Jossman, at the time the bank failed, had on deposit in said bank in his name, as trustee, the sum of $1,995.60. What the relations of these parties were to each other and to the bank as far as this deposit was concerned cannot be gained from the contents of this petition. It has been necessary, therefore, to examine the entire record for that purpose. From such examination we are able to make the following statement:

It appears that the five persons named whom petitioner claims to represent in his petition organized, whether according to law or not does not appear, the International Live Stock & Timber Company of Mexico, and bought, probably in its name, 65,000 acres of land in Mexico. A large amount of the stock was issued to these five men, who signed their joint notes for the sum of $50,000 in payment for the land which was bought, or it may be as guarantors of the company's debts for that amount for which they held the company's notes. Whichever it was, they were indemnified against all their liability to the company and secured by other collateral securities. The entire amount of stock each took does not clearly appear. It does appear that they did sell some of their stock, the amount of which is not stated. It also appears they borrowed some money from private individuals for which they also gave their joint notes. This borrowed money and money arising from the sales of stock went into this account of "A. K. Edgar, trustee," and was to be used to pay pressing debts and interest arising out of this Mexican venture. This was done by them without authority of the company or any corporate action. It was wholly voluntary on their part and entirely independent of the company. They also created what they call a pool of some of their individual stock, and each of the five men put in 20 shares under an agreement between them that such

stock was to be held by the bank and not to be delivered to each individual until all the money they had borrowed for the above purpose had been paid in full. Jossman, who was cashier of the bank, disregarded this agreement and took out from the custody of the bank his own stock and delivered to Foster and Edgar their stock a short time before the bank closed. It was valueless and the company had no credit.

Petitioner positively testifies that this credit to his account as trustee belonged to himself and the four men he mentions equally, to each one-fifth. Petitioner was president, Foster was a director, and Jossman was cashier of the insolvent bank. One or two of the others were stockholders. Four of them at the time the bank was closed by the commissioner were largely indebted to the bank, Jossman in the sum of more than $100,000, petitioner in the sum of $3,000 or $4,000, the others in sums from $2,000 down to $800. Petitioner was treasurer of this Mexican company they were apparently promoting. Jossman was its secretary. One of the others was president. Edgar, as treasurer of the Mexican company, had an account credit in the bank at the time its doors were closed, which belonged to the company. Upon this claim the receiver paid the first dividend of 20 per cent. without question.

The contention in the case upon the part of the petitioner is that as trustee for himself and four others he held a valid claim against the bank and owed it nothing, so that it held no valid set-off against him, as such trustee, therefore, he was entitled as such trustee to participate in the first dividend as a bona fide creditor.

We cannot agree with such contention. The evidence in the case supports the contention of the receiver that this fund in dispute, deposited in the name of petitioner as trustee, was not the property of the

company, but was the property of these five men of which each individually owned one-fifth. This is clear, however muddled other transactions in relation to handling the stock of the company may appear, and was recognized by the petitioner, who was at the same time its treasurer.

We find, then, the relation of this insolvent bank, by its duly appointed receiver, to the petitioner and the four men named, who were operating with him, to be the same as if each had been a depositor in this bank to the amount of one-fifth of the sum $1,995.60, in which relation they are to be dealt with by the receiver in exactly the same manner as if they were individual depositors. The fact that the petitioner used the word "trustee" in designating this account did not change the relation of these parties, who operated together in this matter to each other or their individual relations to the insolvent bank. Their real relations may be shown.

The principle involved is the same as in case of a suit upon a promissory note between the original parties. A defendant maker who signs as "agent" may show who were in fact the parties to the note. Keidan v. Winegar, 95 Mich. 430 (54 N. W. 901, 20 L. R. A. 705); Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93.

The principle is well settled that the deposits and notes of the same person in an insolvent bank can be set off against each other even before the maturity of the notes in the hands of the bank. Thompson v. Trust Co., 130 Mich. 508 (90 N. W. 294, 97 Am. St. Rep. 494); Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148. In the case last above cited, the distinction between the rule of set-off applied in cases of equity and the strict rule of set-off at law is clearly stated. In the instant case the receiver of this insolvent bank was entitled to set off against the individual share in the deposit in question of each of the four persons

owning such share the amount of his indebtedness to the bank.

The order and decree of the circuit court is therefore affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

BROOKE, C. J., and KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

TOWNSHIP OF HAMPTON v. WESPINTER.

TAXATION-BOARD OF REVIEW-TIME OF MEETING STATUTES-ASSESSMENT.

In an action to recover taxes assessed against the defendant on personal property, the trial court was not in error in directing a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that defendant was not given sufficient opportunity to present his objection to the tax before the board of review, where the evidence tended to show that, on the last day fixed by statute for a meeting of the board, defendant's agent attended at the office of the town clerk, where he remained from about 2 o'clock until 2:30, that no member of the board was present during that time, the office was locked and no one was present and no notice posted to advise the public at what time the adjourned meeting, if any, would take place. 1 Comp. Laws, § 3853; Act No. 226, Pub. Acts 1907 (1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 1798).

Error to Bay; Collins, J. Submitted November 11, 1914. (Docket No. 27.) Decided March 18, 1915.

Assumpsit by the township of Hampton against Ida Wespinter for the collection of a personal property Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Kinnane & Lane, for appellant.

Cooley & Hewitt, for appellee.

MCALVAY, J. This was an action in assumpsit, brought in justice's court in the county of Bay, by the plaintiff, to recover the amount of $70.72, taxes assessed upon $5,500 personal estate in said township, by the supervisor against defendant. The tax was not paid and was returned as delinquent to the county treasurer, who issued a warrant to the treasurer of the township for its collection. Defendant pleaded the general issue to the declaration and gave notice of special defenses, the material one of which was, in substance, that the board of review of the township of Hampton did not sit the required time for review of the assessment roll of said township as provided by law, and defendant was given no reasonable opportunity to appear before it and be heard. The case was first tried in justice's court, then appealed to the circuit court, where a trial was had before a jury. This trial resulted in a verdict against the plaintiff, upon which a judgment was entered in due form, including costs to be taxed. Plaintiff has removed the case to this court for review upon a writ of error asking for a reversal upon errors assigned.

The principal question in the case is whether defendant was given a reasonable opportunity for appearing before the township board of review and objecting to her assessment in question. The facts are that on the last day provided by law in which the board of review is required to be in session for the purpose of reviewing and correcting the assessment roll, defendant's agent in her behalf went to the town clerk's office where the sessions of the board were to be held, for the purpose of examining, correcting, and reviewing her said assessment, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and found said office securely locked; that