have now liberty to import this species of property, and much of the property now possessed had been purchased, or otherwise acquired, in contemplation of improving it by the assistance of imported slaves. What would be the consesequence of hindering us from it? The slaves of Virginia would rise in value, and we should be obliged to go to your markets."

If

I need not expatiate on this subject. Great as the evil is, a dismemberment of the Union would be worse. those States should disunite from the other States for not indulging them in the temporary continuance of this traffic, they might solicit and obtain aid from foreign powers.

Mr. Tyler warmly enlarged on the impolicy, iniquity, and disgracefulness of this wicked traffic. He thought the reasons urged by gentlemen in defense of it were inconclusive and ill founded.

It was one cause of the complaints against British tyranny, that this trade was permitted. The Revolution had put a period to it; but now it was to be revived. He thought nothing could justify it.

This temporary restriction on Congress militated, in his opinion, against the arguments of gentlemen on the other side, that what was not given up was retained to the States; for that, if this restriction had not been inserted, Congress could have prohibited the African trade. The power of prohibiting it was not expressly delegated to them; yet they would have had it by implication, if this restraint had not been provided. This seemed to him to demonstrate most clearly the necessity of restraining them, by a bill of rights, from infringing our unalienable rights. It was immaterial whether the bill of rights was by itself, or included in the Constitution.

But he contended for it one way or the other. It would be justified by our own example and that of England.

His earnest desire was, that it should be handed down to posterity that he had opposed this wicked clause.

Mr. Madison was surprised that any gentleman should return to the clauses which had already been discussed.

He begged the gentleman to read the clauses which gave the power of exclusive legislation, and he might see that nothing could be done without the consent of the States.

With respect to the supposed operation of what was denominated the sweeping clause, the gentleman, he said, was mistaken; for it only extended to the enumerated powers.

Should Congress attempt to extend it to any power not enumerated, it would not be warranted by the clause.

As to the restriction in the clause under consideration, it was a restraint on the exercise of a power expressly delegated to Congress; namely, that of regulating commerce with foreign nations.

Patrick Henry insisted that the insertion of these restrictions on Congress was a plain demonstration that Congress could exercise powers by implication. The gentleman had admitted that Congress could have interdicted the African trade, were it not for this restriction. If so, the power, not having been expressly delegated, must be obtained by implication. He demanded where, then, was their doctrine of reserved rights. He wished for negative clauses to prevent them from assuming any powers but those expressly given. He asked why it was omitted to secure us that property in slaves which we held now. He feared its omission was done with design. They might lay such taxes on slaves as would amount to emancipation; and then the Southern States would be the only sufferers.

His opinion was confirmed by the mode of levying money. Congress, he observed, had power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises. Imposts (or duties) and excises were to be uniform; but this uniformity did not extend to taxes. This might compel the Southern States to

liberate their negroes. He wished this property, therefore, to be guarded. He considered the clause, which had been adduced by the gentleman as a security for this property, as no security at all. It was no more than this-that a runaway negro could be taken up in Maryland or New York.

This could not prevent Congress from interfering with that property by laying a grievous and enormous tax on it, so as to compel owners to emancipate their slaves rather than pay the tax.

He apprehended it would be productive of much stockjobbing, and that they would play into one another's hands in such a manner as that this property would be lost to the country.

Mr. George Nicholas wondered that gentlemen who were against slavery should be opposed to this clause; as, after that period, the slave trade would be done away.

He asked if gentlemen do not see the inconsistency of their arguments.

They object, says he, to the Constitution, because the slave trade is laid open for twenty odd years; and yet they tell you that, by some latent operation of it, the slaves who are so now will be manumitted.

At the same moment it is opposed for being promotive and destructive of slavery. He contended that it was advantageous to Virginia that it should be in the power of Congress to prevent the importation of slaves after twenty years, as it would then put a period to the evil complained of.

As the Southern States would not confederate without this clause, he asked if gentlemen would rather dissolve the confederacy than to suffer this temporary inconvenience, admitting it to be such.

Virginia might continue the prohibition of such importation during the intermediate period, and would be benefited

by it, as a tax of ten dollars on each slave might be laid, of which she would receive a share.

He endeavored to obviate the objection of gentlemen, that the restriction on Congress was a proof that they would have powers not given them, by remarking, that they would only have had a general superintendency of trade, if the restriction had not been inserted.

But the Southern States insisted on this exception to that general superintendency for twenty years. It could not, therefore, have been a power by implication, as the restriction was an exception from a delegated power. The taxes could not, as had been suggested, be laid so high on negroes as to amount to emancipation; because taxation and representation were fixed according to the census established in the Constitution. The exception of taxes from the uniformity annexed to duties and excises could not have the operation contended for by the gentleman, because other clauses had clearly and positively fxed the census.

Had taxes been uniform, it would have been universally objected to; for no one object could be selected without involving great inconveniences and oppressions.

But, says, Mr. Nicholas, is it from the general government we are to fear emancipation? Gentlemen will recollect what I said in another house, and what other gentlemen have said, that advocated emancipation. Give me leave to say, that clause is a great security for our slave tax. I can tell the committee that the people of our own country are reduced to beggary by the taxes on negroes.

Had this Constitution been adopted, it would not have been the case. The taxes were laid on all our negroes. By this system two-fifths are exempted.

He then added, that he had not imagined gentlemen would support here what they had opposed in another place.

Mr. Henry replied that, though the proportion of each was to be fixed by the census, and three-fifths of the slaves

only were included in the enumeration, yet the proportion of Virginia, being once fixed, might be laid on blacks and blacks only; for the mode of raising the proportion of each State being to be directed by Congress, they might make slaves the sole object to raise it.

Personalities he wished to take leave of; they had nothing to do with the question, which was solely whether that paper was wrong or not.

Mr. Nicholas replied, that negroes must be considered as persons or property. If as property, the proportion of taxes to be laid on them was fixed in the Constitution.

If he apprehended a poll tax on negroes, the Constitution had prevented it; for, by the census, where a white man paid ten shillings, a negro paid but six shillings; for the exemption of two fifths of them reduced it to that proportion.

Mr. George Mason said, that gentlemen might think themselves secured by the restriction, in the fourth clause, that no capitation or other direct tax should be laid but in proportion to the census before directed to be taken; but that, when maturely considered, it would be found to be no security whatsoever. It was nothing but a direct assertion, or mere confirmation of the clause which fixed the ratio of taxes and representation. It only meant that the quantum to be received of each State should be in proportion to their numbers, in the manner therein directed. But the general government was not precluded from laying the proportion of any particular State on any one species of property they might think proper.

For instance, if five hundred thousand dollars were to be raised, they might lay the whole of the proportion of the Southern States on the blacks, or any one species of property; so that by laying taxes too heavily on slaves, they might totally annihilate that kind of property. No real security could arise from the clause which provides