dough together in an attempt to obey the order of the superintendent. To do so he was obliged to lift this mass, which weighed some 60 or 70 pounds, out of the stock box, and put it forward from his body so that it would drop between the rolls and feed in. He attempted to do this while standing upon the block, and the position he was required to assume to make the necessary movements caused the block to slip backwards, and away from the machine for about two feet because of the slippery and inclined floor, and by such slipping, and without negligence on his part, he was thrown against the machine, and his right hand went between the two revolving rolls. He cried out, and seized the frame of the machine with his other hand and endeavored to prevent his right hand from feeding into the rolls. A fellow employé attempted to hold him away from the drawing force of the rolls, and shouted to Rocco to stop the water wheel, who went to the wheel pit and attempted to stop the water wheel, but did not succeed, and the plaintiff by his own efforts disengaged his hand. The rolls were revolving slowly, and, had this machine been equipped with any of the safety devices in common use at that time they could have been stopped almost instantly, and probably before plaintiff had received any substantial injury whatsoever to his hand, at least before the serious injury actually suffered had been received. The four fingers of the plaintiff's right hand were so badly crushed between the rolls that amputation of the fingers became necessary. against the defendant in return for his doctor's bill and hospital bill and wages, and that he could work for the defendant company at regular pay as long as he did not get lazy. Soon after the release had been obtained, the plaintiff and his father were discharged. It was the intention of defendant's superintendent to obtain this release without consideration, and the same was procured in such a manner that it would be grossly inequitable to hold the plaintiff to be bound thereby. The trial court found that the defendant was negligent in the following particulars: In maintaining said unlevel and inclining floor; in failing to provide wooden cleats or lattice-work for the employés to stand upon and prevent slipping; in causing large quantities of water to be discharged on the floor in front of the sheeting machines, thereby causing it to become slippery; in failing to exercise reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place in which plaintiff was required to work in respect to said conditions; in operating the machines without any safety device to stop same without stopping the water wheel; in failing to give plaintiff adequate instruction and caution in regard to the operation of said machine, and in ordering and permitting plaintiff to operate the mills alone until he had become more experienced; in ordering plaintiff to stand upon the moveable block without instruction and caution that the floor was unlevel, and, when wet, likely to be slippery, and that the block was likely to slip; in trying to hurry and force plaintiff, a green boy, to accomplish as much work on the machine as experienced men; and ordering him not to feed the rubber dough in pieces, but to lift it in all at one time. The court further found that the plaintiff was in the exercise of reasonable care under the conditions prevailing, and that his injury did not result from a cause of danger that was obvious to him, and rendered judg ment for the plaintiff for $1,500 damages. Upon the trial the plaintiff's father, having been called as a witness in rebuttal to contradict defendant's claims as to what was said at the time the plaintiff's father and mother called at defendant's office and had a conversation with defendant's general man While plaintiff was in the hospital, his father and mother called at the office of the defendant, and, through an interpreter, told the vice president and general manager of the company that they wanted to know what the company was going to do. The manager told them that the company would give plaintiff a permanent job, and told the father to come to work at once. The father commenced work in defendant's factory September 24, 1906, and was employed there until February 4, 1907, when he was discharged. The plaintiff returned to work at defendant's factory November 11, 1906, and remained there until January 21, 1907, doing sweeping and similar work. On December 14, 1906, the plaintiff was called into the office and his signature | ager, was asked on cross-examination this to a release of all his claims against the defendant was obtained by the bookkeeper and the superintendent of the defendant company. No interpreter or any other person, friendly to or in the interest of plaintiff, was present when the release was signed. The consideration expressed in the release was $107.50 received from the defendant. The defendant nad voluntarily paid wages to the plaintiff since his injury, and part of his hospital bill, amounting in all to $75.50, but these payments were not made as a part of any agreement. The persons who procured the plaintiff's signature claimed to have told him that question: "Well, you understood, didn't you, that if Mr. Askam [defendant's general manager] paid the doctor's bill and the hospital bills, and Joseph's wages, and did the rest of the things he said he would do, that that would settle the case?" This question was excluded upon plaintiff's objection. Subsequently on cross-examination he was asked: "Did Mr. Askam, or any one, say anything to you at the time of that conversation ** * which led you to believe or understand that if Mr. Askam and the company did what Mr. Askam said he or it would do that it would settle Joseph's claim against the Conn.) Seymour C. Loomis, for appellant. Birney Tuttle, for appellee. J. "No," was asked: "What did you suppose and of the plaintiff's inexperience, and that he was doing this for?" The court sustained the boy 17 years old who had worked on the machine but a few days, and that without plaintiff's objection to this question. adequate instructions, had not the knowledge or means of knowledge possessed by the defendant of the danger of the work which he was directed to perform. Assuming that the defendant might upon the hearing in damages have availed itself of a legal discharge from all liability, the trial court properly treated the release presented in evidence by the defendant as invalid. The infancy of the plaintiff, his ignorance of the English language, and the circumstances under which the release was procured were sufficient reasons for setting it aside. As it was presented upon a hearing in damages, the plaintiff was not required to plead its invalidity, and, as the payments by the defendant of plaintiff's wages and a part of his hospital bills are found to have been voluntary and not made under any agreement of settlement, it was not necessary to make the return of the sum so paid a condition to the annulment of the discharge. HALL, J. (after stating the facts as above). In his appeal to this court the defendant claims that the superintendent's orders to the plaintiff to "put in another shovelful of powder" and "not to pick it (the rubber dough) up in pieces," but to "take it up altogether and shove it in," was the real cause of the accident, and that these acts of negligence are not alleged in the complaint, and were therefore erroneously made the basis of the judgment for substantial damages. The complaint states a good cause of action, and properly describes several acts of defendant's negligence as the causes of the plaintiff's injury. All of them having been proved, the fact that several others were also established without objection ought not to defeat the plaintiff's recovery. But proof that these two orders were given is not variant from the averments of the complaint that the superintendent ordered the plaintiff "to hurry and feed faster," and directed him to work upon this machine. The plaintiff was not required to state in his complaint the precise words by which he was directed to work on this roller. The complaint contains a sufficient averment that he was so directed, and a sufficient description of the acts of negligence proved, to sustain the judgment rendered upon a hearing in damages after a default. Anderson v. United States Rubber Co., 78 Conn. 48, 52, 60 Atl. 1057. The complaint contains a direct allegation that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's negligence. A separate averment that the negligence of the plaintiff did not contribute to the injury or that he was in the exercise of due care was therefore unnecessary. Brockett v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 73 Conn. 428, 433, 47 Atl. 763. The defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the question asked the plaintiff's father on cross-examination whether he did not understand that, if Mr. Askam paid certain bills and did certain things, that would settle the case, since the witness afterward same question. answered practically the Whether the next question, "What did you suppose he was doing this for?" should have been allowed was so far a matter of discretion with the trial court in determining the proper limits of cross-examination that its exclusion is not a sufficient ground for a new trial. Other assignments of errors in rulings upon questions of evidence not pursued in defendant's brief are not noticed. We discover no ground for the claim that the trial court did not apply the proper tests of negligence in holding upon the facts found that the defendant failed to sustain the burden imposed upon it by the default of either disproving the negligence with which it was charged or of proving contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff. There is no error. The other Judges concurred. Appeal of STAVOLO. 18, 1908.) (81 Conn. 454) It is contended that the complaint is insufficient because it fails to aver that the plaintiff did not have equal means of knowledge with the defendant of the alleged unsafe conditions; and Keefe v. National Folding Box Co., 66 Conn. 38, is cited as sustaining this claim. In that case the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was negligently put to work in placing colored paper saturated with (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Dec. poison in a box greatly heated with steam. It was held upon demurrer that the facts alleged failed to sustain the averments that the defendant was bound to know of the presOn appeals from decisions of county comence of the poison, and that, so far as ap-missioners granting an occupant of premises a peared, the plaintiff's means of knowing it removal permit, and refusing to grant the owner of the premises a liquor license, which were were as good as the defendant's. In the case before us it appears sufficiently clear from the tried together in the superior court, whether the commissioners had exceeded their powers in averments of the complaint that the defend-granting the occupant a license to the premises ant knew of the unsafe conditions described, before the removal permit was granted, and aft 1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS ($ 75*)--PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE LICENSES-APPEAL FROM DECISION-MATTERS REVIEWABLE. 2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 102*)-LICENSES "RENEWAL LICENSES"-STATUTORY PRO VISIONS. A liquor license granting the same privilege to the same person to sell in the same place is a renewal license within Gen. St. 1902, § 2647, providing that no license except a renewal of a license shall be granted in purely residential or manufacturing parts of a town, with certain exceptions, but a license granted to a different person would not be a renewal. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Dec. Dig. § 102.*] er the owner had purchased the premises, but, saloon, although less so than No. 59, on the before his deed was recorded, was not in ques- opposite side of the street. This locality tion in the superior court; no appeal having been taken from the granting of that license. is practically a manufacturing and residen[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating tial part of the city. More saloons than one Liquors, Dec. Dig. § 75.*] in this vicinity would be too many. For more than 10 years previous to January 27, 1907, one Frank P. Bartley had occupied the premises No. 60 River street under a parol lease from month to month from the owner, and had there conducted a licensed saloon business. After the purchase of the place by Stavolo, with the knowledge of Bartley, the latter agreed to vacate the premises on or before November 1, 1907. He afterward refused to do so, and remained in possession until about January 27, 1908, and until after had been rendered against him, and in favor of Stavolo, for the possession of said premises. Bartley had previously, on the 9th of September, 1907, applied for a license for No. 60 River street, which was granted to him by the county commissioners on the 1st of November, 1907. No appeal was taken from the granting of such license, and on the 27th of January, 1908, the county commissioners granted the application of Bartley, made December 26, 1907, under section 2669 of the General Statutes of 1902, for a removal permit from No. 60 to No. 59, the appeal from the granting of which is Bormann's Appeal, supra. 3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 69*)-LICENSES-a judgment in an action of summary process SUITABILITY OF PLACE-QUESTION OF FACT. Whether premises at which a license to sell liquors is asked is a suitable place for a saloon is a question of fact. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Dec. Dig. § 69.*] 4. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 69*)-LICENSES SUITABLE PLACE FOR SALOON. Neither the fact that county commissioners had granted a renewal liquor license for a certain location in a residential and manufacturing part of a town, nor that they had granted the same person a removal permit to a more unsuitable location on the opposite side of the street, would as matter of law render the former location a suitable place for which to grant a license which was not a renewal; there being one saloon in the locality. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Dec. Dig. § 69.*] Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Ralph Wheeler, Judge. Application by Cono Stavolo for a license to sell intoxicating liquors. From a judgment of the superior court, affirming the action of the county commissioners in refusing a license, applicant appeals. Affirmed. James E. Walsh and William H. Cable, for appellant. Howard W. Taylor, for appellees. The appellant in the present case claimed in the trial court that since he, Stavolo, was the owner of the fee, he, and not Bartley, should have received from the county commissioners the license for No. 60 River street; that the fact that a license was granted to Bartley for No. 60 did not prevent the county commissioners from granting a license to the appellant for No. 60; that the license granted to Bartley for No. 60 was not a renewal license; and that as a matter of law No. 60 was a suitable place to be licensed. HALL, J. This appeal from the refusal Whether the county commissioners exceeded of the county commissioners to grant a li- their powers in granting the license to Bartcense to the appellant, Cono Stavolo, to sell ley for No. 60 on the 1st of November, and spirituous and intoxicating liquors at No. before Stavolo's deed of No. 60 was record60 River street, in the town and city of Dan-ed, was not a question in the superior court, bury, and Bormann's Appeal, 71 Atl. 502, as no appeal was taken from the granting of were tried together in the superior court, although argued separately in this court. Many of the facts stated and views expressed in the latter case are applicable to the decision of this appeal. In affirming the action of the county commissioners in the present case the superior court found these facts: The appellant, Cono Stavolo, purchased the premises No. 60 River street by deed dated October 26, 1907, and recorded November 7, 1907. On October 19, 1907, he applied to the county commissioners for a license, which was refused on the 8th of February without notice to him of a remonstrance which had been filed. He is a suitable person to receive a license, but No. 60 River street is an unsuitable place for a that license. The superior court sustained the appellant's claim that the granting of the license to Bartley did not as a matter of law prevent the granting of a license to the appellant. The trial court rightly held that the license granted Bartley on November 1, 1907, was a renewal within the meaning of section 2647 of the General Statutes of 1902. It granted the same privilege to the same person to sell in the same place specified in his license of the previous year. Bormann's Appeal, supra. A license granted to Stavolo would not have been such a renewal, since it would have been a license granted to a different person. Whether or not No. 60 was a suitable place for a saloon was a question of fact. Neither the proper granting by the county commis-recting the bank to pay to the donee the entire sioners of a renewal license to Bartley for No. 60, which under section 2647 they might in their discretion as to suitability of person and place grant even in a purely residential or manufacturing part of the town, nor what has been held to have been an improper granting to Bartley by the county commissioners of permission to remove his saloon from No. 60 to the more unsuitable location No. 59, rendered the former place as a matter of law upon the facts found a suitable place for which to grant a license which was not a renewal. There is no error in the judgment of the superior court. The other Judges concurred. (81 Conn. 372) CANDEE v. CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK et al. deposit. The depositor had lost her bank book, Dig. 88 52-57; Dec. Dig. § 30.*] 6. GIFTS (§ 30*)-INTER VIVOS-DELIVERY. There may be a valid gift of a deposit in a savings bank in the donor's name, though he retains possession of the bank book. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. 88 52-57; Dec. Dig. § 30.*] (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Dec. 7. CONTRACTS (§ 77*) - "GOOD CONSIDERA. 18, 1908.) 1. GIFTS (§ 30*)—"GIFT INTER VIVOS"-REQUISITES-DEPOSIT IN SAVINGS BANK. To establish a gift inter vivos of a deposit in a savings bank, it must appear, not only that the depositor intended a gift, but also that he executed his intention and completed the gift by acts sufficient to pass title. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. 8 52-57; Dec. Dig. § 30.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3091-3093; vol. 8, p. 7671.] 2. GIFTS (§ 30*)-INTER VIVOS-REQUISITES— "USE." A depositor in a savings bank formed a fixed purpose of giving the deposit to her brother, and that the deposit should at once become his property. She had lost her bank book, and delivered to her brother an order on the bank, directing it to pay the entire deposit to him. At the time of the delivery of the order to him, she stated that she gave him the deposit "subject to her use of the same" for life. Held to show an intention to make an absolute gift; the word "use" as applied to the use of money being the profit derived therefrom. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. § 52-57; Dec. Dig. § 30.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7228-7237, 7825.] 3. GIFTS (§ 18*)-INTER VIVOS-RESERVATION BY DONOR. A reservation by the donor of the use and enjoyment of the subject of the gift is not necessarily inconsistent with the absolute character of the gift, and a gift accompanied by such reservation may be valid. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. § 31; Dec. Dig. § 18.*] 4. GIFTS (§ 22*)-INTER VIVOS-DELIVERY. A gift is perfected when the donor places in the hands of the donee the means of obtaining possession of the contemplated gift, accompanied by acts clearly showing an intention to devest himself of all dominion over the property. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. $ 37; Dec. Dig. § 22.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3084-3087; vol. 8, p. 7670.] 5. GIFTS (§ 30*)—INTER VIVOS-DELIVERY. A depositor in a savings bank, intending to make a gift of the deposit, signed an order di TION. Since a good consideration is that of blood or natural affection, a gift made for such a consideration prevails, unless it interferes with the rights of creditors and purchasers. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 286-290; Dec. Dig. § 77.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3115, 3116.] Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge. Action in the nature of interpleader by David P. Candee against the Connecticut Savings Bank and against Clarence E. Thompson, executor of Jane A. Isbell, deceased, to recover a deposit in defendant bank. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant Clarence E. Thompson, executor, appeals. Affirmed. Howard C. Webb, for appellant. George E. Beers and George M. Wallace, for appel lee. RORABACK, J. On May 29, 1905, one Jane A. Isbell had on deposit in the Connecticut Savings Bank the sum of $363.14 which she was desirous of giving to her brother, the plaintiff. When Mrs. Isbell died in November, 1906, said fund was still on deposit in said bank, which refused payment because of conflicting claims made by the plaintiff and one Clarence E. Thompson, executor of the last will and testament of Mrs. Isbell. The court of common pleas for New Haven county having rendered judg ment for the plaintiff, the defendant Thompson in his appeal to this court, by several assignments of error, raises the following question: Was there a valid gift of the money in the Connecticut Savings Bank from the deceased, Jane A. Isbell, to the plaintiff, Candee, so that the money belonged to him? In order that a deposit of money in a savings bank to the credit of another person shall operate as a gift inter vivos, it should appear, not only that the depositor intend ed a gift, but also that he executed his in-ly showing an intention to give and to ditention and completed the gift by an act or vest himself of all dominion over the propacts sufficient to pass title. Main's Appeal, erty. Main's Appeal, 73 Conn. 638, 48 Atl. 73 Conn. 638, 48 Atl. 965. It appears that 965; Reed v. Copeland, 50 Conn. 472, 47 Mrs. Isbell was an old lady, a childless widow, and that she had the pecuniary ability to make the gift. She entertained an affectionate feeling for her brother, who was in needy circumstances. Her conduct leading up to and in giving an order transferring the deposit in the Connecticut Savings Bank in dicated a fixed purpose upon her part that the money in the bank should at once become the property of the plaintiff. It nowhere appears that she ever entertained any other desire, or changed her intention upon this subject. Having lost her bank book, she followed the instructions of the bank, and signed and delivered an order which one of its officers had drawn, which she gave to the plaintiff, stating that she gave him the fund "subject to her use of the same during her lifetime." This order, with the accompanying circumstances, is not only satisfactory evidence of an executed intention to give, but in the absence of the book was all that the donor could do to perfect the gift. Upon the facts found independently of the expression "use of the same for her lifetime," an intention to make an absolute gift is clearly shown. This expression does not make the gift conditional or uncertain, but simply postpones the day of enjoyment. She intended that the fund should at once become the property of the plaintiff, and there was no attempt to make the gift effectual after death. The elementary definition of the "use" of money is the benefit or profit to be derived therefrom. Taking this whole expression together with the circumstances under which it was used, the only intelligent construction to be given to it is that the words "use of the same for her lifetime" simply included the income or profit of the money in the bank. A reservation by the donor of certain proprietary rights in the subject of the gift such as the use and enjoyment thereof is not necessarily inconsistent with the absolute character of the gift, and gifts accompanied by such reservations have been repeatedly upheld. Bone v. Holmes, 195 Mass. 496, 81 N. E. 290; Smith v. Savings Bank, 64 N. H. 230, 9 Atl. 792, 10 Am. St. Rep. 400; Green v. Tulane, 52 N. J. Eq. 169, 28 Atl. 9; Hope v. Hutchins, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 77; O'Neil v. Greenwood, 106 Mich. 572, 64 N. W. 511; Smith v. Youngblood, 68 Ark. 255, 58 S. W. 42. Am. Rep. 663; Scott v. Berkshire County Savings Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N. E. 925; Howard v. Windham County Savings Bank, 40 Vt. 597; Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 Atl. 43, 44 L. R. A. 205; Sayre v. Weil, 94 Ala. 466, 10 South. 546, 15 L. R. A. 544; Goelz v. People's Savings Bank, 31 Ind. App. 67, 67 N. E. 232. The plaintiff's claim is based on an order in these words: "New Haven, Conn., May 29, 1905. Connecticut Savings Bank of New Haven: Pay David Candee the entire amount on my deposit book number 70653. Jane A. Isbell." With full knowledge of the loss of the bank book and of Mrs. Isbell's intention to give the money to the plaintiff, and for the purpose of assisting her in carrying out this intention, one of the officials of the savings bank filled out this order and delivered it to the plaintiff, informing him that it would be necessary for him to obtain the signature of Mrs. Isbell to make the transfer effectual. This was obtained, and the plaintiff returned to the bank with the order signed, and pre sented the same. Then the bank, by one of its officers, made a memorandum upon the page of the ledger containing Mrs. Isbell's account, reading as follows: "May 29th, 1905, David P. Candee holds order for the entire amount." In May, 1906, the plaintiff by an order signed by him without the bank book drew the interest which had accrued on this fund. This order, signed by Mrs. Isbell, was intended by her to operate as a donation and transfer of the money therein specified. The bank, with full knowledge of her intention, recognized and accepted it for the purpose for which it was made. Mrs. Isbell did all in her power to deliver to the plaintiff the means of reducing to his possession the money on deposit in the bank. She could not at any time after making the gift have maintained an action for the recovery of this money from the bank. There is nothing to show that the defendant administrator had any better claim for the fund than the decedent whom he represents. The administrator is bound by this transfer as if a purchase had been made for a valuable consideration. It is claimed that the alleged transfer was incomplete, in that said order was not witnessed and was unaccompanied by the bank book, as required by the laws of said bank. An examination of the It is claimed that there was not a com- by-laws of the bank fails to disclose any replete delivery of the money deposited in the quirements that orders for the payment of bank. It is not necessary that there should money shall be witnessed. The blank form be a manual delivery of the thing given; of the order used by the bank for the purnor is there any particular form or mode in pose of making transfers of deposits containwhich the transfer must be made. The gift ed a requirement that it "must be dated, may be perfected when the donor places in signed, witnessed, and accompanied by the the hands of the donee the means of ob- book." Mrs. Isbell, intending to make a taining possession of the contemplated gift, transfer of her deposit by means of such an |