principal and accrued interest, and a premium of $39,500. That on the sixth day of August, 1919, the county engineer and surveyor was directed to make plans and specifications for the said road from Sebastopol to Freestone; "that thereafter said county surveyor prepared, and on March 23d, 1921, filed with said county clerk plans, specifications and estimates of a portion only of said Sebastopol-Freestone four-mile road showing said portion as Section A, being of the length of 10,208 feet, to-wit, 1.93 miles, and calling for an estimated expenditure thereon of $81,500, but did not and has not filed any plans, specifications, or estimates whatever of, or for, the remaining 2.07 miles of said SebastopolFreestone four-mile road. . . . That the fact is that in said road from Sebastopol to Freestone there are four hills requiring grading and drainage, and three of said hills are in Section A, and the O'Farrell hill the largest by far of said hills is not in said Section A, cannot possibly be graded and drained with the small amount of money, if any, that will remain applicable thereto after the building and construction of said Section A, if done according to the plans and specifications filed as aforesaid. That on the 23d day of March, 1921, the defendant board adopted the above mentioned plans and specifications and directed the clerk to advertise for bids. That on the 25th day of March, 1921, the clerk did so advertise for bids; that said bids have been received; that the board threatens to and will, unless restrained, open the bids so invited, accept the lowest bid and will enter into a contract with the lowest bidder. That the plaintiff and many others will be irreparably damaged, etc., wherefore plaintiff prays judgment."

The complaint was filed April 11, 1921. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint in which it is alleged that on the twelfth day of April, 1921, the defendant board opened the bids and that the lowest responsible bid for the construction of Section A, 1.93 miles, was $72,840.60; that the cost of constructing the rest of the road, 2.07 miles, will exceed the cost of constructing Section A.

The statute (Pol. Code, sec. 4088) under which the bonds were issued, among other things, provides: "Any county . . . may incur . . . a bonded indebtedness for . . . the purpose of . . . constructing roads. . . . Such indebtedness shall be . . . incurred in the following manner, to wit: The board

of supervisors thereof shall by order specify the purpose for which the indebtedness is to be incurred. . . . ... (Then follows itemized procedure regarding issuance of bonds and the levy of a tax.) Such tax, when collected, shall be paid into the treasury of the county, and used solely to pay the interest and principal of said bonds as they respectively become due. The revenue derived from the sale of said bonds shall be applied to the purpose specified in the order of the board, and no other. Should there be any surplus, it shall be applied toward the payment of said bonds. The board of supervisors of any county can contract a bonded indebtedness for county purposes only as in this title provided . . ."

The plaintiff contends that under the foregoing facts the board of supervisors had the jurisdiction to ask for bids for the construction of the road, Sebastopol to Freestone, as an entity and if the bids were too high that the board was not entitled to proceed without further authority from the electors. The defendants contend that a board of supervisors has discretionary power to spend the entire $85,000 on any part or portion of said road as to the board seems meet and proper.

[1] We think that "discretionary powers" are a false issue In this case. When the defendant board was contemplating a bond issue on the sixteenth day of April, 1919, it had the statutory right to make its order just as broad, and just as narrow, and just as specific as it was willing to be bound by, so long as the provisions of the statute were complied with. At that time it could have asked generally for the consent of the electors to issue bonds in the sum of $1,640,000 for constructing roads in Sonoma County, but it did not do so; on the contrary, it specified road by road, name by name, and length by length, of each piece of road that was to be constructed. When, in the order, it specified Sebastopol to Freestone, four miles, designating the point of beginning and the point of the ending, any question of discretion as to division or subdivision into sections was, as to these elements, exercised once and for all and as a finality. When thereafter, pursuant to that order, the defendant board published a notice to the electors in exact accord with its order, every elector had the right to assume that the statement contained in the order to the effect that

a road would be constructed from Sebastopol to Freestone meant the entire distance between those two points-not one end, or the other end, or any part or portion-but the whole. The electors are presumed to have known the law and to have known that by the provisions of subdivision 11 of section 2643 of the Political Code, road work, costing more than $1,000, may be done and performed only after notice duly given calling for bids. The electors must have also known that ordinarily a board of supervisors has many discretionary powers; but, nothing to the contrary appearing, the electors had the right to assume that after the election the board of supervisors would call for bids for the construction of a road four miles in length between Sebastopol and Freestone as described in its order and costing not to exceed $85,000. [2] The order calling the election and the ratification of that order by the electors constituted a contract between the state and the individuals whose property was thereby affected. (Peery v. City of Los Angeles, 187 Cal. 753 [19 A. L. R. 1044, 203 Pac. 992].) After the contract had been made it could not be altered by one of the parties, only, but by all of the parties thereto. When by its order, duly accepted by the vote of the electors, the length of the road had been specifically defined, its terminals specifically located, and the cost of the whole established-these elements became a part of the contract. As to them the board, acting alone, could not redivide the contract. Neither could it directly expend the moneys on only a portion of the road. What it could not do directly it could not do indirectly. Such fact is of the utmost importance to the interested parties. It is the only hold the taxpayers have for specifically enforcing the contract as made by them. The very gist of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant board has not asked for, and has not obtained, a bid for constructing the whole road. For this reason the plaintiff may complain. If the defendant board has the statutory right to let contracts to build said road in sections, then, as the defendant argues, all of the funds may be spent on one mile in the discretion of the board. But the board may not let the contracts piecemeal. It has waived its right to do so. The foregoing views are fully sustained by the principles announced in Jenkins v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 89 [111 Pac. 116]. The only difference between the instant case and

that case is that the instant case involves roads, whereas the Jenkins case involved bridges. Both cases rest on the same section of the same statute. No one can read that decision without being impressed that the board of supervisors of Sacramento County could not have used the moneys voted for a "New Steel Bridge over Cosumnes River at Bridgehouse, Sacramento County" for the purpose of building one-half of a bridge, or one pier for a proposed bridge, or anything else or otherwise, except an entity-a bridge, whether large, small or otherwise. Cases quite closely in point, in other jurisdictions, are in accord with the case last cited. (Marteeney v. Louth, 197 Ill. App. 106, 115, 116; Haus v. County Court, 86 W. Va. 650 [104 S. E. 119, 121]; Whitner v. Woodruff, 68 Fla. 465 [67 South. 110, 111]; Pine v. Baker, 76 Okl. 62 [184 Pac. 445, 451]; Thompson v. Pierce County, 113 Wash. 237 [193 Pac. 706, 707]; Carson v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 2, 150 Ark. 379 [234 S. W. 257].)

We think that the demurrer should have been overruled and that the defendants should have been required to answer, and that the case should have been heard on its merits.

The judgment is reversed.

The foregoing opinion heretofore rendered herein by the district court of appeal of the first appellate district, divi. sion two, is hereby adopted as the opinion of the court.

Shaw, C. J., Lennon, J., Waste, J., Richards, J., pro tem., and Myers, J., pro tem., concurred. Lawlor, J., and Sloane, J., dissented from decision of case without further consideration.

Rehearing denied.

All the Justices present concurred.

Richards, J., pro tem., and Myers, J., pro tem., were acting.

[S. F. No. 10158. In Bank.-July 31, 1922.]

MADERA SUGAR PINE COMPANY (a Corporation). Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.

[1] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-TOTAL DEPENDENCY OF MINORSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-In this proceeding to review an award of a death benefit to the minor child of a deceased employee, the record clearly establishes, as a fact in the proceeding before the Industrial Accident Commission, that the minor was wholly dependent upon the deceased for support, irrespective of the "conclusive presumption" of dependency declared by section 14, subdivision a, paragraph 2, of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Stats. 1919, p. 917).

PROCEEDING in Certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Accident Commission. Award affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Fee & Ring for Petitioner.

A. E. Graupner and Warren H. Pillsbury for Respond

ents.

WASTE, J.-This is a proceeding on a writ of review. Lilburn Mankin, while employed by the petitioner as a laborer, sustained injuries occurring in the course of, and arising out of, his employment, which resulted in his death. After proceedings duly had the Industrial Accident Commission found that the deceased employee left surviving, alone, and wholly dependent upon him, Lilburn Mankin, his son, aged five years, and awarded said minor child a death benefit in the sum of $4,900, payable weekly at a specified rate. The sole question presented upon the application is the correctness of an award predicated upon total dependency of the claimant. The respondent justifies its action upon two grounds, first, that it is supported by evidence of the existing facts, and, second, that it is warranted by the conclusive presumption as to the dependency of a minor, laid down in section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Laws (Stats.