ter under Moreau himself crossed without difficulty and proceeded to connect themselves with Schaffhausen on the right, to protect the passage of the right wing under Lecourbe, and with the division of St. Cyr on their left at Stühlingen. The right wing under Lecourbe now executed with complete success the important manoeuvre of crossing the river by boats near Schaffhausen—in an hour and a half a bridge of boats, previously provided on the Aar by Bonaparte's orders, was thrown across the Rhine, and the passage of the remainder of the army was effected without opposition. Thus was this important movement, with which the campaign commenced, executed with the happiest success--Moreau presenting the heads of three columns at the bridges of Strasbourg, Brisach, and Basle, had attracted the enemy to these three passes; then suddenly withdrawing and marching two of his corps on the German and one on the French bank of the river, ascended to Schaff. hausen and effectually covered the passage of the remainder of the army. During these manoeuvres, fifteen hundred prisoners, six field-pieces with their materiel, forty wall-pieces, and some magazines, were captured. It is impossible that movements so complicated should have been executed more happily, that the enemy should have fallen more credulously into the snare, or that the commanders should have coöperated with greater union, precision, and effect. Now commenced a series of successes elaborately wrought out by a course of tactics, different, indeed, less brilliant and more slow in the development of their results, than those which characterized the career of Napoleon, but in the end not less sure in the attainment of the objects of the campaign. The preceding movements occupied six days, from the 25th April to the 2d May. The French line was now ranged with its face to the enemy and its back to the Rhine, forming a semicircle occupying the angle formed by the river at Basle. The Austrians occupied a parallel line extending along the defiles of the Black Forest, their center and headquarters being at Donaueschingen, a village situated near the sources of the Danube and occupying the middle of the angular tract already mentioned bounded by the Rhine. A little to the east of Donaueschingen, towards the Lake of Constance, are the towns of Engen and Stokach, the last forming the

extreme left of the Austrian position, and containing extensive military stores and supplies. On the morning of the 3d May, the extreme right of the French, which had just crossed the Rhine, marched straight upon Stokach, attacked that place and succeeded in capturing it. In this first encounter, four thousand prisoners, five hundred horses, eight guns, and immense magazines were taken. The same morning Moreau marched with the reserve on Engen, placed as we have already stated between Stokach and the Austrian headquarters; at the moment Moreau showed himself, Marshal Kray was passing through Engen on his way to aid in the defence of Stokach, expecting any thing but a battle to intercept him. He was compelled, however, to halt and defend Engen, trusting to the force of about forty thousand men then at his disposal. A bloody action took place here, which occupied the entire day and even at nightfall, when the combat was still doubtful; the Austrian commander, receiving intelligence of the destruction of the division of his army at Stokach in the morning, was disconcerted and, fearing that his left should be turned, ordered a retreat and left Moreau in possession of Engen. The loss of the French army on this occasion amounted to two thousand men killed and wounded; the loss on the part of the Austrians amounted to three thousand killed and wounded and five thousand prisoners. The Austrian line now fell back upon the town of Mosskirch, a strong position. Here another struggle took place on the 5th, which ended as before in the complete defeat of the Austrians. The operations were now transferred to the banks of the Danube, behind which river, Marshal de Kray threw himself, in order to establish a line of operation. After a series of movements in which the Austrians gradually fell back and the French advanced, another engagement took place at Biberach– another great magazine of the Imperialists. The attack upon this place was so vigorous and rapid, that the Austrians had not time to destroy their magazines, much less to transport them away. They fell altogether into the hands of the conquerors. The French cavalry and light troops rushed through the town and crossed the defile byond it. In this contest the Austrians lost fifteen hundred

prisoners, a thousand killed and wounded, and five pieces of cannon besides the magazines.

.."; Marshal de Kray fell back upon . Ulm, , in the entrenched camp around which he took up his position, in which he was fianlly surrounded by the army under Moreau, extending from that place to Augsburg.

All was now accomplished which had been contemplated preparatory to the grand movement of Bonaparte on the Alps. The situation of the army under Masséna, in Italy, had become as we shall presently show, most critical; and a positive order arrived from Paris for the immediate detaching of the division intended to coöperate in Italy with the Army of Reserve. In order to conceal as much as possible from the enemy this diminution of his forces, Moreau formed the troops to be thus detached by draughting a portion from each division of his army; in this way about sixteen thousand men were detached and marched towards the Alps.

While these successes were attained beyond the Rhine, a series of corresponding reverses were suffered by the army of Italy. It will be remembered that that army under the command of Masséna, with Soult and Suchet for his lieutenants, was posted on the line separating Italy from the South of France, forming a sort of semicircle along the Appenines and Maritime Alps. The right wing under Soult rested its extremity on Genoa, while the left extended along the line of the War. The instructions sent by Napoleon to Masséna, partook as usual, of the spirit of his own tactics, which, however, few but himself could carry out to a successful issue. He warned Masséna, that the Baron de Melas would attempt to break his centre, separating Soult from Suchet, and shutting up the former in Genoa; and he recommended Masséna to avoid extending his line too widely; “Keep but few men,” said he to him, in letters full of admirable foresight, dated March the 5th and 12th, “keep but few men on the Alps, or in the passes of the Col di Tenda, there the snow will sufficiently protect you; leave some detachments to cover Nice, and to occupy the forts in its neighborhood, but collect four-fifths of your force in and around Genoa. The enemy will débouch either upon your right in the direction of Genoa, or on your center in the direction of Savona,

or probably on both these points at once —refuse one of these attacks and throw your entire forces combined upon one of the enemy's columns. The nature of the ground will not permit him to profit by the superior numbers of his artillery and cavalry. He can, therefore, only use the infantry, in which you are infinitely his superior, and the nature of the place will compensate for the inferiority of your numbers. In that broken ground, 3. may with thirty thousand men give attle to sixty thousand; but, in order to bring sixty #. light troops against you, M. de Melas must have ninety thousand, which supposes a total army of a hundred and twenty thousand men at least. He possesses neither your talents nor activity, and you have no reason to fear him. If he advance in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on : stir not ño, four position. He will not advance far, if you remain in Liguria ready to throw yourself upon his rear or upon the troops he must leave in Piedmont.” It is difficult to secure the realization of the conceptions of one head by the hands which are directed by another, but this difficulty is always greatly augmented, when he, who is charged with the execution of the design, is himself capable of forming designs of his own of equal or nearly equal pretension to consideration. Had Napoleon's orders been given to a general less eminent than §. or had Napoleon issued these orders when his reputation had been raised by the triumphs of Marengo and Austerlitz, and when his mandates proceeded from the imperial throne, it is probable that they would have been in some degree observed, and the subsequent miseries and surrender of Genoa would not have ensued. But this was not destined to take place. Either from want of a full consciousness of the importance of the instructions and the danger of his position, or from want of time to accomplish the desired concentration of his forces, Masséna was assailed by the Imperialists literally as Bonaparte had predicted. His right, beyond Genoa, was attacked by General Ott, his left at the Col di Tenda and on the War by Ellnitz, and his center at Savona by the main body of the Austrians under the Baron de Melas himself. This general movement on the line of the Appenines commenced on the 6th April, and from that time until the 18th a series of combats was maintained, in which the French soldiers displayed the most heroic courage and their leaders the most consummate military skill. Neither skill nor courage—no, not even success in the individual o which took place between the different divisions of the opposing armies could, however, avail inst the apparently inexhaustible numbers on which the Imperialists could draw. In vain did the attacks of Masséna and Soult mow down their ranks—in vain were hundreds and thousands of prisoners captured—the blanks were instantly filled, and the enemy presented its lines unimpaired and undiminished. At last, on the 18th, Masséna was definitively shut up in Genoa, without hope of supplies either by land or water, for the harbor was closely blockaded by the English fleet under Admiral Keith. What the force of arms and overwhelming numbers could not effect, famine was now sure ultimately to consummate, and the fall of Genoa became a question merely of time and endurance. The provisions within the city were carefully husbanded and distributed in regular rations among the inhabitants and soldiers. Masséna took possession of all the grain in Genoa, paying for it when voluntarily i.e.; but seizing it when its surrender was refused or attempted to be evaded. In this way, a *. of grain including much of inerior quality, such as rye and oats, was collected sufficient to support the army and the people for four weeks; nor did this fearful condition of things extinguish the warlike fire of the French soldiers. Sallies were continued to be made and not without success upon the besiegers. On the 30th, a brisk engagement took place, commencing with an attack by the Austrians on the principal fort which commanded the city, called the Diamond Fort. During the whole of the day the strugle continued with doubtful success—at ength, when all seemed lost, Masséna pushed forward with two batallions, one against each flank of the enemy; a violent hand-to-hand combat ensued—the soldiers being too close to each other to fire, hurled stones at each other, and fought with the butts of their guns. . At the moment when the French were about to yield, Masséna led on, in person, a # batallion which he had in reserve, and decided the victory. The Austrians driven from position to position, left the field covered with dead. Masséna re

entered Genoa that night, bringing with him the ladders which the Austrians had prepared to escalade the walls, and marching before him sixteen hundred prisoners;–again, on the 10th of May, General Ott sent word to Masséna, that he was firing guns to celebrate a victory gained over Suchet, an announcement which, however, was altogether destitute of truth; Masséna replied to this boast, by sallying from the town, driving back into the ravines of the Appenines the swarms of Austrians by which he was beset, and returning to the city in the evening, preceded by fifteen hundred prisoners; but alas ! his very successes only accelerated the catastrophe which menaced him, for they multiplied prisoners upon his hands, to the number of several thousands, who aided in consuming the small amount of provisions that remained in the town. The rapid diminution of this stock, and the deterioration from day to day of the quality of food, as well as its j uantity allowed to the unfortunate inhabitants and troops, were gradually producing all the horrors which might be expected among a hundred thousand persons thus situated. At length bread was forced to be made of a meal formed by a mixture of coarse cocoa and starch. All the day, the cries of the wretched victims resounded through the streets, the rocks within the walls were covered with troops of famished creatures, seeking and devouring the vilest and filthiest animals, and greedily gathering the smallest traces of vegetation to assuage their intolerable torments—besides the black and revolting bread just mentioned, the only liquid food supplied to the people was a miserable vegetable soup. The streets were covered with wretched beings dying of inanition—women, attenuated with famine, exposed to public charity the infants who could no longer extract nourishment from their bosoms—at night the lamentations and wailings were dreadful —too agitated to sleep, and unable to endure the agony around them, they called aloud for death to relieve them from their suffering. The usual effect of severe and long endured calamity, became apparent in an appalling form, by closing the fountains of mercy in the human heart, and rendering men insensible to everything but their own woes, infants lay in the public streets deserted by the

arents, women prostrated with ex

austion, stretched on the thoroughfares, were abandoned to their fate, and sought with their dying hands in the sewers and other receptacles of filth, the means of prolonging for a few hours a miserable existence—some rushed out at the gates, and threw themselves on the Austrian bayonets, where they met neither commiseration nor aid; not only were leather and skins of every kind greedily devoured, but the horror of human flesh itself was so much abated, that numbers sustained life on the dead bodies of their fellow citizens. Pestilence stalked in the rear of famine, and death in many forms awaited the crowds collected in the hospitals, and the corpses multiplying faster than the strength of the survivors could bury them, encumbered the streets and presented an awful and revolting spectacle. Another circumstance still further increased the horrors of this condition of affairs. Masséna had, as we have already stated, captured, during the siege, several thousand Austrian prisoners; .# that their liberation upon parole woul have been followed by their reappearance in the Austrian ranks, he felt himself bound to retain them. While this body of men shared the sufferings of the people and the army, they also augmented the evils which both had to endure; he therefore proposed to General Ott and Admiral Keith, that they should furnish the provisions necessary for their daily subsistence, passing his word of honor that no part of the same should be abstracted for the garrison. Though his word was not doubted, the proposition was not acceded to; and although Masséna supplied the same rations to the prisoners as to the inhabitants and troops, the former showed such a disposition to revolt, that he was compelled to shut them up in the hulks of some old vessels placed in the middle of the harbor upon which a park of artillery, constantly pointed, stood ready to bellow forth destruction ; the frightful howlings of these miserable beings resounding through the streets of the city, increased if possible the horrors and sufferings of the unfortunate inhabitants. During this time, many instances of individual heroism were developed, which will ever be regarded with interest. In one of the sallies from the town, two French regiments, between which a feeling of hostility had grown up, owing to one being employed to quell a spirit of insubordination which had been kindled in the

other, were engaged in a desperate attack to recover from the Austrians some of the outworks of the town. When these brave men had succeeded in their object, and vanquished the enemy, they rushed into . other's arms, and forgot for ever their mutual animosities. In several cases, aids-de-camps and officers around Masséna, ventured singly to pass the Austrian lines by land, or through the British navy by water, to carry important intelligence to or from the city. . In one case, an aid-de-camp bringing despatches from Bonaparte ventured to enter the harbor in an open boat; being fired upon, he saved the boatman who rowed him by jumping into the water, with his sword in his mouth, and swimming to the shore, where he succeeded in i. object; and by intelligence thus gained, Masséna had received assurances that if he could hold out even for a day or two, the descent of the French army from the Alps, on the rear of the Imperialists, would necessarily break up the blockade. It was this which at once induced and justified the extremity to which that general pushed his resistance in this memorable siege. At length, on the 4th of June, the whole stock of provisions remaining in the town was reduced to two ounces of loathsome bread, made of starch and cocoa, for each individual. To have continued the resistance longer, was, therefore, a P. impossibility, and on that day a flag of truce was sent to Masséna by General Ott, proposing the surrender, and desiring to negotiate terms. The fact was, though not then known to Masséna, that, on that morning, Ott had received from his Generalin-Chief peremptory and unqualified orders to raise the siege, and to join, with his troops, the main body of the army, which was in danger of being overwhelmed by the French forces under Bonaparte, which had poured down upon them, to their utter astonishment and consternation, from the acclivities of the Alps. Had Masséna been informed of this, he would even then, hard as was the situation in which he was placed, have refused to surrender; but, having no definite information, he had no alternative left. He insisted, however, on fixing the terms of capitulation himself, declaring that if they were not acceded to, he would put himself at the head of the twelve o men then in the city, and, be the consequences what they might, would cut his way through the Imperialists. It was agreed that the garrison should be permitted to depart with their arms and munitions, but it was objected that if he were himself allowed to escape, it was impossible to foresee what formidable enterrise might not be effected by such a eader, upon the rear of the Baron de Melas. It was also proposed for the greater security of the Austrians, that the garrison should leave the city by water, and not by land. To all this, Masséna calmly replied, that his army must retire whither and how he pleased, with its arms and baggage, with colors flying, and with liberty to serve and fight anywhere beyond the besiegers' lines. “If these terms” said he to the officer who bore the flag of truce, “be not acceded to, I will sally forth from Genoa, sword in hand,

and with eight thousand famished men I will attack your camp and fight till I cut my way through you.” It was at length agreed that the eight thousand men still able to bear arms, should march out of the town as proposed by Masséna. The remaining four thousand invalids the Austrians undertook to feed and take care of “Now,” said Masséna, “these things being settled, 1 give you notice, that before fifteen days shall pass away I shall be again here.” Strange prophecy—to which an Austrian officer made the following noble and delicate reply. “You will then find here, general, the men whom you have so well taught to defend the city.” This prediction of Masséna was, as we shall see, destined to be literally fulfilled by the impending catastrophe of the field of Marengo.

To be continued.


To every commercial nation, a complete and efficient Light-House Establishment is a provision of the utmost necessity. The perils of the open sea, from tempests, or lightning, or any of the ordinary hazards of ocean navigation, are trifling in comparison with the dangers which lurk along the shore. The coast of the United States, stretching, as it does, over twenty-five degrees of latitude, swept by the winds of a northern winter, and, at times, by the still more destructive blasts of a hotter clime; indented with bays of narrow and difficult entrance; or projecting in capes frowning in over-hanging terror, or extending more fearful, because less palpable, dangers beneath the surface of the sea; skirted with sunken rocks and quicksands; and beset, in almost every mile of its irregular extent, with “dangers difficult and dark,” is exposed for nearly three thousand miles to these terrible hazards. The natural dangers of such a coast must be compensated by science and human skill. Perils, known and unknown, must be warded off. Charts must be provided, on which every turning point, every rock, and every shoal must be distinctly brought to the view of him who sails along or approaches the shore. Reefs

and headlands should be lighted up; beacons must point out danger wherever it exists; and by night, as well as by day, the navigator should be able to ascertain his precise position, the perils which environ his ship, and the path by which he may hope to escape them. A blaze of light should illuminate the seaboard; and all the resources of science and of art should be employed in rendering this service to Commerce and Humanity.

The provision of such a Light-House Establishment devolves upon the General Government. The same authority which maintains a corps of Consular Agents to protect American Commerce from hostility abroad, is in duty bound to guard it from peril at home. This responsibility has always, under the Constitution, been assumed by our Government, and the general charge of this important branch of the public service has rested with the Treasury Department. The collectors of the customs are inspectors of the lighthouses within their respective districts: the office is merely collateral, and a very slight addition to their regular salary is allowed for this superadded duty. The only information, in the ordinary course, which reaches the Treasury Department, concerning this branch of the service,

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