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X.

A CAMPAIGN OF MANEUVRES.

JULY, 1863-MARCH, 1864.

I.

THE MARCH TO THE RAPIDAN.

THE safe retreat of Lee from Maryland into Virginia imposed upon General Meade the necessity of an immediate pursuit. This he undertook with a promptitude that was very creditable, considering the trying campaign that had just closed.

On recrossing the Potomac, Lee fell back into the Shenandoah Valley, placing his force on the line of Opequan Creek— the same position he had held during the autumn after his retreat from Antietam.

Meade's plan of advance into Virginia was confessedly modelled on that of McClellan in November, 1862; and it was probably the best that could have been adopted. As a problem in that branch of the art of war which is named logistics, or the supplying of armies, it was not considered practicable to subsist a force of the magnitude of the Army of the Potomac by the means available in a direct advance up the She nandoah Valley. It remained, therefore, to march by the route of the Loudon Valley; and by hugging the Blue Ridge closely, Meade hoped, by vigorous action, to bring the Con

federate force to battle under advantageous conditions before it should break through the mountains.*

The army crossed the Potomac on ponton-bridges at Harper's Ferry and Berlin on the 17th and 18th July, and followed southward, skirting the Blue Ridge; while Lee, conforming to this manœuvre, fell back up the Shenandoah Valley. The movement of Meade was made with much vigor-indeed with so much vigor that, on reaching Union, on the 20th of June, he was compelled to halt a day, lest by further advance he should dangerously uncover his right; but even with this delay, the army, on reaching Manassas Gap on the 22d, was so well up with the enemy, that it gained that point while the long Confederate column was still passing on the other side of the mountains. This, therefore, seemed an excellent opening for a flank attack, and it was fully appreciated by Meade, who directed five corps on Manassas Gap-the Third Corps, now under command of General French, being in advance. The selection of the leader for an enterprise demanding the most energetic qualities of mind-seeing that it was necessary to force Lee to battle under circumstances in which he would naturally wish to avoid it was very unfortunate; and by his mismanagement General French succeeded in depriving the army of one of the few really advantageous opportunities it ever had to strike a decisive blow. A slight observing force had been left at the Gap, but this was expelled, and the corps passed through on the evening of the 22d, prepared to advance on Front Royal in the morning. But, on moving forward to strike the enemy's line of retreat, the corps-commander acted with such feebleness,† as to allow the rear-guard to delay him

* No demonstration was made in the Valley of the Shenandoah other than that of a body of cavalry under Gregg, which retired after an indecisive engagement with the Confederate cavalry under General Fitz Hugh Lee at Shepherdstown.

+ General Warren, in his evidence before the War Committee, states that General French "made a very feeble attack, with one brigade only, and wasted the whole day." He adds, that General Meade "was more disappointed in that result than in any thing that had happened."-Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., pp. 381, 382.

the whole day, so that it was evening before he penetrated to the Confederate line of battle at Front Royal. Next morning, when Meade hoped to give battle, Lee had made good his retreat.* Upon this, as nothing was now to be hoped from the movement on hand, the march was conducted leisurely towards the Rappahannock, and Lee retired to the vicinity of Culpepper.

In this position a considerable period of repose followed; and this inaction was imposed not more by the necessity of resting and recruiting the army, than because both sides found it necessary to draw detachments from the armies in Virginia for other needs. From the army of Meade a considerable body was taken to send to South Carolina, and a large force withdrawn to dispatch to New York for the purpose of enforcing the draft, the attempted execution of which, some time before, had given rise to extensive riots in that city. On the other hand, the severe pressure that Rosecrans was bringing to bear upon the central army of the Confederacy under General Bragg, in Tennessee, prompted the detachment from Lee's army of the corps of Longstreet, for the purpose of throwing it into the scale as a make-weight against the Union force. This withdrawal took place early in September, and necessarily reduced the Confederates to a purely defensive attitude in Virginia. Soon afterwards, General Meade became aware of Longstreet's departure, and he then sent his cavalry across the Rappahannock, drove the enemy over the Rapidan, and subsequently followed with his whole force, occupying Culpepper and the regions between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, the latter river now becoming the

*"As the Federals continued to advance along the eastern slope of the mountains, apparently with the purpose of cutting us off from the railroad, Longstreet was ordered on the 19th of July to proceed to Culpepper Courthouse by way of Front Royal. He succeeded in passing part of his command over the Shenandoah in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas and Chester Gaps by the enemy. As soon as a ponton-bridge could be laid down, the rest of his corps crossed and marched through Chester Gap to Culpepper, where they arrived on the 24th. He was followed by Hill's corps. Ewell reached Front Royal the 23d, and encamped near Madison Courthouse the 29th."-Lee: Report.

dividing line between the opposing armies. As the position held by Lee on the south bank of the Rapidan was a very advantageous one, Meade's projects of advance turned towards a flanking movement; but just at the time he had matured a plan of operations, he was informed from Washington that it was found necessary to still further weaken the Army of the Potomac by the withdrawal of two corps to forward to Tennessee, in which section of the theatre of war the military situation had been seriously compromised by Rosecrans' defeat at Chickamauga-a defeat to which the force sent from Virginia under Longstreet had in no small degree contributed. The corps taken were the Eleventh and Twelfth, and they were put under the command of General Hooker. This, in turn, reduced Meade to a strict defensive; for though he received some accessions to his numbers from the draft, yet these added little to his real strength, the conscripts being raw and unreliable, and large numbers deserted at the first opportunity. It was evident, therefore, that he could undertake no considerable operation until the return of the troops sent to New York. But when, towards the middle of October, these finally came back, and General Meade was about to initiate an offensive movement, he found himself suddenly thrown once more on the defensive by the bold initiative of Lee, in an operation the events of which I shall now relate.

II.

THE FLANK MARCH ON CENTREVILLE.

Made aware of the heavy deduction of force from the Army of the Potomac, but exaggerating probably its extent, Lee early in October determined on an offensive movement that should have the effect of driving Meade back from the line of the Rapidan. With this object he resolved to move around his opponent's right flank, and endeavor to interpose

between him and Washington.* He counted that if he should be able in this situation to seriously cripple Meade, it would exhaust the season of active operations and detain the Army of the Potomac on the frontier for the winter, during which time it would be possible for Lee to still further re-enforce from his own command the heavily pressed Confederate Army of the West.

In execution of this plan, Lee crossed the Rapidan on Friday, October 9th, and taking "circuitous and concealed roads," passed by way of Madison Courthouse quite to Meade's right. Stuart, with Hampton's cavalry division, moved on the right of the column, while Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry division, with a detachment of infantry, was left to hold the lines south of the Rapidan and mask the turning movement.

The first positive intimation which General Meade had of Lee's intention was an attack made upon his advance posts on the right at James City, held by a portion of Kilpatrick's cavalry division and some infantry of the Third Corps. This force was driven in by Stuart on the 10th, and fell back on Culpepper; and it being then clear to Meade that his right was already turned, he that night sent back his trains, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 11th, began a retrograde movement across the Rappahannock. The march was accomplished during that night, and the bridge at Rappahannock Station blown up.

Lee with his main body reached Culpepper on the 11th to find that the whole army had moved behind the Rappahannock some hours before. He then halted during the rest of the 11th at Culpepper, while Stuart pressed the rear of

* I learn from General Longstreet that Lee at this time frequently spoke of an operation that should "swap Queens;" that is, he thought of marching direct upon and capturing Washington, giving up the attempt to cover Richmond. But Mr. Davis would never consent to this war à l'outrance; and, besides, the Army of Northern Virginia was at this time too much reduced from its late losses to authorize so audacious an enterprise.

+ Lee: Report of Fall Operations in Virginia.

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