to save expense to the plaintiffs. Nor do we think the other damages allowed to the plaintiffs for actual occupation of the land and for detriment to the rest of the land are so clearly excessive as to warrant an interference with the verdict.

The defendants' exceptions are therefore overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court, with direction to enter judgment on the verdict.

(29 R. I. 428)

diately, under Court and Practice Act 1905, § 483, which reads as follows: "Sec. 483. Exceptions to rulings, directions, and decisions made during a hearing in a cause heard by the court without a jury or during a trial by a jury shall be taken immediately. teson, C. J., in Bristow v. Nichols, 19 R. I. As was clearly explained by Mat719, 37 Atl. 1033: "To render a trial not a full, fair, or impartial trial, within the meaning of Gen. Laws 1896, c. 251, § 2, there must, we think, be something more than mere error on the part of the court which would form the subject of an exception. March 12, Unless there be something more than this, be to do away practically with the procedure to grant a new trial under section 2 would provided in section 6."

CAMPBELL v. CAMPBELL et al. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

1909.)

1. TRIAL (§ 31*)-EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS TIME FOR TAKING.

The conduct of the court, in compelling counsel to choose either to continue the case without witnesses after the regular hour of adjournment or to limit the number of witnesses to be called on the following day to those he could forthwith name, is a ruling made during the hearing of a cause, subject to exceptions to be taken immediately, under Court and Practice Act 1905, § 483.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. 88 55, 84; Dec. Dig. § 31.*]

2. NEW TRIAL (§ 20*)-Grounds-Conduct of COURT.

The conduct of the court in requiring counsel to choose either to continue the case without witnesses after the regular hour of adjournment or to limit the number of witnesses to be called on the following day to those he could forthwith name, without having previous notification that the court would sit beyond the usual time or that he would be compelled to make such choice, is not such a denial of an impartial trial as, under Court and Practice Act 1905, 472, entitles a party to a new trial. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. § 23; Dec. Dig. § 20.*]

Action by Elisha J. Campbell against George E. Campbell and others. There was a verdict for defendants, and plaintiff petitions for a new trial. Petition denied and dismissed.

See, also, 71 Atl. 369, 881.

Green, Hinckley & Allen, for petitioner. James Harris and Irving Champlin, for respondents.

therefore the appellant's petition for a new That case is determinative of this, and trial must be denied and dismissed.

LANASA v. STATE.

(109 Md. 602)

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. Jan. 15, 1909.)
1. CONSPIRACY (§ 23*)-DEFINITION OF TERM.
A "conspiracy" in general terms is a com-
action to accomplish some criminal or unlaw-
bination of two or more persons by concerted
ful purpose; or to accomplish some purpose,
not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
be punishable by indictment.
unlawful means. The act intended need not
the offense is the unlawful agreement and combi-
The essence of
nation of the parties, and therefore it is com-
plete whenever such combination is formed,
though no act be done toward carrying the main
design into effect.

Cent. Dig. § 32; Dec. Dig. § 23.*
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Conspiracy,

vol. 2, pp. 1454-1461; vol. 8, p. 7613.]
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases,
2. CONSPIRACY (§ 23*)—AGREEMENT FOR DE-
STRUCTION OF PROPERTY-"COMPLETED CRIM-
INAL CONSPIRACY."

A combination and agreement between two
or more persons willfully and maliciously to
injure and destroy the property of a third per-
the subject of indictment; it not being neces-
son is a "completed criminal conspiracy," and is
sary to the completion of the crime that the con-
spirators should determine in advance what par
ticular property should be injured or destroyed.
Dec. Dig. § 23.*]
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Conspiracy,

3. CONSPIRACY (8 43*)-AGREEMENT TO DESTROY PROPERTY-INDICTMENT-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.

As it is not essential to the completion of that any particular property should be destroythe offense of conspiracy to destroy property ed, it is not required that the object of the unexecuted conspiracy should be set out with great particularity and certainty in the indictment; and reasonably inform the accused of the offense only such facts being required as shall fairly with which he is charged.

PER CURIAM. This is the appellant's petition for a new trial, under Court and Practice Act 1905, § 472, upon the ground that he did not have a full, fair, and impartial trial in the superior court, for the reason that the justice who presided at the trial in said superior court compelled his counsel to choose either to continue the case without witnesses after the regular hour of adjournment or to limit the number of witnesses to be called on the following day to those he could forthwith name, without having previously notified him that the court would sit beyond the usual time that night, or that he would be compelled to make such choice. The conduct of the court complained of was subject to exception to be taken imme-willfully and maliciously "injure and destroy the

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Conspiracy, Cent. Dig. § 86; Dec. Dig. § 43.*] 4. CONSPIRACY (§ 43*) STROY PROPERTY-INDICTMENT-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.

AGREEMENT TO DE

An indictment charging a conspiracy to

property" of the prosecutor is sufficient without | 13. WITNESSES (8 198*) - "PRIVILEGED COMfurther description of the property.

11. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 510*)-EVIDENCE-TES-lant filed a general demurrer to the indictTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICES-CORROBORATION. A conviction of conspiracy to destroy property cannot be had on the uncorroborated testimony only of accomplices connecting defendant with the crime. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. 88 1124, 1125; Dec. Dig. § 510.*]

and the motion in arrest of judgment was upon the seventh count of the indictment the overruled by the Supreme Bench of Balti- traverser was acquitted of the identical more city. The object of the conspiracy | crime for which he was convicted upon the charged in the counts of the indictment up-third count; secondly, because the judgment on which he was tried was as follows:

deprives the appellant of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In the elaborate briefs filed by the counsel for the appellant and the state these questions have been fully discussed, and many cases, both in this country and in England, upon the law of conspiracy, have been called to our attention. It is apparent that upon this sub(7) Unlawfully to willfully and malicious-ject, as upon most others, there is much real ly injure and destroy the property and | or apparent conflict to be found in the addwelling house of the said Joseph Di Gior- judged cases. Upon the settled law of this gio.

port the allegations of these counts, it did satisfy them that it was the purpose of the accused to injure and destroy some of Mr. Di Giorgio's property. We must conclude that they were so convinced by the verdict of guilty upon the third count and the acquittal upon the others. The sufficiency of the evidence was a question for the jury, and this court upon a motion in arrest of judgment has no power to review their finding. We said in Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 446, 28 Atl. 401, that: "As an appellate court we cannot review the findings of the jury upon matters of fact, nor can we pass upon the comparative weight of the conflicting evidence submitted to them. If no error of law had been committed by the inferior court in any of its rulings, the verdict of the jury, whether right or wrong, just or unjust, and even though it be directly against and in the very teeth and face of the preponderance of evidence, cannot be interfered with here; and there is no power lodged elsewhere to set the verdict aside, except with the Judge before whom the case was tried." Much that was said in argument in support of the motion in arrest of judgment cannot be considered by this court; but could have been appropriately addressed to the trial court upon an application for a new trial.

unlawful, or prejudicial to the community, | evidence in their judgment did not fully supis a conspiracy.'" We cannot for a moment doubt that a combination and agreement between two or more persons willfully and maliciously to injure and destroy the property of a third person is a completed criminal conspiracy, and is the subject of an indictment. Nor is it necessary to the completion of the crime that the conspirators should determine in advance what particular property should be injured or destroyed. To hold that the law cannot interpose and arrest by criminal procedure the malicious purposes of the conspirators, unless they had agreed upon the destruction of some particular property, would strip it of its most beneficent preventive powers, and leave the confederates at liberty to consummate their wicked purposes. The law is not so impotent and ineffective. As it is not essential to the completion of the offense that any particular property should be destroyed, it is therefore not required that the object of the unexecuted conspiracy should be set out with great particularity and certainty in the indictment, because only such facts need be stated as shall fairly and reasonably inform the accused of the offense with which he is charged. To require more in such a case would be to put an unnecessary burden upon the state, and make it impossible in many cases to secure the conviction of the guilts. The position taken by the state that, in a prosecution for such an offense as that charged in the third count, the indictment need not particularly describe the property, the injury, or destruction of which was the object of the conspiracy, is well supported by the authorities. 2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure, §§ 204, 207, 208; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law, c. 21; U. S. v. McKinley (C. C.) 126 Fed. 242; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539, 14 Sup. Ct. 680, 38 L. Ed. 545; United States v. Stevens (D. C.) 44 Fed. 132, 141; State v. Straw, 42 N. H. 393; Reinhold v. State, 130 Ind. 467, 30 N. E. 306; People v. Clark, 10 Mich. 314; 8 Cyc. 664, 666.

We are of opinion that the third count charged the defendant with a common-law conspiracy, and sufficiently informed him of the crime charged. The objection against it is purely technical, as it is not pretended that he was in the slightest degree injured or prejudiced by the general and indefinite description of the property, the destruction of which is charged to have been the object of the conspiracy. On the contrary, the record shows that he was well informed as to the accusation against him. Nor can we discover any necessary repugnance between the verdict of guilty on the third count and the verdicts of acquittal on the seventh and eighth counts. In those counts the object of the conspiracy was alleged to be "to injure and destroy the property and dwelling house of Joseph Di Giorgio." The jury might have

It is insisted by the appellant that the indictment, trial, verdict, judgment, and sentence violate the sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments of the federal Constitution, and the sixteenth and twenty-first articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The sixth amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and the fourteenth declares that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Practically the same declarations are found in the twenty-first and twenty-third articles of the Declaration of Rights of this state. The object of these provisions was to declare and secure the pre-existing rights of the people as those rights had been established by usage and the settled course of law. We take it to be settled that when a person accused of crime within a state is subjected, like all other persons, to the law in its regular course of administration in the courts of justice, he cannot be heard to say that the proceedings and judgment were without due process of law because law in its regular and orderly administration through the courts is due process of law within the meaning of the constitutional provisions, and, when the rights of the citizen are thus secured by the law of the state, the requirements of the federal Constitution are gratified. Having herein before held that by the law of this state the third count of the indictment is sufficient, it necessarily follows that the appellant has been deprived of

first article of the Maryland Declaration of courts must adopt the methods of punishRights or the sixth or fourteenth amendment prescribed by law. No one ought to ment of the federal Constitution.

imagine that in a free country a court would have the power to devise new and singular modes of punishment. Its duty is 'dicere non facere legem.' Even where the law confides to the judge the imposition of the sentence without definite limit, it still may be possible to violate the Declaration of Rights. If the punishment is grossly and inordinately disproportionate to the offense so that the sentence is evidently dictated not by a sense of public duty, but by passion, prejudice, ill will, or any other unworthy motive, the

remanded for a more just sentence." While the sentence in this case is severe, it is not open to the objection of being in the sense of the law cruel or unusual. We cannot review the action of the lower court in refusing to require the state to elect between certain counts and in overruling the appellant's demand for a bill of particulars. Those motions were addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action upon them is not the subject of an appeal in the absence of some gross abuse of discretion in the lower

we find nothing of that kind in this case. Warren v. Twilley, 10 Md. 39; Gibson v. State, 54 Md. 453. In Gibson's Case it is said: "No question has been raised in this court to the refusal of the court below to compel the state to elect on which the prisoner should be tried. The practice is well settled in this state that such a motion is ad

It is urged that the judgment should be reversed, because it constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and of the Constitution of the United States. In support of this contention the appellant relies upon the eighth amendment of the federal Constitution, which forbids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, and upon article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which declares that no law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and pen-judgment ought to be reversed and the cause alties ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter. To dispose of this question we must understand the real crime of which the accused was charged. Di Giorgio was a prominent business man living in Baltimore city and engaged in the importation of fruit to the Baltimore market. He lived with his wife and family at Walbrook. In order to extort money from him, threatening letters demanding money were sent him by an organization or society of men known as the "Black Hand." He declined to comply with these demands, and on the night of De-court resulting in injury to the accused, and cember 10, 1907, a dynamite bomb was placed in the rear room of his dwelling house and exploded, terrorizing the occupants of the house, and causing much damage. Whatever may have been the motive which prompted this act, whether it was an attempt to murder Di Giorgio and his family in revenge for his refusal to pay over money in response to demands made upon him, or had for its ulti-dressed to the discretion of the court, and mate purpose the coercion of Di Giorgio by personal violence into a compliance with these demands, there can be no two opinions as to the heinousness of the crime. It was an act characterized by the most malicious and diabolical wickedness, and should be punished with the greatest severity. We do not think that a sentence of 10 years for such a crime would be open to any constitutional or other objections. In the case of Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 527, 34 Atl. 246, where the accused had been sentenced to jail for a term of 15 years upon a conviction | We find no reversible error in the first, secfor an assault with intent to commit a rape, ond, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, this court passed upon the very question now ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, before us, and held that the sentence was not fourteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, a cruel and unusual punishment within the nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twentyconstitutional prohibition. It is said in that second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twentycase that "our law inflicts pain not in a sixth, twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and spirit of vengence, but to promote the essen- twenty-ninth exceptions. There was, howtial purposes of public justice. Severity is ever, serious error committed by the court not cruelty. The punishment ought to bear in the sixteenth, twenty-fifth, thirtieth, thirtya due proportion to the offense. Crimes of first, thirty-second, thirty-third, thirty-fourth, great atrocity ought to be visited with such thirty-fifth, and thirty-sixth exceptions. The penalties as would check, if not prevent, state relied largely upon the testimony of Tamtheir commission. It is impossible in the buro and Lupo to connect Lanasa with this abstract to mark the boundaries which sep- crime. Both were under indictment, and upon arate cruelty from just severity. If the the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices circumstances which accompany the crime connecting Lanasa with the crime the law does are of unusual aggravation, the punishment not permit a conviction to stand. Wharton's

is not a subject of appeal or writ of error. State v. Bell, 27 Md. 677, 92 Am. Dec. 658. It is unnecessary to multiply authorities on this question, as they are practically unanimous in support of the doctrine stated by this court.

2. This brings us to the consideration of the 36 bills of exception reserved by the accused to the rulings of the trial court upon questions of evidence. We have given these careful consideration; but we do not think it necessary to discuss them all separately.