body was to have no share in legisla. tion, but was to be the tribunal in the last resort to decide whether laws were constitutional. A questionable law, proposed as we have explained by the Council of State, and passed by the Legislative Body, was to be denounced before the Senate by the Tribunate, and the Senate possessed the power, without appeal, to break such a law if it deemed it to be unconstitutional, or to confirm it if otherwise. Hence this body derived its name—the Conservative Senate. The Senate was to have the power of continually filling up the deficiences in its own numbers, occurring by death or otherwise, from the Notables of the Nation; and it was also invested with a |. of electing from the same list, by allot, the members of the other deliberative bodies of the state. At the head of this great political system was to be placed a functionary whose origin may easily be traced to the sovereign in the English monarchy, however different in appearance and in name. This Chief of the State was to be called the Grand Elector, and was to possess and exercise no other power save that of appointing two executive officers to be called, the one the Consul of Peace, and the other the Consul of War. These Consuls, once appointed, were to nominate all the inferior functionaries of the executive, and were themselves removable at the will of the Grand Elector. This supreme magistrate, thus strictly limited in his powers like the British sovereign, to the appointment and dismissal of his ministers, was to be surrounded with great external magnificence, to support which, an annual income of six millions of francs, equal to above a million of dollars; sumptuous palaces to dwell in, such as the Tuilleries in Paris, and Versailles in the country, with a body guard of three thousand men, were to be granted; in his name laws were to be promulged, justice executed, and the functions of government performed. To him foreign ministers were to be accredited, and from his signature treaties with foreign powers would derive their validity. This splendid head of the executive was to be elected by the Conservative Senate, but what must determine his official existence 2 With that Senate, already invested with powers so extensive, was also lodged the power of annihilating the official authority of any member of the State by the simple expedient of reëlect

ing such member into its own body—a Senator being incapable of discharging any other political functions. This extraordinary power of the Senate was provided with the evident design to guard against the acquisition and exercise of that dangerous personal ascendency which individuals often acquire under popular governments, and which so fre. leads to the establishment of a espotic power: an event which the circumstances of the French nation were so soon after destined to develop. Such was the Constitution proposed by Sièyes, and the first question which sugested itself to the nation regarding it, did not refer to its civil or political merits, or to the guarantees which it offered for the conservation of constitutional liberty, or to the securities which it provided against the despotism of demagogues, or to the skill with which wise legislation was provided in it. It was not to questions such as these that the public attention was immediately directed, but to a simple and practical question; one which probably had not occurred to the philosophical mind of the framer of this piece of state mechanism, yet a question to which a summary and immediate answer was rendered indispensable by the condition of the country. This question was, what place in the new constitution was intended for Bonaparte To him every eye was directed, on him every mind was bent. The constitution was an abstraction about which the nation in general gave itself little trouble. The plain, practical question was, how, and under what conditions and restrictions the country was to be governed by General Bonaparte, for by him it was conceded by all, even by Sièyes himself, that it must be ruled. The public mind in France had not then been rendered so familiar with the convenient fiction by which the attribute of irresponsibility is given to the head of the state, and the responsibility shifted to the ministers, as it is at present, and it was natural that a people who had been taught to regard the chief magistrate as one invested with powers which could prompt the utterance of such a sentence as le Roi le veut, should consider the Grand Elector, endowed with an income of six millions, and regal splendor, having no other business, except now and then to nominate the Consuls, as rather a chimerical notion. In fact, they could not fathom the profoundness of the views of Sièyes, and they easily fell under the sarcasm of Bonaparte. “Your Grand Elector,” said he, “is a pageant king. . Where is the man of understanding and heart who could be bribed by six millions a year and rooms in the Tuilleries, to endure a life of such intolerable idleness—to nominate men who are to act, and yet not be permitted to act himself. If I were your Grand Elector, be assured I would act in spite of you ; 1 would tell the Consuls that if they did not make such or such an appointment, or pass such or such a measure, I would dismiss them. I would compel them to walk according to my will—I would become master by stratagem.” While such sentiments showed the utter ignorance of the principle of the irresponsibility of the sovereign which must have prevailed in France, they showed that Bonaparte himself was not more conversant with it than those he addressed. It is surprising that no one was present who could have told him that although the appointment of the minjsters is invested in the sovereign, it is accompanied by such checks as would render such a course, as he sarcastically describes, impossible. The sovereign must appoint such a ministry as will command the confidence and support of the legislature, otherwise the wheels of the administrative machine will be stopped : the measures proposed by a ministry chosen by the sovereign against the voice of the representatives of the nation would be thrown out by majorities proportioned to their unpopularity—and among others, the votes for the supplies would be negatived, when the ministry must of necessity fall, and even Bonaparte, were he Grand Elector, would be compelled to nominate such a ministry as would be enabled to obtain funds to carry on the government. But such views were foreign to the spirit of the French nation at that epoch, and the predominating influence of the conqueror of Italy and Egypt easily made his philosophical colleague to succumb. The Grand Elector and his two Consuls of Peace and War were given up, and it was settled that the head of the Executive should be composed of a Chief Consul with two colleagues sharing with him the sovereign power. Bonaparte became of necessity the Chief Consul, but Sièyes by his age, station, past recollections and grand intellectual position, could not for a moment be contemplated

in the second position necessarily assumed by either of the other Consuls. He was accordingly named President of the Conservative Senate, a position which suited his character, and which might, in some respects, be considered superior even to that of the Consuls themselves. When these important points were settled, Bonaparte with that generosity and delicacy which he so often exercised on similar occasions, caused a mark of national gratitude to be offered to his colleague. He caused a proposition to be made to the legislative commissioners to vote him the estate of Crosne as an honorary gift. This was announced to Sièyes with the most noble expressions of public gratitude, and was accepted b him with lively satisfaction—for althoug his integrity was unimpeachable, he was not insensible to the enjoyment of an ample fortune, and could not fail to be touched with the delicate and elevated forms with which this munificent gift of the nation was presented to him. The new Constitution with some other modifications was formally accepted by the people, and came into operation in the commencement of January, 1800. When the first Consul had succeeded in pacifying the revolted provinces, redressing the finances, replenishing the treasury, relieving and restoring disciline to the armies, and establishing orer throughout France, all of which he accomplished with an expedition and address which proved his administrative talents to be scarcely inferior to those which he had displayed in war, he turned his attention to the external relations of the country, which afforded abundant ground for embarrassment, and ample scope for the display of those rare abilities by which he was so eminently distinguished in his proper profession. Previous to the return of Bonaparte from Egypt, it will be remembered that the Austrian power was reëstablished in Italy, and that the French army in that country had been driven back to the Appenines, and even beyond the Maritime Alps. The Austrian force which now occupied Lombardy and Piedmont, amounted to a hundred and twenty thousand men. The residue of the French army, to the command of which Bonaparte had recently nominated Massena, amounted at the utmost to thirty-six thousand men. This force was distributed, in the early part of the year 1800, before the recommencement of hostilities, along the line of the Appenines and the Maritime Alps, which form a semicircle extending from Genoa to Mont Cenis, keeping first parallel to the Mediterranean and at a short distance from it, and as they approach Nice turning in a northern direction towards Mont Cenis. The French army consisted of two divisions, the right wing towards Genoa being 'oï. by Soult, and the left wing towards Nice by Suchet. The Austrian forces opposed to these were under the command of the Baron de Melas. The other point of attack selected by Austria was on the eastern frontier. The Rhine ascending from Strasbourg to Basle keeps a course nearly north and south, and separates Alsace from the territory of Baden. At Basle it turns to the east, forming rather an acute angle with its former course, and keeps that direction to Schaffhausen and the Lake of Constance. . Within the angle thus formed by the river a tract of country is included which, at the period now referred to, was occupied by an army of a hundred and fifty thousand troops, composed of Austrians, Wirtemburgers, Bavarians &c., under the . of Marshal de Kray. Of these thirty thousand were shut up in garrison, but a hundred and twenty thousand were present in active service. Besides these forces it was known that twenty thousand troops composed of English and emigrants were waiting at Minorca to be landed at Toulon, whenever the Austrian army in Italy crossing the line of the Bar, should penetrate into France. Finally the English navy swept the Mediterranean, blockading the coasts of France and Italy. The French army under Moreau consisting of about a hundred and thirty thousand men occupied the left bank of the Rhine, extending from Strasbourg to Basle, and from Basle to Schaffhausen. This was, in all respects, the finest army of the Republic; all that could be furnished to it was supplied both in men and material, immense exertions were made to complete its artillery and augment its means of transportation—so that it might be able, if need were, to cross the Rhine suddenly, and at a single point. Such was the condition of things when the winter broke up in 1800, and the period for the opening of the campaign approached. The total amount of the French forces, then on the frontier, did not, therefore, exceed a hundred and seventy thousand men, opposed to which

were forces composed of the flower of the Austrian armies, amounting to little less than three hundred thousand. That the army of the Rhine, under Moreau, would be sufficient to repel the Austrians, superior though they were in number, was not doubted; but it was manifest that thirty-six thousand men on the Italian frontier, worn out and dispirited by previous defeats and unexampled hardships, having lost their moral courage and that prestige which surrounded them during the course of Bonaparte's triumphs, could not be expected to stand against an army above three times their own number, flushed with victory and in the highest state of equipment, discipline and efficiency. The plan of campaign laid down by Bonaparte in these difficult and trying circumstances, displayed the same happy combination of foresight which characterized all his military operations. It was evident, that reinforcements must be prepared to accomplish this. The pacification of La Vendée, where the presence of sixty thousand men was necessary, must be. brought about. This was effected with admirable address, and at a sufficientl early period. It was publicly announced, that a force would be collected, the centre of which would be Dijon, to be called the Army of Reserve ; and the impression was encouraged, that this army was destined to reinforce that of the Rhine. The best and most efficient of the troops collected in La Vendée, were accordingly marched through France towards Dijon and Geneva. An increased force was raised with the sanction of the Legislative Body, by recruiting and by conscription. Thus was collected insensibly, and without exciting much public observation—a body of troops who were prepared to act at the command of the government, and stationed near the southern and south-eastern frontiers. It was apparent that one of the first objects to be effected, was to prevent a junction of the Austrian armies on the Rhine and in Italy, and, if possible, to cut off all communication between them. To effect this, it was proposed that Moreau should assume the offensive, and drive back the forces under Kray, towards Ulm and Ratisbon, keeping carefully between them and Switzerland. The two Austrian armies would thus be separated by the French army of the Rhine, advanced into Suabia, with Switzerland and the Alps in its rear. While the public impression throughout Europe was encouraged that the Army of Reserve was intended to reinforce that of the Rhine, and that its chief quarters were at Dijon, a very different design was secretly entertained by the First Consul. The semblance only of military forces was kept up at Dijon, so that the enemy's spies employed there, gave information which lulled all suspicions on the part of the coalesced powers of Austria and England as to any serious effects from that quarter. The real design of Bonaparte, was imparted only to a few of those officers and generals, whose coöperation in realizing it was indispensable. The army of reserve, which, by incredible exertions was raised to the number of forty thousand efficient troops, fully supplied and equipped, was intended by a movement, unprecedented in audacity since the days of Hannibal, to cross the Alps, and M. unexpectedly down on the rear of the Austrian army in Piedmont, cutting of their communications with Germany, hemming them in in the circle of the Alps ...; Appenines, with the Army of Reserve under Napoleon on one side, and the army of Italy under Masséna on the other. It was designed that they should thus be compelled to fight—and it was assumed that they should be vanquished, and forced to lay down their arms upon the plains of Piedmont. Never were the talents of Napoleon more brilliantly developed than in the organization of this campaign—never was foresight more admirable, or combination more happy. As no measure was too grand for the capacity of his mind, so no wants or provisions were too minute for his care and foresight—every thing was prepared, and all ready at the proper time and place. But as no exertion could swell the numbers of the disposable troops, called the Army of Reserve, sufficiently to secure the success of the operations contemplated in Italy, it was indispensably necessary to withdraw about twenty thousand men from the army of the Rhine, before the proposed movement could be commenced. But this force could not safely be withdrawn until that army should have succeeded in driving back the Austrians along the Danube, and should have achieved such victories as would render them secure with diminished numbers. The operations on the Rhine must therefore necessarily have preceded the

contemplated movement on the Alps, but neither would this admit of much delay, for it was certain that the French army under Masséna on the Italian frontier would be pressed by the superior forces opposed to them at the earliest practicable moment. Nice might be occupied, a portion might be blockaded in Genoa, nay, Toulon might be taken, and a landing of the English and emigrants collected at Minorca might be effected. The utmost celerity on the part of Moreau was therefore indispensable. A plan of operations to be followed by Moreau, was proposed by the first Consul, but the genius of those two great captains was so widely different, if not opposite in its character, that it could scarcely be expected that the plan of one could harmonize with the views of the other, and at the epoch we refer to, the military reputation of Moreau was so little inferior to that of the First Consul, that it was not likely that the former should quietly submit to act as the mere lieutenant of the latter. Indeed, it has been maintained that instead of the plan of operations already explained, Bonaparte would have directed his main attack on the Austrian forces in Suabia, taking the command himself; but the rank and reputation of Moreau precluded the idea of his accepting the post of second in command, and the feeling of the army of the Rhine towards the revolution of the 18th Brumaire was not such as to render the displacement of Moreau and a substitution of Bonaparte safe or prudent. The plan of attack proposed by the First Consul was in the spirit of the tactics which marked his entire military career, and which, when executed by himself in person, always ensured a brilliant result. The range of mountains and wooded country called the Black Forest, runs parallel and near to the Rhine, on the right bank from Strasbourg to Basle. This was occupied by the army of Kray, which also extended from the angle at Basle to the extremity of the lake of Constance. Great magazines for the supply of this army were established at Stokach, a small town near the northern extremity of the lake of Constance, at Engen, a little west of Stokach, at Mosskirch, a place farther towards Ulm, and at Biberach, still nearer to Ulm and Ratisbon. Bonaparte proosed that Moreau should concentrate #. army, secretly and suddenly, near

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Schauffhausen, that he should throw four bridges at the same place, and not above a hundred yards asunder, across that river, and march his army over before any effective opposition could be given to them; that with the forces thus concentrated he should out-flank Kray, cut him off from Bavaria, and hem him in between the Danube and the Rhine, in the same manner as that in which he designed himself to hem in the Baron De Melas between the plains of Piedmont and the Appenines, by the passage of the Alps. But to accomplish all this it was requisite to deceive the Austrians as to the intended point of crossing the Rhine, and to execute the passage with great boldness. . The First Consul had already provided facilities for this manaeuvre by ordering boats to be collected in considerable numbers on the Aar, and other tributaries of the Rhine; but it was easier to conceive these masterly plans than to ensure their execution, especially as that command and authority had not yet grown around the person of Napoleon which he afterwards wielded with such singular effect, when, as Emperor, he issued his orders to the marshals of the Empire. In fact, the mind of Moreau, little accustomed to such bold combinations, was disconcerted. He would proceed by measures attended, as he believed, with more certainty of success, though that success would neither be as immediate or as brilliant. He proposed, with different divisions of his army, to cross the river by the bridges of Strasbourg, Brisach, and Basle, and by this means to attract the Austrian forces towards the corresponding defiles of the Black Forest. That the forces should then suddenly retire, descending the right bank of the Rhine to Schaffhausen, where they should protect and cover the passage of the remainder of the army. “The spectacle,” . Thiers, “of two men opposed to each other under circumstances so well calculated to develop the diversities of their minds and characters, is not unworthy of the attention of history.” Moreau's plan, as often happens with those of second rate commanders, had the semblance of prudence, but it had nothing more. It succeeded in the execution, but it must be remembered that success in execution sometimes defeats the best combinations, and carries the worst in triumph. Moreau persisting in his views, the First Consul sent for General Dessoles, the head of his staff, a man of

acute understanding and sound judgment, to mediate between them. To this officer Bonaparte explained his views, but while Dessoles admitted their superiority he nevertheless counselled Bonaparte not to press them on Moreau. “Your plan,” said he, “is more grand, more decisive, and probably more certain, but it does not suit the genius of him who must carry it into effect. You have a method of making war superior to all others; Moreau has his own, inferior, doubtless, to yours, but still an excellent one. Leave him to himself, he will act well, and though his progress may be slow, his results will be sure, and he will do all that is necessary for the success of your general combinations. If, on the other hand, you force your plan of operations upon him, he will be disconcerted. You will wound his self-love, and by seeking to obtain too much, possibly obtain nothing.” The First Consul, versed in the knowledge of human character as profoundly as in the art of war, appreciated the prudence of Dessolés' suggestions, and gave up the point. “You are right,” said he to the general; “Moreau is not capable of grasping and executing the plan which I have conceived. Let him follow his own course, only let him push back Marshal De Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and afterwards move his right wing in time upon Switzerland. #. plan which he cannot understand, and dares not execute, I will realize myself on another part of the arena of war. What he fears to attempt on the Rhine I will accomplish on the Alps, and the day may come when he j regret the glory which he surrenders to me”— proud and profound prediction, which succeeding events verified to the letter. Thiers relates this anecdote from the lips of general Dessoles himself, who related it to him, as he says, while he was yet a mere youth. Moreau was accordingly left to follow his own plans, but it was stipulated in writing, that after pushing back the Austrians as far as Ulm, a division of twenty thousand men to second Napoleon were to be detached towards the Alps. In accordance with the plan conceived by Moreau, the Rhine was passed on the 25th April and the following days by the several bridges at and above Strasbourg, and the French columns showed themselves at the different defiles of the Black Forest which opened upon the Rhine between Strasbourg and Basle. The cen

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