phreys' little band joined in, and had the satisfaction to retake and bring back its lost guns. A new line was then formed by Doubleday's and Robinson's divisions of the First Corps, and by troops from the Twelfth Corps, brought up by General Williams.* Thus, at dusk, ended the action on the left centre, and at the same time the complicated action on the left, whose ebb and flow I have already described, was brought to a close. It has been seen how line after line was swept back, and how the enemy, following on the heels of the troops of Ayres last engaged, debouched from the woods in front of Little Round Top. Thus far, the success of Longstreet had indeed been considerable; but it had no decisive character, and until this crest and spur should be carried, he could claim no substantial victory; for the position wrested from Sickles was one intrinsically false, and though the successive attacks of Barnes and Caldwell and Ayres had been repulsed, yet the advantage was gained at a heavy cost to the Confederates. When, therefore, debouching from the woods, they suddenly saw across a narrow swale the beetling sides of Little Round Top crowned with troops and artillery, and the figure of a battle array defined on the bold crest to the right,t their line was visibly shaken. At this moment six regiments of the division of Pennsylvania Reserves, moving down the ridge, rapidly advanced under the personal leadership of General Crawford. This sally was enough to determine the action; for seeing attack to be hopeless, and in turn assailed themselves, the Confederates, after a sharp but brief contest for the retention of a stone wall occupied by them, hastily recoiled to the woods beyond the wheat-field, the opposite margins of which were that night held by the combatants. *It had been intended that Geary's division (with the exception of Greene's brigade) should also re-enforce the left; but this division missed its way. General Williams was temporarily in command of the Twelfth Corps, Slocum having charge of the whole right wing. Bartlett's and Wheaton's brigades, of the Sixth Corps, had just taken position on this crest Such was the main current of the action as it fell on the left and left centre of the army, and it was fought by Longstreet's corps and a part of Anderson's division of Hill's corps. Now the plan of battle contemplated that, while Longstreet attacked, Ewell should make vigorous demonstrations against the forces on Cemetery and Culp's hills, to prevent re-enforcements being drawn from that flank to increase the opposition to be encountered in the real assault against the Union left. For some reason, however, Ewell's demonstrations were much delayed, and it was sunset before he got to work. Then, opening up with a fire of artillery from a knoll in front of Cemetery Hill, he followed it by a powerful infantry attack with the divisions of Early and Johnson-the former on Cemetery Hill, the latter on Culp's Hill. As Early's columns defiled from the town, they came under the fire of Stevens' battery, at eight hundred yards; but, wheeling into line, they pushed up the hill, and as their front became unmasked, all the guns that could be brought to bear upon them (some twenty in number), were opened upon them, first with shrapnel, then with canister, and with excellent effect, for their left and centre were beaten back. But the right, working its way up under cover of the houses and undulating ground, pushed completely through Wiedrich's battery into Ricketts' battery. The cannoneers of both batteries stood well to their guns, and when no longer able to hold them, fought with handspikes, rammers, and even stones.* Howard's troops were considerably shaken by the assault; but the firmness of the artillery and the opportune arrival of Carroll's brigade of the Second Corps, voluntarily sent by General Hancock on hearing the firing, repulsed the attack and saved the day.† But Ewell's efforts did not end here; for at the same time this attack was made, he threw his left division, under General Johnson, up the ravine formed by Rock Creek, and *Hunt: Report of Artillery at Gettysburg. "Ewell had directed Rodes' division to attack in concert with Early, covering his right. When the time came to attack, Rodes not having his troops in position, was unprepared to co-operate with Early."-Lee's Report, MS. struck the extreme right of the Union position on Culp's Hill. If Ewell's delay had thwarted the original intention of preventing re-enforcements being sent from the right to buffet Longstreet's attack, it at least gave him the opportunity to make his demonstration, when at length made, really effective; for such heavy detachments had been taken from the Twelfth Corps to re-enforce the left during the operations of the afternoon, that there remained of this corps but a single brigade, under General Greene, drawn out in a thin line, with the division of Wadsworth on its left. The brunt of the attack fell upon Greene, who, re-enforced by parts of Wadsworth's troops, maintained his own position with great firmness, but Ewell's left penetrated without opposition the vacated breastworks on the furthest right, and this foothold within the Union lines he held during the night. Thus closed the second day's action, and the result was such that the Confederate commander, believing he would be able ultimately to carry the position, resolved to renew attack on the morrow. It must be admitted that the events of the day seemed to justify this belief. Longstreet had carried the whole front on which the Third Corps had been drawn; Ewell's left was thrust within the breastworks on the right, in a position which, if held by him, would enable him to take Meade's entire line in reverse, and the Union loss in the two days' combat had already reached the frightful aggregate of upwards of twenty thousand men. But Lee's inference, though specious, was unwarranted. The position carried from Sickles at such costly price to the assailants was no part of the real line as drawn on the crest of hills south of Gettysburg. This, intact throughout, remained yet to be assailed; and such was the confidence felt by the corpscommanders in their ability to maintain this position, that notwithstanding the partial reverses of the day, and the heavy loss sustained, when they came together that night there was a unanimous determination to fight it out at Gettysburg-a sentiment which was quite in accord with General Meade's own conviction. VIII. GETTYSBURG-THE THIRD DAY. Lee's plan of attack of the previous day had been directed against both flanks of the Union position, but, as I have shown, though the whole of the advanced line on the left had been carried, this only brought Longstreet abreast a more formidable front drawn on the original line. Ewell, however, still maintained his foothold within the breast works on Culp's Hill; and this lodgment inside of the works on the right shaped the determination of the first plan of attack for the third day. "General Ewell," says Lee, "had carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy." With this view, Johnson's force, hugging closely Culps' Hill, was considerably strengthened; but before preparations could be made for an attack, Meade assumed the offensive and drove back the intrusive force. During the night a powerful artillery was accumulated against the point entered by the enemy, and at four o'clock opened a heavy fire. Meanwhile, the troops of the Twelfth Corps returned from the left, and the divisions of Williams and Geary, aided by Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Corps, entered upon a severe struggle to regain the lost portion of the line. After four hours' close contest, it was carried by a charge of Geary's division, the original line on Culp's Hill was re-established and the right flank made secure. Being thus thwarted in his plan of attack on the right-a plan which, besides, would have been difficult of execution, owing to the wide separation of the Confederate wings-General Lee altered his determination and resolved to assault the centre of the Union position. In this he seems to have aimed to imitate Wagram. *Lee: Report of Gettysburg. That some weighty design was in preparation by the enemy was throughout the morning evident; for after the struggle had ceased on the right there was for some hours a deep silence. During all this time the Confederates were placing in position heavy masses of artillery. Lee, less sanguine than the day before, knew well that his only hope lay in his ability, first of all, to sweep resistance from the slopes before the assaulting columns moved forward. By noon a hundred and forty-five guns were in position along the ridge occupied by Longstreet and Hill. At one o'clock the ominous silence was broken by a terrific outburst from this massive concentration of the enginery of war. Ample means for a reply in kind were at hand; for General Hunt, the chief of artillery, had crowned the ridge along the left and left centre, on which it was manifest the attack was to fall, with eighty guns-a number not as great as that of the enemy, but it was all that could be made effective in the more restricted space occupied by the army.* Withholding the fire until the first hostile outburst had spent itself, General Hunt then ordered the batteries to open; and thus from ridge to ridge was kept up for near two hours a Titanic combat of artillery that caused the solid fabric of the hills to labor and shake, and filled the air with fire and smoke and the mad clamor of two hundred guns. During this outburst the troops crouched behind such slight cover as they could find; but the musket was tightly grasped, for each man knew well what was to follow-knew that this storm was but the prelude to a less noisy, yet more deadly shock of infantry. When, therefore, after the duel had * In the cemetery were placed Dilger's, Bancroft's, Eakin's, Wheeler's, Hill's, and Taft's batteries, under Major Osborne. On the left of the cemetery the batteries of the Second Corps, under Captain Hazard-namely those of Woodruff, Arnold, Cushing, Brown, and Rorty. Next on the left was Thomas's battery, and on his left Major McGilvray's command, consisting of Thompson's, Phillips', Hart's, Sterling's, Ranks', Dow's, and Ames' of the reserve artillery, to which was added Cooper's battery of the First Corps. On the extreme left, Gibbs' and Rittenhouse's (late Hazlitt's) batteries. As batteries expended their ammunition, they were replaced by batteries of the artillery reserve, sent forward by its efficient chief, Colonel R. O. Tyler. : |