A Matter of Weeks Rather Than Months: The Impasse Between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War 1965-1969Trafford Publishing, 2012年8月2日 - 772 頁 Founded on 35 years of research into o the post-1945 Anglo-Rhodesian history, this book complements Richard Wood's The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963 (1983) and So Far and No Further! Rhodesia's bid for independence during the retreat from empire: 1959-1965 (2005). Of So Far, Michael Hartnack wrote that 'Once in a lifetime comes a book which must force a total shift in the thinking person's perception of an epoch, and of all the prominent characters who featured in it.' A Matter of Weeks Rather than Months recounts the action and reaction to Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of Rhodesia's independence, the second such declaration since the American one of 1776. It examines the dilemmas of both sides. Smith's problem was how to legitimise his rebellion to secure crucial investment capital, markets, trade and more. His antagonist, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was determined not to transfer sovereignty until Rhodesia accepted African majority rule in common with the rest of Africa. Given British feelings for their Rhodesian kith and kin and Rhodesia's landlocked position, Wilson eschewed the use of force. He could only impose sanctions but hoped they would defeat Smith 'in a matter weeks rather than months'. The Rhodesians, however, evaded the sanctions with such success that they forced Wilson to negotiate a settlement. Negotiations were nevertheless doomed because the self-confident Rhodesians would not accept a period of direct British rule while rapid progress to majority rule was made or the imposition of restraints on powers they had possessed since gaining self-government in 1923. In tune with their allies in the African National Congress of South Africa, the Rhodesian or Zimbabwean African nationalists had already adopted the Marxist concept of the 'Armed Struggle' as a means to power. Sponsored by the Communist Bloc, its surrogates and allies, they began a series of armed incursions from their safe haven in Zambia. Although bloodily and easily repulsed, they would learn from their mistakes as the Rhodesian forces would discover in the 1970s. Consequently, this is a tale of sanctions, negotiations and counter-insurgency warfare. |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 91 筆
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... Gibbs asked Smith and his colleagues to associate themselves with an ... Beadle telephoned Downing Streetonlyto be told thatWilson wasatthe Commons ... Beadle chose London instead ofneutral Malta (Wilson's last minute choice for preUDI ...
... Gibbs asked Smith and his colleagues to associate themselves with an ... Beadle telephoned Downing Streetonlyto be told thatWilson wasatthe Commons ... Beadle chose London instead ofneutral Malta (Wilson's last minute choice for preUDI ...
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... Beadle wereovertheir realisation that almost all thewhites and a significant number of Africans had backed Smith's ... Gibbs had put the suggestion toSmith, Dupont and LardnerBurke, and they had agreed to supportit. Replying confusingly that ...
... Beadle wereovertheir realisation that almost all thewhites and a significant number of Africans had backed Smith's ... Gibbs had put the suggestion toSmith, Dupont and LardnerBurke, and they had agreed to supportit. Replying confusingly that ...
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... Gibbs and Beadle protestedto Fingland that Wilson had thereby dashed anychanceof reopeningthe negotiations. Wilson, however, had not deterred Beadle who promptly telephoned LardnerBurke suggestingthat they meetthe next day, Sunday, 14 ...
... Gibbs and Beadle protestedto Fingland that Wilson had thereby dashed anychanceof reopeningthe negotiations. Wilson, however, had not deterred Beadle who promptly telephoned LardnerBurke suggestingthat they meetthe next day, Sunday, 14 ...
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... Gibbs. LardnerBurke reported that hehaddiscussed this with Beadle thatmorning and thatBeadle had argued he shouldstay because hehad already persuadedGibbs fromunwise action. The Cabinet seemed to accept both this and Beadle's reiterated ...
... Gibbs. LardnerBurke reported that hehaddiscussed this with Beadle thatmorning and thatBeadle had argued he shouldstay because hehad already persuadedGibbs fromunwise action. The Cabinet seemed to accept both this and Beadle's reiterated ...
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... Beadle forarapid meansof communication. Wilson preferred, however, to continue touse the secure means provided by Fingland at the British ResidualMission. Beadle also asked for British financial supportfor Gibbs. Wilson agreed toprovide ...
... Beadle forarapid meansof communication. Wilson preferred, however, to continue touse the secure means provided by Fingland at the British ResidualMission. Beadle also asked for British financial supportfor Gibbs. Wilson agreed toprovide ...
內容
A Stay of Execution Harold Wilson and | |
First Contact with a British Minister Herbert | |
Chapter 24George Thomsonand theConsequences of Operation Nickelonthe AngloRhodesian Dialogue | |
The Second Attempt to Settle | |
B J Vorster Chapter 32 The VisitofJames Bottomley and theDecision | |
The Attempt to Salvage the Fearless Agreement | |
TheVisit of GeorgeThomson Chapter 36 Thomsons Returnto Rhodesiaand | |
Chapter 37Marking Time until the Commonwealth Conference The End of George | |
The First Steps | |
Appendix | |
Mandatory Sanctions Chapter 18Now grave actionsmust follow The Adoption of Mandatory Sanctions and NIBMAR | |
Taking Chargeof RhodesiasFuture | |
Endnotes | |
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常見字詞
1961 Constitution African nationalist agreed andthe AngloRhodesian settlement argued Arthur Bottomley asked atthe Beadle’s Beira Bottomley Bowden Britain British Government BSAP Bulawayo bythe Cabinet Commission commitment crossvoting December declared demanded didnot economic election embargo entrenched clauses entrenchment force Gibbs and Beadle Gibbs’s Government House Government’s Governor Greenfield hadbeen hadto Harold Wilson hehad Hennings Herbert Bowden hewas hewould Howman Ian Smith immediately independence before majority interim government inthe issue itwas James Kariba Kaunda LardnerBurke London Lusaka majority African rule majority rule Malcolm MacDonald mandatory sanctions meeting negotiations November ofthe Rhodesian onthe political Portuguese Prime Minister proposed reassured rejected return to legality Rhodesian Front Rhodesian Government Rhodesian security Rhodesian whites roll seats Salisbury Secretary Security Council senate six principles South Africa Southern Rhodesia suggested talks test of acceptability theBritish theRhodesian Tiger tobe tothe Vorster wanted warned Watson Whitehall Wilson withthe wouldbe wouldnot Wright Zambia ZANU ZAPU