Money and Macroeconomic Policy, 第 1 卷Sami Daniel, Philip Arestis, John Grahl Edward Elgar, 1999 - 226 頁 Twelve contributions comprise this festschrift in honor of two influential British economists. The first three sections address a number of issues faced by the established industrialized countries, including the formulation of macroeconomic policy, aspects of central bank independence, and the prospects for macroeconomic policy in the near future. An additional couple of essays discusses macroeconomic policy outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in Poland and the micro states of the Eastern Caribbean. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 93 筆
第 100 頁
... central bank independence Response to Alesina & Summers . Relationship is not causal. Year Economist 1985 Rogoff 1991 Grilli , Analysis Social welfare function weighting deviations of output and inflation from optimal levels . Calculates ...
... central bank independence Response to Alesina & Summers . Relationship is not causal. Year Economist 1985 Rogoff 1991 Grilli , Analysis Social welfare function weighting deviations of output and inflation from optimal levels . Calculates ...
第 106 頁
... central banks : low inflation at no cost ? ' , AEA Papers and Proceedings , Vol.85 , No.2 , May 1995 , 196–200 . Alesina , A. and Summers , L.H. ( 1993 ) , ' Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative ...
... central banks : low inflation at no cost ? ' , AEA Papers and Proceedings , Vol.85 , No.2 , May 1995 , 196–200 . Alesina , A. and Summers , L.H. ( 1993 ) , ' Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative ...
第 121 頁
... central bank independence may be more difficult than is sometimes suggested by the more standard exercises . We also find that , if the central banker is subject to an optimal compensation contract , it should be no more or less ...
... central bank independence may be more difficult than is sometimes suggested by the more standard exercises . We also find that , if the central banker is subject to an optimal compensation contract , it should be no more or less ...
內容
a further tale | 10 |
Kaleckis Political Aspects of Full Employment revisited | 18 |
continuing relevance | 34 |
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