of the existence of alfalfa or of signs of phosphorus in the exhibit submitted to him as coming from the body of the dead animal. During the intervening period some correspondence passed between the under-sheriff and the defendant, the latter complaining of the tardiness of the chemist's report, and after it arrived declined to swear to a complaint in the face of its negative finding. On June 10, 1918, matters were brought to a crisis by the discovery of a cow of the defendant lying dead within the premises of the plaintiff, its death having been caused by violence inflicted upon it in some manner. Upon learning of the death of her cow the defendant again called in the veterinarian, who examined its body. She also sent for the under-sheriff, who looked over the body of the cow and interviewed the plaintiff as to his knowledge of the cause of its death, and after doing so advised the defendant to go to Martinez and lay the facts before the district attorney. She went to the county seat and had an interview with the district attorney, who offered to draw a complaint for her to sign. She had an angry dispute with the under-sheriff over some of the facts in the case, and finally left the office of the district attorney without signing the complaint, but later returned and had a further interview with the district attorney, who told her that if she wanted to swear to a complaint he would draw it up, but it would be difficult to get a conviction. The complaint was finally drawn in the district attorney's office, whereupon the under-sheriff, the defendant, and her husband went to the office of a justice of the peace, where the complaint was sworn to and filed, and a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff upon the charge of poisoning the defendant's horse was issued. The plaintiff was arrested thereon and put to trial, when he was acquitted of the charge. Thereupon he commenced this action.

[1] The foregoing is merely a summary of certain salient facts of the case. There is much other evidence bearing upon the defendant's mental attitude toward the plaintiff herein and her good faith in instituting the proceedings against him. The evidence was conflicting as to many of the essential features of the case. It is one of those cases wherein the verdict of the jury either way would find substantial support in the evidence. This being so, it is not the province of this court to usurp the function of the jury in

cases of this character. (Runo v. Williams, 162 Cal. 449 [122 Pac. 1082].) We cannot, therefore, uphold the appellant's contention that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, even though we might be disposed to conclude from a review of the record that the evidence preponderates in the appellant's favor. In such a case, however, it becomes the duty of this court to carefully scrutinize the rulings and instructions of the trial court upon matters of law in order to determine whether any errors alleged to have occurred therein had a prejudicial influence upon the verdict. The trial court, at the plaintiff's request, gave the following instruction:

[2] "You are instructed that if you find from the evidence in this case that the criminal proceedings against plaintiff were instituted by defendant over a fixed and malicious determination of her own, and not from the advice of counsel, or that she did not communicate a full, fair and true statement of all the facts known to her to the sheriff and the district attorney, and that the district attorney did not advise her there was probable cause for the arrest, then such would constitute lack of probable cause."

It would seem to require no argument to show that this instruction is erroneous, and is prejudicially so, since it might well be that the defendant herself might have had abundant cause for insisting upon and procuring the plaintiff's arrest upon the charge of having poisoned her horse, even though, in so doing, she was acting upon a fixed and malicious determination of her own and without the advice of counsel; and even though she had not communicated all of the facts known to her to the sheriff and district attorney, or made a full, fair, and true statement of the facts to these officials; and even though the district attorney had not advised her that there was probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest. [3] Nor do we find that this error has been corrected in any other or later instruction. There is a later instruction in which the trial court makes a review of the evidence in the case from the defendant's point of view. It occupies several pages of the record, is much involved in detail, and concludes with the direction to the jury that if they shall find all of its asserted facts to be true they should find a verdict for the defendant. But this instruction cannot be held to have removed the sting of the former instruc

tion wherein the court had already erroneously charged the jury that upon a few facts clearly and tersely stated they were bound to find that the defendant had acted without probable cause in bringing about the plaintiff's arrest.

[4] The trial court wandered further in the path of error in giving the following instruction: "You are instructed that the prosecution of a person with any other motive than to bring the guilty person to justice is in law a malicious prosecution."

The chief vice of this instruction consists in its use of the term "malicious prosecution," since this term has in law a technical meaning, embracing the twofold elements of malice and want of probable cause. The court had already, in substance, charged the jury that both of these elements must be found by the jury to exist before it could render a verdict in the plaintiff's favor; yet in the instruction last above quoted the jury is told in plain terms that the prosecution of a person with any other motive than to bring the guilty person to justice is sufficient in itself to constitute in point of law a malicious prosecution; or, in other words, to furnish sufficient proof of both of the foregoing elements to justify a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. It cannot with reason be contended that instructions such as these, so obviously erroneous, and yet so tersely put as to be easily comprehensible by the jury, were not prejudicial, or that the verdict of the jury, in a close case like this, would not be injuriously affected thereby. In the case of Runo v. Williams, supra, this court has stated: "The law is clearly and definitely settled how a jury shall be instructed in the cases of this character (Grant v. Moore, 29 Cal. 644; Harkrader v. Moore, 44 Cal. 144; Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123 [56 Am. Rep. 77, 4 Pac. 1106]; Fulton v. Onesti, 66 Cal. 575 [6 Pac. 491]; Ball v. Rawles, 93 Cal. 222 [27 Am. St. Rep. 174, 28 Pac. 937]; Smith v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 107 Cal. 433 [40 Pac. 540]; Scrivani v. Dondero, 128 Cal. 31 [60 Pac. 463])."

To this list of cases may be added the recent decisions of this court in Burke v. Watts, 188 Cal. 118 [204 Pac. 578], and Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199 [205 Pac. 113].

Since this case must go back for a new trial, the parties and the court should have no difficulty whatever, in the light of the foregoing authorities, in formulating and giving to

the jury clear and definite instructions governing their duties in considering their verdict.

The judgment is reversed.

Wilbur, J., Sloane, J., Shaw, C. J., Lennon, J., Lawlor, J., and Shurtleff, J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 10240. In Bank.-June 13, 1922.]

VETERANS' WELFARE BOARD et al., Petitioners, v. FRANK C. JORDAN, as Secretary of the State of California, Respondent.

[1] VETERANS' WELFARE BOND ACT-CREATION OF BONDED INDEBTEDNESS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The Veterans' Welfare Bond Act (Stats. 1921, p. 959), authorizing a bond issue to carry out the provisions of the Veterans' Welfare Act (Stats. 1921, p. 969) and the Veterans' Farm and Home Purchasing Act (Stats. 1921, p. 815), provides for the creation of an indebtedness against the state within the meaning of section 1 of article XVI of the constitution, notwithstanding it makes an appropriation for the payment of the issued bonds and interest.

[2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GIVING OR LOANING OF THE CREDIT OF THE STATE.-Section 31 of article IV of the constitution, prohibiting the giving or loaning of the credit of the state, should be construed liberally to effect its purpose, and such construction prohibits any plan or scheme by which in substance and effect the credit of the state is given or loaned, regardless of the particular form which the transaction takes.

[3] VETERANS' WELFARE BOND ACT-PURCHASE OF LAND AND SAle to VETERANS ON CREDIT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The Veterans' Welfare Bond Act in so far as it provides for the devotion of a por tion of the money raised by the bond issue to carry out the provisions of the Veterans' Farm and Home Purchasing Act

1. Constitutionality of statutes providing for bounty or pension for soldiers, notes, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 951; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 282; 7 A. L. R. 1636; 13 A. L. R. 587; 15 A. L. R. 1344.

2. Constitutionality of statute authorizing state to loan money to engage in business of a private nature, note, 14 A. L. R. 1151.

3. Validity of statute providing for governmental assistance of individual members of certain classes, note, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1196.

providing for the purchase by the state of land to be sold to the veterans on credit is violative of section 31 of article IV of the constitution as a loan of the credit of the state. [4] STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-PUBLIC PURPOSE-ACT WITHIN POWER OF LEGISLATURE-CREDIT OF STATE AS INCIDENT-EFFECT OF.Where a separate and distinct public purpose is achieved and such public purpose is one within the constitutional powers of the legislature to bring about, the law will not be declared unconstitutional because of the fact that as an incident to its main purpose the credit of the state is used to effectuate that purpose.

[5] ID.-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE.-Doubts are to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.

[6] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. The broad general restrictions against the taking of property without due process of law ought not to be construed so as to prevent legislative action adjusted to the growing needs and the changed condition of the people.

[7] VETERANS' WELFARE BOND ACT-SALE OF LAND TO VETERANS AT COST-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The provisions of the Veterans' Welfare Bond Act authorizing a bond issue for the purpose of acquiring, subdividing, improving, acquiring water rights for, and selling the land so improved to veterans at cost, are valid as authorizing the expenditure of public money for a public purpose. [8] ID. PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR FARMING OPERATIONS-LOAN OF PROCEEDS OF BONDS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The portions of the Veterans' Welfare Bond Act providing for the loaning of money from the proceeds of the bonds to settlers to enable them to purchase personal property to carry on their farming operations is a loan of the credit of the state.

[9] ID.-UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PORTION OF ACT-EFFECT OF.-The unconstitutionality of the Veterans' Welfare Bond Act so far as it authorizes the use of money from the sale of bonds in the farm and home purchasing scheme does not affect the validity of the bond issue so far as it authorizes the welfare board to use the money derived from the sale of bonds in the purchasing, improving, subdividing, and disposition of such land so subdivided. [10] ID.-BOND ISSUE "SINGLE OBJECT"-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The bond issue provided by the Veterans' Welfare Bond Act is for a single purpose within the meaning of section 1 of article XVI of the constitution, providing that the legislature shall not create a debt unless the same shall be authorized by law for some single object or work to be distinctly specified therein, and of section 34 of article IV, providing that no bill making an appropriation, except the general appropriation bill, shall contain more than one item of appropriation, and that for a single and certain purpose, to be therein expressed.