METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACT, I., Under Public Health Act. See BOARD OF COMPETENCY OF WITNESS. See EVIDENCE. COMPOSITION DEED. See BANKRUPT, II., III., IV., V., VI. CONCEALMENT. Of material fact. See INSURANCE, MARINE, CONDITION. Averment of performance of. See VEXATIOUS Precedent. See CHARTER-PARTY. subscribed for; but the Company, being in | Under Metropolis Local Management Act. See want of money, determined to borrow 10,000%. to enable them to pay debts due to the contractor, engineer, solicitors, and for land, and also to meet a claim made by W. C. for travelling expenses and loss of time. The directors applied to their bankers, and obtained the sum required on the security of the joint and several promissory note of W. C. the then chairman of the Company, and of B., one of the directors. B., having been compelled to pay the money, brought an action against W. C. for contribution. The board of directors resolved that, "in order to discharge the liability of the chairman in the action of B. against him, the secretary be authorized to seal Lloyd's bonds to the extent of," &c. Bonds were accordingly sealed with the common seal of the Company, by each of which the Company "acknowledge that they stand indebted to W. C. in the sum of 1000l. for money due and owing from the said Company to the said W. C.; and the said Company, for themselves, their successors and assigns, hereby covenant with the said W. C., his executors and administrators, to pay to him, his executors, administrators, or assigns, the said sum of 1000l., &c." These bonds were delivered to W. C., and he assigned them to one D. to secure money advanced by him, and with which money the action brought by B. against W. C. was settled. Subsequently, the directors resolved that the bonds should be redeemed, and that the expenses incurred by the chairman should be paid by the Company out of the first moneys in their hands. In an action brought by W. C. upon one of these bonds, held that, taking into consideration stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85, The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, and the special Act, the bond was illegal, and that he could not recover. Chambers v. The Manchester and Milford Railroad Company, 588 V. A railway Company issued a consignment note for the carriage of cattle from O. to B., one of the conditions of which was, "the Company are not to be amenable for any consequences arising from detention or delay in or in relation to the conveying or delivery of the said animals however caused:" held an unreasonable con dition within the first proviso in sect. 7 of The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31. Allday v. The Great Western Railway Company, 903 Unreasonable. See Company, Railway, V., VI. CONDUCTOR. See POLICE, COMMISSIONERS OF. CONSIDERATION, FAILUre of. See MONEY HAD AND REceived. CONSOLIDATED CHAPELRY. See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, III. CONSPIRACY. See QUARTER SESSIONS, I. CONSTRUCTIVE RELOADING. CONTEMPT OF COURT. I. Every Court of record has attached to its jurisdiction, as inherent in it, the power to punish for contempt: but if the Court is one of inferior jurisdiction, the Court of Queen's Bench has authority to intervene and prevent any usurpation of jurisdiction by it; and, if it treats conduct as a contempt which there is no reasonable ground for so treating, may interfere to protect the party upon whom the power to commit or fine for contempt has been improperly exercised. Ex parte Pater, 299 III. The Court of Queen's Bench has, howSee ever, no jurisdiction to act as a Court of appeal in such cases. Therefore where, on a trial for CONTEMPT OF COURT. felony at the Middlesex Quarter Sessions, the counsel for the prisoner, whose mode of conducting the case had been remarked upon by the foreman of the jury, in his address to the jury uttered words which reflected upon the foreman, and being required by the Judge to withdraw them refused, and was thereupon adjudged guilty of contempt and fined, upon motion for a certiorari to remove the order: Held, that as the words used might have been and were by the Judge adjudged to have been used to insult the juror, there was no excess of jurisdiction, and the Court of Queen's Bench could not interfere. Ex parte Pater, 299 See FOREIGN DOMINION of Crown. CONVICTION, SUMMARY. See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, JURISDICTION OF. QUARTER SESSIONS, II. COPYRIGHT OF DESIGNS. I. The Copyright of Designs Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 70, s. 5, declares "that the registration of any pattern or portion of an article of manufacture to which a design is applied, instead or in lieu of a copy, drawing, print, specification, or description in writing, shall be as valid and effectual to all intents and purposes as if such copy, drawing, print, specification, or description in writing had been furnished to the registrar under The Copyright of Designs Acts." Held, that it was a sufficient registration of a design applicable to the ornamenting woven fabrics comprised in class 12 of stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, to leave with the registrar a pattern or portion of the article of manufacture. McCrea v. Holdsworth and Others, 495 manslaughter, or for being an accessory to any murder or manslaughter, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused," applies to a coroner's inquisition. The Queen v. Ingham, 257 II. A coroner's inquisition, which found A. B. guilty of manslaughter, omitted to state the time at which the offence was committed: Held, that the objection was cured by stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 83, s. 2, which enacts that no inquisition found upon any coroner's inquest shall be quashed "for omitting to state the time at which the offence was committed, when time is not the essence of the offence." Id. III. It is not necessary that the jurors on such an inquisition should be sworn super visum corporis, or that they should be sworn at the same time, or that they should all view Id. the body at the same time. IV. It is no ground for a certiorari to bring up a coroner's inquisition that evidence not upon oath was received. Id. V. Or that the direction of the coroner to the jury was improper. Id. VI. Or that there was no evidence to warId. rant the finding of the jury. COSTS. See BILL OF EXCHANGE, I. HIGHWAY, REPAIR OF. QUARTER SESSIONS, II. COTTON-MILL. See RATE, POOR, I. COUNCIL, ORder in. See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, III., V. COUNSEL. See CONTEMPT OF COURT, II., III. VENUE, ABUSE OF CHANGING. COUNTS, SEVERAL. See INDICTMENT. COURT. Contempt of. See CONTEMPT OF COURT. For Divorces and Matrimonial Causes. See Payment of money into. See INSURANCE, MARINE, XI. Of Record. See CONTEMPT OF COURT, I. COVENANT. See BANKRUPT, IV., V., VI. COMPANY, INSURANCE, II. For title. By deed dated the 9th September, 1861, re citing that the defendant had contracted with CUSTODY, ILLEGAL. the plaintiff for the absolute sale to him of a See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, JURISDICTION OF. messuage and hereditaments, and the inheritance thereof, free from all encumbrances, the defendant conveyed to the plaintiff and his heirs the messuage, &c., together with (inter alia) all rights, liberties, privileges, easements, CUSTOM, LOSS OF. See LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, I. DAMAGES. profits, and appurtenances to the messuage, See APPEAL. BOARD OF HEALTH. INSURANCE, &c., belonging or in anywise appertaining, or LIFE. PUBLIC PURPOSES, TRUSTEES FOR. usually held, occupied, or enjoyed therewith, or deemed or taken as part, parcel, or member Reduction of. See CHARTER-PARTY. thereof, or any part thereof, to the uses and upon the trusts therein mentioned; and the Special. See SLANDER. defendant covenanted that notwithstanding any act, deed, matter, or thing whatsoever DAYS. made, done, or permitted to the contrary by In port of discharge, how reckoned. See IN SURANCE, MARINE, IX. DEATH. the defendant or any person or persons claiming through, under, or in trust for him, he then had in himself good right and absolute authority by the deed to convey the messuage, Manner, cause and time of. See CORONER, I., &c., with their appurtenances. On the 22d June, 1842, the defendant, then being the owner in fee of the messuage, &c., by an agree ment in writing with the owners in fee of an adjoining building, agreed that a certain cor II. DECEASE OF MAGISTRATE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE. DECLARATION. DEED, COMPOSITION. DELAY BY RAILWAY. DEMAND. nice and certain spouts and pipes conducting See INSURANCE, MARINE, X. WAY, RIGHT OF. the water into a spout belonging to the building, and the dripping of water from the eaves of the messuage, and the three windows on the east side of the messuage overlooking the building were encroachments by the defendant, and should and might be used by him so long only as the other parties to the agreement should consent thereto; and the defendant paid to the other parties 58. as an acknowledgment, and agreed to pay 58. per annum so long as the cornice, spouts, pipes, or windows should be used by him. At that time the defendant had not acquired any easement in respect of the cornice, spouts, pipes, or windows by the lapse of twenty years. The plaintiff, having been interfered with in the enjoyment of the easement by the owners of the adjoining building, brought an action against the defendant for breach of covenant. Held, that the defendant had conveyed the premises described so far as he possessed or could grant them ; but that the covenant for title was limited to that which he actually had, or but for his own act would have had, and that the acknowledgment and payments were not an act within that covenant. Thackeray v. Wood, CREDITOR., 325 See BANKRUPT, II, III., IV., V., VI., VII. CREW. Personal injury to, under running-down clause. CROWN. Foreign dominion of. See FOREIGN DOMINION See BANKRUPT, I., IV., V., VI. DIRECTORS. DISCHARGE. Days in port of, how reckoned. See INSUR- DISPLACEMENT. See COMPANY, INSURANCE, II. DISPOSITION. See FINES AND RECOVERIES. DISTRESS. See ELECTION. DISTRICT BOARD. See METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACT, I., Of Health. See BOARD OF HEALTH.' II. In a parish where there is both a lay See BOARD OF HEALTH, III. METROPOLIS rector and a vicar, the rector has no right to LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACT, V. DRAMATIC LITERARY PROPERTY. K., the licensed proprietor of a theatre, prevent the vicar having access to any part of the parish church by any of its doors. Id. 391 III. A consolidated chapelry, formed by order in council, on the representation of the under stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, entered into an Church Building Commissioners, under stat. arrangement with D. whereby D. had the use of the theatre for dramatic entertainments. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 70, s. 9, the boundaries of which are set forth in the order, is duly constituted D. provided the company, had the selection of the pieces to be represented, together with without enrolment of the name and descripthe entire management of their representation, tion of the boundaries in Chancery, even supand exclusive control over the persons em-posing it rendered essential by the provisions The Queen on the ployed in the theatre. K., on his part, paid of stat. 59 G. 3, c. 134, s. 6. Prosecution of the Burial Board of Christ for printing and advertising, furnished the Church Great Warley, v. The Overseers of lighting, door-keepers, scene-shifters and suSouth Weald, pernumeraries, and hired the band, music being a necessary part of the performance. The money taken at the door was taken by servants of K., who retained one-half of the gross receipts as his remuneration for the use of the theatre, and handed the other half to D. Among the pieces represented were two which L. had the sole liberty of representing or causing to be represented, &c., as assignee of the author, under the Dramatic Literary Property Acts, 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 15, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45. Held, by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that no action under those statutes was maintainable by L. against K., as the above facts did not show that those pieces had been represented, &c., by him, or that there was a partnership between D. and him so as to render him liable for the representation, &c., of them by D. Lyon and Wife v. Knowles, Law. DIVERTING HIGHWAY. DIVORCE COURT. DUTY, POST-HORSE. ECCLESIASTICAL. 751 IV. By stat. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 85, s. 12, vacancies in a Burial Board may be filled up "when and as the vestry shall think fit." By stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 128, s. 4, every vacancy shall be filled up by the vestry within one month after the vacancy; and, in case of neglect, "the vacancy may be filled up by the Burial Board." Held, per Cockburn, C. J., and Blackburn, J., Crompton, J., dubitante, that the vestry might fill up a vacancy in the Board at any time before the Burial Board did so, though not within one month after the vacancy. Id. V. On the 26th November, 1858, three vacancies occurred in the Burial Board of a consolidated chapelry formed under stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 70, none of which were filled up either by the vestry or the Board, until, on the 21st June, 1859, F. was appointed by the vestry to be a member of the Board. F. and two other members of the Board signed a certificate directing the overseers of S., one of the parishes a portion of which was included in the consolidated chapelry, to pay the propor tion of the expenses incurred in respect of the burial ground chargeable on that part of the parish of S. On mandamus to the overseers of S., commanding them to pay or raise the necessary sum: Held, per Cockburn, C. J., and Blackburn, J., that F. was duly appointed, and therefore the certificate was valid; per Crompton, J., and Blackburn, J., that if quo warranto would lie for the office of a member of a Burial Board, as to which quare, the appointment of F. could not be questioned in this collateral proceeding, and then the certificate would be valid. I. The doctrine laid down by Sir J. Nicholl, in Jarratt v. Steele, 3 Phillim. 167, 169-170, "that the possession of the church is in the minister and the churchwardens;-and that no person has a right to enter it when it is not open for Divine service, except with their permission, and under their authority," holds in Benefice. See BANKRUPT, VII. the temporal as well as in the Ecclesiastical Courts: By the Exchequer Chamber; consisting of Erle, C. J., Williams and Willes, JJ., and Channell, B.; affirming the judgment of EJECTMENT. See INTERROGATORIES. Id. ELECTION. By deed made the 4th September, 1843, B. granted to A. license to get all the copperas stone which might be found in a certain part of the manor of M. for twenty-one years, at the yearly rent of 251., payable half-yearly on the 24th June and 25th December, with a proviso that if any part of the rent should be in arrear for twenty-one days, it should be lawful for B., his heirs and assigns, by notice in writing delivered to A., his executors, administrators, or assigns, to determine the grant. On the 31st January, 1856, J. H., who had become assignee of the license, assigned the license to the defendants by way of mortgage, and on the 5th August, 1857, it was absolutely assigned to the defendants by arrangement under the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, III. FINES AND 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, who by oral agreement that the actions should be settled on certain These terms the RECOVERIES, I. ERROR. ESTIMATE. See BOARD OF HEALTH, V., VI. ESTOPPEL. See BILL OF EXCHANGE, IV. EVIDENCE. Upon an information, under stat. 5 G. 4, c. 83, s. 3, against a person able to maintain his wife and children, for neglecting and refusing to do so, whereby she and they became chargeable to a Union, the wife of the accused is not a competent witness against him. Reeve, Ap364 pellant, Wood, Respondent, See CORONER, IV., VI. WAY, Right of. of account stated. See BILL OF EXCHANGE, IV. 1858, the plaintiff gave a written notice to the Parol. See INSURANCE, MARINE, VIIL defendants and J. H., pursuant to the proviso, to determine the license. On the 11th January, 1859, the defendants tendered to the plaintiff 50%. for two years' rent due at Christmas, 1858, which the plaintiff refused to accept. In trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's close and taking away copperas stone, the Court having power on a special case to draw inferences of fact: 1. Held, by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Court below, that the plaintiff, after the cause of forfeiture had occurred, sufficiently expressed and communicated to the defendants his determination to treat the license as existing, and was bound by that election, and therefore the subsequent notice was inoperative. 2. Quære, whether, the distress being within six months after the cause of forfeiture, the period within which, by stat. 8 Ann. c. 14, ss. 6, 7, a lessor may distrain after the determination of a lease, would by itself amount to an EXCHANGE. See BILL OF. EXTRADITION. See INTERNATIONAL LAW. FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. FALSE PRETENCES. FENCING FOOTPATHS. |