vested contract liens, and when a court makes such an appointment it
has no right to make the receivership conditional on the payment of
any unsecured claims except the few which by the rulings of this court
have been declared to have an equitable priority; it being the excep-
tion and not the rule that the contract priority of liens can be dis-
placed. Kneeland v. American Loan and Trust Co., 89.
2. A court which appoints a receiver acquires, by virtue of that appoint-
ment, certain rights and assumes certain obligations, and the expenses
which the court creates in discharge of those obligations are neces-
sarily burdens on the property taken possession of, and this, irrespec-
tive of the question who may be the ultimate owner, or who may
have the preferred lien, or who may invoke the receivership. Ib.
3. When a court appoints a receiver of railroad property it may, in the
administration, contract debts necessary for operating the road, or
for labor, supplies or rentals, and make them a prior lien on the prop-
erty. Ib.
4. When, at the instance of a general creditor, a receiver of a railroad
and its rolling stock is appointed, and among the latter there is rolling
stock leased to the company with a right of purchase, and, there being
a deficit in the running of the road by the receiver, the rental is not
paid, and the lessor takes possession of his rolling stock, his claim for
rent is not entitled to priority over mortgage creditors on the fore-
closure and sale of the road under the mortgage. Ib.
5. Where the holder of a first lien upon the realty alone of a railroad
company asks a court of chancery to take possession not only of the
realty but also of personal property used for the benefit of the realty,
that personalty thus taken possession of and operated for the benefit
of the realty should be first paid in preference to the claim secured by
the realty. Ib.
6. Where, on the application of the trustee of a railroad mortgage, a
receiver is appointed and takes possession of the road and of its roll-
ing stock, and among the latter is rolling stock which the company
was operating under lease, and the receiver continues to operate it, its
rental at the contract price, (and not according to its actual use,) if
not paid from earnings will be a charge upon the proceeds of the sale
under the foreclosure of the mortgage prior to the mortgage debt. lb.
7. A receiver derives his authority from the act of the court, and not from
the act of the parties; and the effect of his appointment is to put the
property from that time into his custody as an officer of the court, for
the benefit of the party ultimately proved to be entitled, but not to
change the title, or even the right of possession. Union Bank v. Kan-
sas City Bank, 223.
S. Under some circumstances a receiver would be derelict in duty if he
did not cause to be insured the property committed to his custody, to
be kept safely for those entitled to it. Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Cos
9. If a receiver, without the previous sanction of the court, applies funds
in his hands to pay insurance premiums, the policy is not, for that
reason void as between him and the company; but the question
whether he has rightly applied such funds is a matter that concerns
only himself, the court whose officer he is, and the parties interested
in the property. Ib.
10. Where a receiver uses moneys in his hands without the previous order
of the court, the amount so expended may be allowed to him if he
has acted in good faith and for the benefit of the parties. Ib.
See INSURANCE, 3.
It appearing that the subject of the controversy in this case is identical
with that which was before the court in an action at law at October term,
1883, in Cragin v. Lovell, 109 U. S. 194, and that the parties are the
same, and that the court then held that "the petition shows no privity
between the plaintiff and Cragin," and "alleges no promise or con-
tract by Cragin to or with the plaintiff;" Held, that while the plea of
res judicata is not strictly applicable, the court should make the same
disposition of the controversy which was made then. Lovell v. Cragin,
130.
In the absence of the Secretary of War the authority with which he was
invested by that act could be exercised by the officer who, under the
law, became for the time Acting Secretary of War. Ryan v. United
States, 68.
See TABLE OF STATUTES CITED IN OPINIONS.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
The statute of Maryland of 1798, c. 101, sub-ch. 12, § 10, is not repealed
by the act of Congress of March 3, 1883, c. 87. Thaw v. Ritchie, 519.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 6;
EXTRADITION, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 5;
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 2;
CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2;
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1;
EXTRADITION, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 3;
MORMON CHURCH.
C. STATUTES of States anD TERRITORIES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, B;
Missouri.
New Hampshire.
New York.
LOCAL LAW, 9.
See PROMISSORY NOTE.
See LOCAL LAW, 1, 2, 3.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 3, 4, 5, 6.
See JURISDICTION, B, 1.
See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5, 7, 8.
See LOCAL LAW, 4, 6.
See JURISDICTION, B, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 10;
CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 2.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 4.
See LOCAL Law, 7.
See MORMON CHURCH.
A writ of error to the highest court of a State is not allowed as of right,
and ought not to be sent out when this court, after hearing, is of
opinion that it is apparent upon the face of the record that the issue
of the writ could only result in the affirmance of the judgment. In re
Kemmler, 436.
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