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also seen that the questions proposed to be entrusted to that body are of a nature to render it subservient to one of the parties to every controversy which it would be required to decide. On these two grounds we hold the proposition of Governor Clinton to be indefensible. But to render the view of this subject entire, let us briefly examine the constitution and character of the national judiciary. This body is independent both of the national and state governments for the tenure of office, and for compensation. They are, therefore, above all influences of interest and authority. They have no powers to enlarge, nor will to execute, their office being confined exclusively to judgment. They have consequently no motive to excite, nor power to gratify, ambition. They have but one interest-reputation-an interest which can only be elevated and sustained by adhering inflexibly to established principles of law and government, and by applying to the cases arising within their jurisdiction, a wise and uniform course of decisions. They are selected on account of their legal knowledge acquired by long and laborious study, and of their general fitness for the business of judgment. A systematic course of usurpations is not to be apprehended from them, because they could not profit by such a course. The supposition that they would usurp for others, powers which they could not exercise themselves, furnishes ground, to say the least, only for a very remote apprehension. But the proposition of Governor Clinton supposes a disposition on their part to extend the powers of the federal government beyond their constitutional dimensions, in derogation of the rights of individual states. We do not see how this supposition is to be sustained: they are independent, both of the national and state governments, and we cannot discover in what manner they are exposed to influences in favor of either. Until some good cause is assigned for believing that there is danger of their encroaching upon the reservations of state sovereignty, we shall continue to think that the framers of the constitution of the United States have made the best possible provision, consistently with the imperfection of all human institutions, for a just distribution of powers between the different departments of the government.

In setting out with his proposition, Governor Clinton states, as a rule of natural justice, that no man should be a judge in his own cause, without perceiving that this rule is violated by the very measure which he recommends for the purpose of securing it. He proposes to tranfer powers from a body (the national judiciary) which is, from the nature of its constitution, independent, to another body (the senate of the United States, Vol. II. No. XI.

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which is, from the nature of its constitution, dependent. If the views which we have taken be just, the former of these bodies would be entirely neutral on the questions between the national and state authorities, and the latter of these bodies would inevitably be under the control of one of the parties. By reverting to our reasonings under the extract which we have last quoted, it will be perceived that this proposition defeats itself by fancying in one body a principle of dependence where none exists, and by ascribing the independence necessary for judicial purposes to another body, which is exposed to all the influences attendant on local, political, and party divisions.

We cannot dismiss this subject without adverting to a final objection, which has an importance equal, if not superior, to any other which we have stated; we mean the effect which Governor Clinton's proposition would have to destroy the established divisions of authority, and to assemble powers of a different nature in the same hands. History has furnished so many fatal instances of this accumulation of powers as to invest the slightest approach towards it, in the view of a sagacious forecast, with the forms of solemn admonition. In almost every case, where free institutions have been subverted, tyranny has had its origin in the corruption and enlargement of legislative power. The faculty of judgment, when exercised singly, has led to no great abuses, even in the ill-organized governments of antiquity, except by generating individual cases of hardship and injustice, and by lending itself, in some instances, to the purposes of personal malevolence and revenge. Standing alone, it has no power under the conditions of our system, except to prevent the movement of other powers beyond their legitimate boundaries. Associated with another power, depending upon a different principle, it would be liable to partake the nature of the latter, and lose that character of singleness and purity upon the preservation of which its efficacy entirely depends. Impressed with the justness of these considerations, we shall be compelled to regard any transfer of the powers of the national judiciary to the senate of the United States, as tending to build up the powers of individual states, and to dissolve that central confederating principle which binds them together, and gives to the whole, without impairing the individuality of the component parts, the air and energy of a single empire.

Independently of the objections which we have stated, the message of Governor Clinton is a very able and valuable document. A vast amount of useful information is presented;

many of the practical subjects of public concern are pursued into their details, and topics involving abstract principles of philosophy and law are discussed with a spirit of liberality, and with evident traces of scientific research. It does credit to his character and attainments, and, as a picture of the domestic prosperity and greatness of New-York, we do not see how any citizen of the state, not excepting his opponents, can peruse it without feeling within him resistless movements of pride and gratification.

Governor Clinton is one of those who leave the impress of their character and actions upon the age in which they live. Few men have the power, independently of great personal merits, of subduing opposition, and of converting the popularity which they acquire to their own purposes of public or personal utility. Governor Clinton is not one of these even with undisputed claims to the gratitude of his fellow-citizens, he could, perhaps, never have been called popular in the true spirit of the term. But his fame will be sure to follow him, and secure that public justice, which is not always rendered until the angry passions of party have passed away. We would not be understood to say or insinuate that the career of Governor Clinton has been faultless; but we should do him injustice by forbearing to say, that his eminent public services render it obligatory on the pride, if not on the justice of NewYork, to give his administration a fair and honorable support. To this countenance he will establish a double claim, if, bcsides cherishing, as heretofore, the great interests of the state, he avails himself of his official patronage to heal party animosities, to annihilate all political distinctions except those which have their origin in principle, and to rally his fellowcitizens in support of those great schemes of domestic improvement which have elevated the character of New-York in the eyes of the nation, and the character of the nation in the eyes of the world.

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The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth. In four volumes. Boston. Published by Cummings, Hilliard & Co.

1824.

We never comprehend half so distinctly the curious perils and delicate responsibilities of criticism, as when we venture to publish our opinions of the manner in which a poet or romancer has accomplished the task he has undertaken to perform. In discussing a moot point in political economy,-in examining a doctrine in morals or metaphysics,-in disputing pretended facts in history or science, the critic must be greatly to blame if he does not support his objections with a reasonable share of success. In all matters within the pale and influence of argument, he who has truth and justice and reason on his side, need never despair of convincing, though he may not silence, his antagonist; for here, at least, there must exist in the mind of the most unreasonable disputant, some fundamental truth, some universal principle, some of the indisputable axioms of philosophy, to which appeals from the decisions of prejudice and passion may be made with some confidence in the result. But the case is quite different in disputes about the merits of any literary production of an imaginative character. If the critic is not pleased with some part of a poem or a novel, he has very little chance with the reader, and absolutely none with the author, of justifying his disapprobation or dislike. If he urges in defence of his opinion, a train of arguments deduced from example or authority, he is told that the doctrine of stare decisis, in literature at least, is growing fast into discredit and disgrace. The argumentum ad modestiam being thus summarily disposed of, the reviewer has two courses to pursue. He may (as some of the fraternity occasionally do) declare his sovereign approbation or displeasure, without deigning to assign the grounds of his opinion, or the rule of his decision; or else, he must support the sentence he has undertaken to pronounce, by virtue of such general principles of taste, as he may have reason to believe will be admitted as valid and authoritative by those with whose opinions he is at issue. But here is the dif ficulty. The very existence of such general principles of taste has been strenuously denied,-at least by those who apprehend the effects of their application. It is contended, that as the object of a poem, a picture, a temple, or a statue, is to administer to the imagination a pleasurable stimulus, and

to gratify the intellectual taste with a healthful and appropriate aliment; the question of success becomes a matter of sentiment, and is wholly excluded from the province of argumentative investigation. The author refuses to acknowledge the jurisdiction and authority of reason; and puts himself and his performance upon the common sense and common feelings of mankind. Now, we candidly confess, we never could distinctly understand what is meant by an appeal for a decision on the merits of an imaginative performance, from the judgment to the feelings, from the head to the heart, as it is sometimes prettily denominated. Surely it cannot be pretended that the understanding can mislead the imagination into a false admiration of that which is not apt in design or beautiful in execution. Fancy would be laughed at for her folly and her falsehood, if she ventured to complain that she had been seduced and led astray by the wiles and the witcheries of greybearded Reason. All influence that argument may gain over sentiment is salutary and legitimate;-salutary, because utility is the very first object of the exercise of reason, and legiti mate, as far as it is salutary. If this be admitted, the champion of the sovereignty of sentiment is reduced to the necessity of maintaining, that argument has, in fact, no influence whatever over taste; that the works of the artist can never (in the language of the German metaphysicians) be objective to the understanding; that he who is once pleased with a landscape, an opera, or an ode, will continue to be pleased through all possible modifications, mutations and improvements of the faculties of reasoning whatsoever; and that what is once repelled by the imagination can never be regarded with complacency again, unless some accident, beyond the influence of reason, remove the antipathy by acting on the organic. sensibilities of the percipient. If this were true, it must be admitted that nothing would be more preposterous than criti cism on the works of the imitative artist. It would be as idle to discuss the merits of an epic poem, as to dispute about the fragrance of a flower or the flavor of a sauce. All conversation on subjects of imaginative gratification would be confined to the mere expression of the quantity of pleasure appreciated by the taste of the amateurs. The only question on every such occasion would be, "how do you like it?" and the only answers, "very much," "so so, or "not at all." There would be an end of all remark; for it is plain that every thing beyond the mere avowal of the degree of satisfaction which an object in the fine arts has communicated, is criticism to all intents and purposes, whether it be uttered by the lips or set

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