power, subservient to their mutual independence; and thus the apparent violation of a fundamental principle affords the best security for its preservation.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

54. Under this head may be considered: First, The constituent parts of the Legislature, and the modes of their appointment: Secondly, Their joint and several powers and privileges: and Thirdly, Their method of enacting Laws, with the times and modes of their assembling and adjourning.

I. Of the constituent parts of the Legislature, and the modes of their appointment.

55. All Legislative powers granted by the Constitution, are vested in a Congress of the United States consisting of a Senate, and a House of Representatives.

56. This division of the Legislature into two coordinate branches, was meant to guard against the evil consequences of sudden and strong excitement and precipitate measures, which had been found to prevail in single legislative bodies.

57. A hasty decision is by no means so likely to be made, when a measure is liable to be arrested in its progress; and after its adoption by one branch of the Legislature, to be again subjected to the same forms and solemnities of deliberation, and to the jealous and critical revision of another body sitting in a different place, and from the delay thus induced, if from no other cause, enabled to avoid the prepossessions and correct the errors of the first.

58. Single Legislative assemblies without check or counterpoise, or a Government with all authority collected in one body or department, have been found, in all ages in which they have existed, corrupt and tyrannical dominations of majorities over minorities, uniformly and rapidly terminating in despotism.

59. The instability and passion which had marked the proceedings of two of the State Legislatures, consisting originally of a single House, were the subject of much public animadversion at the time of the contemplated establishment of the new Federal Government; and in subsequent reforms of their Constitutions, the People of the particular States referred to, were so sensible of this defect, that in each a Senate was introduced.

60. These examples, as well as the experience afforded by some of the proceedings of a Congress consisting of a single branch, and uniting in itself all the Executive and Judicial authority of the Union, with all the Legislative powers granted by the articles of confederation, must have had due influence in determining the Federal Convention to divide the national Legislature into two branches.

61. A further reason for this division of the Legislative power in the Government of the United States, arose from the combination of the national and federative principles in the new Constitution.

62. Upon just principles of public polity, it is essential, when a People are thoroughly incorporated into one nation, that every district or territorial subdivision of the community should have its proportional share in the Government; and that amongst independent sovereigns, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in respect to territory!

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and population, should each have an equal voi e in the public councils.

63. It was therefore proper, that in a Republic, partaking both of the national and federal characters, the Government should be founded on a combination of the principles of propor..onal, and equal, representation.

64. The application of this rule of combined representation afforded a convenient and effectual mode of dividing the Legislature of the Union into two co-ordinate branches, by constructing o..e of them upon the principle of proportional, and th other upon that of equal, representation.

65. The House of Representatives is accordingly constituted with as much conformity as practicable, to the principle of proportional representation; but not entirely so, as it is composed of representatives of the People of the several States, and thus far partakes of the federative quality.

66. It consists" of members chosen every second year by the People of the several States," and "the times, places, and manner of holding elections for . representatives are prescribed in each State by the Legislature;" but to guard against the neglect or refusal of the States to exercise this power, Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations."

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67. The electors of representatives in each State must possess "the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature;" and these qualifications are not uniform, as the Constitutions and practice of the several States in relation to them are different and various.

68. In general, the qualifications of electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures, are, that they be of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, free resident citizens of the State, and have paid taxes thereto.

69. In some of the States they are, morever, required to possess property of a certain description and amount; in some to be white, as well as free, citizens; and in others to possess all these qualifications, either together, or in different combinations.

70. A representative in Congress must have attained the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States; and must, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State in which he is chosen.

71. Representatives are apportioned amongst the several States according to their respective numbers, which are determined in each State by adding to the whole number of free persons, (including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed), three fifths of all other persons.

72. The Constitution provides for an actual enumeration of the people within three years after the first meeting of Congress; and directs one to be taken within every subsequent term of ten years in such manner as Congress shall by law direct.

73. The number of Representatives cannot exceed one for every thirty-thousand of the persons to be computed; but each State is entitled to at least one Representative.

74. The ratio of representation is applied to the representative numbers of the respective States, and

not to the aggregate numbers in all the States; nor can an additional representative be assigned to any State on account of any fractional number, which may emain after the application of the ratio to its representative numbers, even though the fraction excced 30,000.

75. The Senate of the United States is constituted upon the principle of equal representation; which, while it gave effect to the main design of a separation of the two branches of the national Legislature, was evidently the result of a compromise between the larger and the smaller States.

76. The Senate accordingly consists of two Senators from each State; and each Senator has one vote: each State, therefore, has its equal voice and weight in the Senate of the Union, without regard to disparity of population, wealth, or territory; yet as the Senators vote individually, without regard to States, the Senate, in that respect, partakes of the proportional or national quality.

77. The Senators are chosen by the respective State Legislatures; and if vacancies happen during the recess of the Legislature, the Executive power of the State may make temporary appointments until its next meeting, when the vacancy must be filled in the ordinary manner.

78. This mode of electing Senators favours a select appointment, and gives to the States such an agency in the formation of the general Govern ent as preserves their separate existence, and readers them, in their political capacities, active members of the federal body.

79. The State Legislatures respectively prescribe