A Matter of Weeks Rather Than Months: The Impasse Between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War 1965-1969Trafford Publishing, 2012年8月2日 - 772 頁 Founded on 35 years of research into o the post-1945 Anglo-Rhodesian history, this book complements Richard Wood's The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963 (1983) and So Far and No Further! Rhodesia's bid for independence during the retreat from empire: 1959-1965 (2005). Of So Far, Michael Hartnack wrote that 'Once in a lifetime comes a book which must force a total shift in the thinking person's perception of an epoch, and of all the prominent characters who featured in it.' A Matter of Weeks Rather than Months recounts the action and reaction to Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of Rhodesia's independence, the second such declaration since the American one of 1776. It examines the dilemmas of both sides. Smith's problem was how to legitimise his rebellion to secure crucial investment capital, markets, trade and more. His antagonist, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was determined not to transfer sovereignty until Rhodesia accepted African majority rule in common with the rest of Africa. Given British feelings for their Rhodesian kith and kin and Rhodesia's landlocked position, Wilson eschewed the use of force. He could only impose sanctions but hoped they would defeat Smith 'in a matter weeks rather than months'. The Rhodesians, however, evaded the sanctions with such success that they forced Wilson to negotiate a settlement. Negotiations were nevertheless doomed because the self-confident Rhodesians would not accept a period of direct British rule while rapid progress to majority rule was made or the imposition of restraints on powers they had possessed since gaining self-government in 1923. In tune with their allies in the African National Congress of South Africa, the Rhodesian or Zimbabwean African nationalists had already adopted the Marxist concept of the 'Armed Struggle' as a means to power. Sponsored by the Communist Bloc, its surrogates and allies, they began a series of armed incursions from their safe haven in Zambia. Although bloodily and easily repulsed, they would learn from their mistakes as the Rhodesian forces would discover in the 1970s. Consequently, this is a tale of sanctions, negotiations and counter-insurgency warfare. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 78 筆
第 頁
... Suggesting that this proposal bekept secret until Wilson was ready'tolet it out insome form,' Mitchell suggested having Beadleflown toNairobi wherehe could beboth crossexamined andhavethe facts oflife explainedby either Malcolm ...
... Suggesting that this proposal bekept secret until Wilson was ready'tolet it out insome form,' Mitchell suggested having Beadleflown toNairobi wherehe could beboth crossexamined andhavethe facts oflife explainedby either Malcolm ...
第 頁
... suggested 'roughing thingsup forthe Portuguese in NATO' as they were in a very dangerous situation with African feelings running high. Because he believed that, ifthe Portuguese failedto cooperate over oil, the AfroAsians would usetheir ...
... suggested 'roughing thingsup forthe Portuguese in NATO' as they were in a very dangerous situation with African feelings running high. Because he believed that, ifthe Portuguese failedto cooperate over oil, the AfroAsians would usetheir ...
第 頁
... suggested mandatory sanctions toWilson under a UN ChapterVII resolutiontoforce the worldtostoptrading with Rhodesia.Saying this,he admittedthatboth heand Gibbs were being hurtbytheaccusations of their friends, notably Sir Frederick ...
... suggested mandatory sanctions toWilson under a UN ChapterVII resolutiontoforce the worldtostoptrading with Rhodesia.Saying this,he admittedthatboth heand Gibbs were being hurtbytheaccusations of their friends, notably Sir Frederick ...
第 頁
... suggested close British examination of bills of lading and certificates of origin of exports from Portuguese territoriesand particularly those fromLourengo Marques where Portugueseofficials wereconniving at illegal Rhodesian trade in ...
... suggested close British examination of bills of lading and certificates of origin of exports from Portuguese territoriesand particularly those fromLourengo Marques where Portugueseofficials wereconniving at illegal Rhodesian trade in ...
第 頁
... suggested to Wilson that he should withdraw South Africa's borrowing facilities. The situation was compounded by South Africa's gold reservesrising from£359 millioninJuly 1965 to $425 million inDecember 1965.104 To assist Wilsonin ...
... suggested to Wilson that he should withdraw South Africa's borrowing facilities. The situation was compounded by South Africa's gold reservesrising from£359 millioninJuly 1965 to $425 million inDecember 1965.104 To assist Wilsonin ...
內容
A Stay of Execution Harold Wilson and | |
First Contact with a British Minister Herbert | |
Chapter 24George Thomsonand theConsequences of Operation Nickelonthe AngloRhodesian Dialogue | |
The Second Attempt to Settle | |
B J Vorster Chapter 32 The VisitofJames Bottomley and theDecision | |
The Attempt to Salvage the Fearless Agreement | |
TheVisit of GeorgeThomson Chapter 36 Thomsons Returnto Rhodesiaand | |
Chapter 37Marking Time until the Commonwealth Conference The End of George | |
The First Steps | |
Appendix | |
Mandatory Sanctions Chapter 18Now grave actionsmust follow The Adoption of Mandatory Sanctions and NIBMAR | |
Taking Chargeof RhodesiasFuture | |
Endnotes | |
其他版本 - 查看全部
常見字詞
1961 Constitution African nationalist agreed andthe AngloRhodesian settlement argued Arthur Bottomley asked atthe Beadle’s Beira Bottomley Bowden Britain British Government BSAP Bulawayo bythe Cabinet Commission commitment crossvoting December declared demanded didnot economic election embargo entrenched clauses entrenchment force Gibbs and Beadle Gibbs’s Government House Government’s Governor Greenfield hadbeen hadto Harold Wilson hehad Hennings Herbert Bowden hewas hewould Howman Ian Smith immediately independence before majority interim government inthe issue itwas James Kariba Kaunda LardnerBurke London Lusaka majority African rule majority rule Malcolm MacDonald mandatory sanctions meeting negotiations November ofthe Rhodesian onthe political Portuguese Prime Minister proposed reassured rejected return to legality Rhodesian Front Rhodesian Government Rhodesian security Rhodesian whites roll seats Salisbury Secretary Security Council senate six principles South Africa Southern Rhodesia suggested talks test of acceptability theBritish theRhodesian Tiger tobe tothe Vorster wanted warned Watson Whitehall Wilson withthe wouldbe wouldnot Wright Zambia ZANU ZAPU