themselves.

25. the followers of Des Cartes. Descartes' theory of the soul residing in the brain was developed by some of his followers in a materialistic direction—that is, they identified soul and brain: and thus we get the purely mechanical psychology of the French eighteenth century materialists. (Cp. Kuno Fischer, Descartes, &c., p. 493.) Cp. Coleridge's 'Theory of Life' (Miscellanies, p. 375) 'Should the reader chance to put his hand on the "Principles of Philosophy," by La Forge, an immediate follower of Descartes, he will see the phenomena of sleep solved in a copper-plate engraving.'

29. as Hartley teaches. See Hartley's Observations on Man, ch. i, sect. i (esp. Props. i-v).

PAGE 72 1. 10. he carefully distinguishes them from material motion. Cp. Bk. ii, ch. iii of De Anima, which is devoted to a refutation of the theory that movement is a characteristic of the soul. The phrase Kivýσeis év Tóπ (movement in space) occurs in this chapter, and τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν (local movement) is also mentioned (ii. 3, §§ 1-4) as one of the powers of animals, distinct from τὸ διανοητικόν. The word Kivnoeis is frequently used in the De Memoria to denote psychical processes.

13. he excludes place and motion. Cp. De Anim. ii. 3, in initio: For perhaps it is not merely false that its being is of such a kind as they affirm, who say that the soul is that which moves itself, or can move, but it may be an absolute impossibility that motion should be a quality of the soul' (quoted in Maass; see Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 104).

16. The general law of association. Aristotle does not state the law in so many words. (Cp. De Memoria 2. 451b 16, 452a 3, 452a 28.) He is discussing ȧváμvnois (recollection) only, and he thus analyses the process: 'When engaged in recollection, we seek to excite some of our previous movements, until we come to that which the movement or impression of which we are in search was wont to follow' (2.451b 16). See Wallace, ib. Introduction, xcv, &c.

23. he admits five agents. More properly four-similarity,

contrast, and connexion in time or space. He continues,' Hence we seek to reach this preceding impression, starting in our thought from an object present to us, or something else, whether it be similar, contrary, or contiguous to that of which we are in search; recollection taking place in this manner, because the movements are in one case identical, in another case contrary, and in the last case overlap' (Wallace, ib.).

27. As an additional solution. Coleridge here seems to have confused Maass' account of this matter with that of Aristotle. It is Maass who gives this explanation of 'The occasional seeming chasms': (Versuch, &c., pp. 28–9; Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 107.)

PAGE 73 1. 25. Among these volumes, &c. Sir James Mackintosh, in the note above referred to (Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, Note S), points out that the story about Hume was a mistake the handwriting was not his, nor the book the Parva Naturalia. He further observes, not without reason, that Coleridge, in his discussion of Aristotle's theory of association, fails to note that it is brought forward in explanation of one mental process only-that of recollection. But Coleridge's contention is, that, as far as the passive element in them is concerned, memory and fancy, and indeed all the faculties of thought are identical. It is in the use which each makes of its material that they differ.

28. It remains then for me. Of the inquiry which he here sets before himself, Coleridge failed to carry out more than the preliminary stage-viz. the confutation of mistaken theories of association, and the statement of what he conceives to be its true nature. the 'philosophical disquisition' of ch. xii he takes a fresh start.

In

PAGE 74 1. 2. sounding on my dim and perilous way. Coleridge is thinking of the lines in The Excursion (Bk. iii. 700-1)— The intellectual power, through words and things, Went sounding on, a dim and perilous way!

CHAPTER VI

PAGE 74 1. 4. Hartley's hypothetical vibrations. See the Obser vations, Pt. i, Ch. i, esp. Prop. 5; Hartley and James Mill, by G. G. S. Bower, p. 28, &c. As early as 1801, Coleridge had written to Poole that he had overthrown the doctrine of association, as taught by Hartley. His disbelief in it had been growing for some time. See Introduction, pp. xxix ff.

10. Reimarus. J. A. Reimarus (1729-1814), physician, and Professor of the Moral Sciences at Hamburg; a philosopher of the rationalistic school. The passage to which Coleridge refers is probably a passing refutation of materialism in §§ 3-7 of a treatise Ueber die Gründe der menschlichen Erkenntniss und der natürlichen Religion (Biog. Lit. 1847, vol. i, App. note B). His father, H. M.

Reimarus, was the author of a work entitled Observations, Moral and Philosophical, on the Instinct of Animals, their Industry, and their Manners, of which Coleridge thought highly. See A. P. 1804 (pp. 91-2).

16. we must bewilder ourselves, &c. Cp. Coleridge's note to his lines in Southey's Joan of Arc (first edition, 1796): 'Who deem themselves most free', &c., from which this sentence is taken verbatim, except for the significant_substitution of fancy for imagination (quoted by Cottle, Early Recollections of S. Í. Coleridge, ii. 242). See also Biog. Lit. i. 91, 1. 21 and note.

20. Pythagoras. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griechen, Leips., 1892, p. 349: This is the meaning of the fundamental doctrine of the Pythagoreans: everything is number, that is, everything consists of numbers: number is not merely the form which determines the composition of things, but is also the substance and the material of which they consist.' Their theory of numbers was also applied to musical notation. (Ib., 401 ff.)

21. Plato.

For Plato's mathematical and musical symbols see Timaeus, 35 B-36 B, 47 A; Rep., 443, 531; Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, Trans., p. 348 and note; Jowett, Plato, Rep., Introd., cxxx (The Number of the State).

24. metaphysical systems . . . become popular. Cp. letter to Wordsworth (May 1815), Letters, p. 649: The philosophy of mechanism, which... cheats itself by mistaking clear images for distinct conceptions': a fallacy to which Coleridge had drawn attention nearly twenty years before, in a note to his contribution to Southey's Joan of Arc, quoted above: 'We are restless because invisible things are not the subjects of vision.'

29. From a hundred possible confutations let one suffice. This particular confutation is borrowed from Maass. (Versuch, &c., pp. 32, 33.)

30. According to this system. See Observations, Pt. I, Ch. i, Prop. 22.

PAGE 75 1. 10. the ideas are themselves in Hartley's system. Hartley does not go so far as actually to identify vibrations and ideas. But he makes the ideas subject to the same processes of motion and change, and governed by the same laws, as the vibrations; and Coleridge's argument is therefore not invalidated. See Observations, Pt. I, Ch. i, Prop. 2: 'The white medullary substance of the brain is also the immediate Instrument by which the Ideas are presented to the mind: or, in other words, whatever changes are made in the substance, corresponding changes are made in our ideas and vice versa'; and see ch. i, passim.

PAGE 76 1. 14. his work has been re-edited by Priestley. Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind on the Principle of the Association of Ideas: with Essays relating to the subject of it. By Joseph Priestley, LL.D., F.R.S. London, 1775. In the Preface

(p. iv) Priestley declares that it is his object to make Hartley's system clearer by exhibiting his theory of the human mind, as far as it relates to the association of ideas only, omitting even what relates to the doctrine of vibrations, and the anatomical disquisitions which are connected with it'. See also the First Introductory Essay.

23. Hartley was constrained, &c. See the Observations, Pt. I, Ch. i, Prop. 10: 'Sensations may be said to be associated together, when their impressions are either made precisely at the same Instant of Time, or in the contiguous successive Instants.' Cp. also Biog. Lit. i. 69: 'Hobbs ... must have reduced all its forms to the one law of time.'

PAGE 77 1. 4. our whole life would be divided, &c. Cp. Letters, p. 428 (Aug. 1803): 'If I had said no one idea ever recalls another, I am confident that I could support the assertion.' And marginal note in Maass, p. 29 (quoted Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 116), to Maass' statement that Every representation calls back its total association': 'Rather is capable, under given conditions, of recalling: or else our whole life would be divided between the despotism of outward impressions and that of senseless memory'. An interesting note on the power of association over the will is to be found in A. P. 1804 (p. 64), where Coleridge attributes lack of volitional energy to 'the streamy nature of the associative faculty', and adds, in confirmation of his statement, that 'it is evident that they labour under this defect who are most reverie-ish and streamy-Hartley (Coleridge's child), for instance, and myself'.

18. which would be absolute delirium.

Lit. i. 62, l. 15.

Cp. note on Biog.

PAGE 78 1. 2. a year or two before my arrival at Göttingen. Coleridge reached Göttingen in Feb. 1799.

PAGE 80 1. 3. this, perchance, is the dread book. Cp. Crabb Robinson, Diary, &c., July 12, 1819: 'Coleridge has the striking thought that possibly the punishment of a future life may consist in bringing back the consciousness of the past.'

II. But not now dare I longer discourse, &c. In almost precisely similar terms Coleridge excuses himself in the concluding lines of the Essays on the Principles of genial criticism, from the further pursuit of an equally recondite subject. The quotation from Plotinus occurs Ennead I. Lib. 6, §§ 4 & 9.

CHAPTER VII

See

PAGE 81 1. 13. the Grimalkins in the Cat-harpsichord. The Spectator, No. 361, April 24, 1712 : 'A dissertation upon the cat-call.'

17. It involves all the difficulties... of intercommunion, &c. Cp. Letters, Jan. 1804 (p. 454), where Coleridge speaks of the

sophism... that all have hitherto both the Necessitarians and their antagonists-confounded two essentially different things under one name'.

PAGE 82 1. 20. well might Butler say. Cp. Butler, Miscellaneous Thoughts, 11. 93-102.

35. my friend Allston. Washington Allston, the American painter, for whom see Biog. Lit. ii. 223 n.

PAGE 83 1. 27. The process by which Hume degraded the notion of cause and effect. See the Enquiry, Sect. vii, 'On the Idea of necessary connection' (ed. Selby-Bigge, pp. 60-79) and Editor's Introd., p. xv; the Treatise, Pt. III, Sect. XIV and XV.

PAGE 84 1. 3. the proofs of the existence and attributes of God. Pt. ii, Ch. i, of the Observations: 'Of the Being and Attributes of God, and of Natural Religion.'

II. the faith... is a collective energy, a total act, &c. In 1796 (Letters, 202), Coleridge thus defined faith: 'By faith I understand, first, a deduction from experiments in favour of the existence of something not experienced, and secondly, the motives which attend such a deduction.' And he adds: Now motives, being selfish, are only the beginning and the foundation, necessary and of first-rate importance, yet made of vile materials and hidden beneath the splendid superstructure.' In 1810 he stated to Crabb Robinson (Diary, &c., MS. Dec. 20) his opinion that 'Religious Belief is an act, not of the understanding, but of the will. To become a believer-one must love the doctrines and must resolve with passion to believe.' And in the Essay on Faith (supplementary to Aids to Reflection, pub. 1825), faith is defined as 'fidelity to our moral being-so far as such being is not and cannot become an object of the senses'; further, 'It subsists in the synthesis of the Reason and the individual Will' and 'by virtue of the latter... it must be an energy, and inasmuch as it relates to the whole moral man. . . must be a total, not a partial-a continuous, not a desultory or occasional-energy. See also Biog. Lit. i. 134 ff.; ii. 216 ('what we can only know by the act of becoming'); and Letters, p. 710 (1820).

28. who deem themselves most free, &c. These lines originally appeared in the passages contributed by Coleridge to Southey's Joan of Arc in the first edition, 1796: they were removed from later editions, and incorporated by Coleridge in his Destiny of Nations. The footnote appended to them in the Joan of Arc (referred to in the last chapter) was not subsequently reprinted.

PAGE 85 1.7. the mistaking the conditions of a thing for its causes and essence. For this, the fundamental error which Coleridge ascribes to Locke, cp. letter to Brabant, 1815 (Westm. Rev., April 1870, p. 354): Locke's whole book is one opioμa éτepošηthσews,