widow, to the children or the survivor of them in fee; and if both
children should die before the widow, devised all the property to her
in fee; Held, that the widow took the legal estate in the real property
for her life; that she and the children took the equitable estate therein
for her life in equal shares; and that the children took vested re-
mainders in fee, subject to be divested by their dying before the widow.
Thaw v. Ritchie, 519.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 5.
1. The municipal corporation called the District of Columbia, created by
the act of June 11, 1878, 18 Stat. 116, c. 337, is subject to the same
liability for injuries to individuals, arising from the negligence of its
officers in inaintaining in safe condition, for the use of the public, the
streets, avenues, alleys and sidewalks of the city of Washington, as
Iwas the District under the laws in force when the cause of action in
Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, arose. District of Co-
lumbia v. Woodbury, 450.
2.. The charge of the court below correctly stated the rules of law, both
general and local to the District, which are applicable to this case;
and they are reduced to seven propositions by this court in its opinion
in this case, and are approved. Ib.
3. Under the statute of Maryland of 1798, c. 101, sub-ch. 12, § 10, the
orphans' court of the District of Columbia had authority to order a
sale by a guardian of real estate of his infant wards for their main-
tenance and education, provided that before the sale its order was
approved by the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in chan-
cery. Thaw v. Ritchie, 519.
4. The authority of the orphans' court of the District of Columbia under
the statute of Maryland of 1789, c. 101, sub-ch. 12, § 10, to order a
sale of an infants' real estate for his maintenance and education is not
restricted to legal estates in possession. Ib.
5. Real estate devised to the testator's widow for the equal benefit of
herself and their two infant children, and devised over in fee to the
children after the death of the widow, and to her if she survived
them, was ordered by the orphans' court of the District of Columbia,
with the approval of the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in
chancery, to be sold, upon the petition of the widow and guardian,
alleging that the testator's property was insufficient to support her
and the children, and praying for a sale of the real estate for the pur-
pose of relieving her immediate wants and for the support and educa-
tion of the children; Held, that the order of sale, so far as it concerned
the infants' interests in the real estate, was valid under the statute of
Maryland of 1798, c. 101, sub-ch, 12, § 10. Ib.
6. An order of the orphans' court of the District of Columbia, approved
by the Circuit Court of the United States sitting in chancery, under
the statute of Maryland of 1798, c. 101, sub-ch. 12, § 10, for the sale
by a guardian of real estate of his infant wards for their maintenance
and education, cannot be collaterally impeached for want of notice
to the infants, or of a record of the evidence on which either court
proceeded, or of an accounting by the guardian for the proceeds of
the sale. Ib.
DIVIDEND.
See CORPORATION, 2.
In an action of ejectment, involving merely the legal title, the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon showing a good title as between him and
the defendant. Ryan v. United States, 68.
See CONTRACT, 3;
Insurance, 2;
LACHES ;
The refusal of the court below to grant the defendant's request to charge
upon a question in relation to which the plaintiff had introduced
no evidence, and which was, therefore, an abstract question, not
before the court, was not error. Hot Springs Railroad Co. v. Wil-
liamson, 121.
1. When one assumes by his deed to convey a title to real estate and by
any form of assurance obligates himself to protect the grantee in the
enjoyment of that which the deed purports to give him, he will not be
suffered afterwards to acquire and assert an adverse title, and turn his
grantee over to a suit upon the covenant for redress. Ryan v. United
States, 68.
2. J. H. A. resided in Reading in Massachusetts. J. A., his father, who
had formerly resided there, removed to Lancaster in New Hampshire,
of which he has since been a resident. The son becoming insolvent,
the father became surety for one of his assignees, and for that purpose
signed a bond in which he was described as of Reading; Held, that
no one being prejudiced thereby, this did not estop the father in a suit
in Louisiana between him and the assignee, involving a claim to prop-
erty of the insolvent there, from showing that he was not a citizen of
Massachusetts, but a citizen of New Hampshire. Reynolds v. Adden,
1. When, under a contract to sell real estate, the vendor delivers to the
vendee a deed of conveyance for the purpose of examination, its reci-
tals, if the memorandum of sale is not fatally defective under the
statute of frauds, are competent for the purpose of showing the pre-
cise locality of the parcel referred to in the memorandum. Ryan v.
United States, 68.
2. Evidence that a medical man, who had been in the habit of contribu-
ting articles to scientific journals was unable to do so by reason of in-
juries caused by a defect in a public street is admissible in an action
to recover damages from the municipality, without showing that he
received compensation for the articles. District of Columbia v. Wood-
bury, 450.
3. The admission of incompetent evidence at the trial below is no
cause for reversal if it could not possibly have prejudiced the other
party. Ib.
4. General objections at the trial below, to the admission of testimony,
without indicating with distinctness the precise grounds on which they
are intended to rest, are without weight before the appellate court. Ib.
5. The stenographic report of an oral opinion of the court below, as
reported by the reporter of that court, cannot be referred to to control
the record certified to this court. Ib.
6. The minute book of a court of chancery is competent and conclusive
evidence of its doings, in the absence of an extended record.
Thaw v.
Ritchie, 519.
See EXTRADITION, 3;
INSURANCE, 8, 9, 10.
EXECUTIVE.
See SECRETARY OF WAR.
1. A writ of habeas corpus in a case of extradition cannot perform the office
of a writ of error. In re Oteiza y. Cortes, 330.
2. If the commissioner has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
person of the accused, and the offence charged is within the terms of
a treaty of extradition, and the commissioner, in arriving at a decision
to hold the accused, has before him competent legal evidence on which
to exercise his judgment as to whether the facts are sufficient to
establish the criminality of the accused for the purposes of extradi-
tion, such decision of the commissioner cannot be reviewed by a Cir-
cuit Court or by this court, on habeas corpus, either originally or by
appeal. Ib.
3. In § 5 of the act of August 3, 1882, c. 378, (22 Stat. 216,) the words
"for similar purposes" mean, "as evidence of criminality," and depo-
sitions, or other papers, or copies thereof, authenticated and certified
in the manner prescribed in § 5, are not admissible in evidence, on the
hearing before the commissioner, on the part of the accused. Ib.
FEME COVERT.
See LOCAL LAW, 9.
1. Under the Michigan statute of frauds it is not essential that the descrip-
tion in a memorandum for the sale of real estate should have such
particulars and tokens of identification as to render a resort to extrin-
sic evidence needless when the writing comes to be applied to the
subject matter; but it must be sufficient to comprehend the property
which is the subject of the contract, so that, with the aid of extrinsic
evidence, without being contradicted or added to, it can be connected
with and applied to the tract intended, to the exclusion of other par-
cels. Ryan v. United States, 68.
2. A complete contract, binding under the statute of frauds, may be
gathered from letters, writings and telegrams between the parties re-
lating to its subject matter, and so connected with each other that they
may fairly be said to constitute one paper relating to the contract. Ib.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 3, 4, 5, 6.
1. On a body execution issued against a debtor on a judgment in the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, his
arrest was authorized on the ground that he had property not exempt
which he did not intend to apply to pay the judgment claim. Notice
having been given to the creditor that the debtor desired to take the
oath for the relief of poor debtors, his examination was begun before
a United States commissioner. Pending this, charges of fraud were
filed against him, in having fraudulently disposed of property, with a
design to secure the same to his own use and to defraud his creditors.
His examination as a poor debtor was suspended, and a hearing was
had on the charges of fraud. After the testimony thereon was closed,
the commissioner refused to resume the poor debtor examination, and
then sustained the charges of fraud and sentenced the debtor to be
imprisoned for six months. His examination as a poor debtor was
not read to him and corrected, and he did not sign or swear to it, and
the commissioner refused to administer to him the oath for the re-
lief of poor debtors. He was then taken into custody under the ex-
ecution and lodged in jail. On a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus
the Circuit Court discharged such writ and remanded him to the cus-
tody of the marshal. On an appeal to this court; Held, that the order
must be affirmed. Stevens v. Fuller, 468.
2. As the commissioner had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
person of the debtor, any errors or irregularities in the proceedings
could not be reviewed by the Circuit Court on habeas corpus, or by
this court, on the appeal. Ib.
3. A District Court of the United States has no authority in law to issue a
writ of habeas corpus to restore an infant to the custody of its father,
when unlawfully detained by its grand-parents. In re Burrus, 586.
See CASES AFFIRMED, 1;
EXTRADITION, 1.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See LOCAL LAW, 9.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 11, 12;
INSOLVENT DEBTOR.
See LOCAL LAW, 10, 11.
1. A condition in a policy of fire insurance, that any difference arising
between the parties as to the amount of loss or damage of the prop-
erty insured shall be submitted, at the written request of either party,
to the appraisal of competent and impartial persons, whose award
shall be conclusive as to the amount of loss or damage only, and shall
not determine the question of the liability of the insurance company;
that the company shall have the right to take the whole or any part of
the property at its appraised value; and that, until such appraisal and
award, no loss shall be payable or action maintainable; is valid. And
if the company requests in writing that the loss or damage be sub-
mitted to appraisers in accordance with the condition, and the assured
refuses to do so unless the company will consent in advance to define
the legal powers and duties of the appraisers, and against the protest
of the company asserts and exercises the right to sell the property
before the completion of an award, he can maintain no action upon
the policy. Hamilton v. Liverpool, London and Globe Ins. Co., 242.
2. When, by inadvertence, accident or mistake, a policy of insurance does
not correctly set forth the contract personally made between the par-
ties, equity may reform it so as to express the real agreement. Thomp
son v. Phenix Ins. Co., 287.
3. A policy of fire insurance, running to a particular person as receiver in
a named suit, provided that it should become void "if any change
takes place in title or possession, (except in case of succession by
reason of the death of the assured,) whether by legal process, or
judicial decree, or voluntary transfer or conveyance;" Held, (1) That
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