conclusions and did not give his opinion as to the character of the business conducted by the bank, but testified that he stated to the plaintiff in error, in a conversation with him in reference to the conduct of the bank, that he had drawn such conclusions and had expressed his opinion as to the manner in which the bank had been conducted. It was complained that this witness was permitted to relate a conversation with the mayor of Chicago with reference to the deposit of city funds in the LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank. This matter was brought out on the cross-examination of this witness by counsel for plaintiff in error, and he cannot now complain that on re-direct examination the whole of the conversation was brought out.

Joseph O. Morris, who was interested in the Rosehill Cemetery Company, identified a blank form of deed or contract which he testified was used in the regular course of business of the cemetery company, and also testified concerning a resolution which was in writing and was a matter of record. The blank form identified by this witness and admitted in evidence constituted primary proof, and the resolution testified to was also admitted in evidence.

William E. Trautman, who was president of the Southern Traction Company, was permitted to give in detail the terms of a contract between the Southern Traction Company and one Mepham relative to construction work to be done by Mepham for the company. Objection was made that this was not the best evidence. This objection should have been sustained. The testimony was material as showing the connection of the Lorimer-Gallagher Company, which was a sub-contractor with the Southern Traction Company through Mepham, and as explaining the action of Lorimer in disposing of the bonds of the Southern Traction Company to the LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank. The contract itself should have been offered in evidence.

Other contentions are made that the court improperly admitted secondary evidence, but we do not deem them to be well grounded.

It is contended that various witnesses were improperly allowed to testify from memoranda and notes made by others and concerning matters about which the witnesses had no personal knowledge. As has already been noted, Spohr testified from a memorandum that had been furnished him by the State's attorney's office. He further testified that he compared it with the books and found it to be correct and used it to refresh his recollection. This same witness, who was auditor of the LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank, gave a summary from the books of that bank which were in evidence. This was proper. McDougal used the abstract of his report on the condition of the LaSalle Street National Bank to refresh his recollection. We do not find the record subject to this criticism.

Plaintiff in error contends that the court erred in permitting the books in the hands of the various receivers of the institutions involved to be introduced in evidence. Plaintiff in error was interested in the Broadway State Bank, the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank and the State Bank of Calumet, and receivers of these institutions were permitted to produce all the books and records of these banks, as was also the receiver of the Southern Traction Company permitted to produce the books and records of that corporation. It is contended that this was a violation of the constitutional rights of plaintiff in error and that he was thereby required to give evidence against himself. This question has been determined against the contention of the plaintiff in error in a well-considered opinion in the case of Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361. In that case it was contended that Wilson, who was president of the United Wireless Telegraph Company, was being deprived of his rights under the Federal constitution when he was compelled, as president, to produce the books of the corporation,

which contained matter that might tend to incriminate him. Wilson was served with a subpoena duces tecum to produce the books before the grand jury which was investigating alleged violations of the Federal laws by Wilson and other officers of the corporation. The contention in that case was that to require him to produce these books was a violation of the fifth amendment to the Federal constitution, which is, in effect, the same as section 10 of article 2 of our constitution on which plaintiff in error relies. The court there held that the privilege afforded by the fifth amendment to the Federal constitution does not protect an officer of a corporation in resisting the compulsory production of records of such corporation which are in his possession because the contents may tend to incriminate him. In the opinion the court goes fully into the identical question presented here, and holds that while one cannot be compelled to produce any of his private books or papers which may tend to incriminate him, he cannot refuse to produce the books or papers of a corporation of which he is an officer or in which he may be interested even though they may be in his custody and under his control, as they are not his private books and records but the books and records of the corporation. This case has been followed and approved in Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478, and Grant v. United States, 227 id. 74. The LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank and the other institutions involved were State institutions and subject to State supervision. Their records were quasi public in character. They were not the private property of plaintiff in error but were the property of the respective corporations. The court did not err in admitting the books and records in the possession of the respective receivers in evidence.

It is contended that the court improperly admitted testimony as to the corporate existence of the Cemetery Securities Company, the Builders Bond Company, the Huttig Manufacturing Company and the Southern Traction Com

pany. The record discloses that the Cemetery Securities Company had a president, vice-president and treasurer, and counsel for plaintiff in error elicited the fact, on cross-examination of the witness Morris, that this company was a Delaware corporation with a capital stock of $600,000, divided into 6000 shares. It does not appear from the abstract of the record wherein it was a material matter whether or not the Builders Bond Company was a corporation. The record discloses as to the Huttig Manufacturing Company that H. W. Huttig was president, and the company had shares of common and preferred stock and was engaged in the manufacture of sash and doors, and this was sufficient proof of the existence of a corporation by user. As to the Southern Traction Company, the witness Trautman testified, without objection, that it was a corporation organized under the laws of Illinois and that he was the president.

A number of depositors of the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank and of the LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank were permitted to testify to the amount of their deposits at the time these banks failed and to the amount of dividends paid since those institutions had been taken over by receivers. The indictment alleges that plaintiff in error and his co-defendants named, and others to the grand jurors unknown, conspired to commit the acts alleged. During the course of the trial, and in response to a motion made by plaintiff in error, the State's attorney announced that certain of those referred to as unknown conspirators had become known and furnished a list of them, included in which list was Abraham Levin, who had been cashier of the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank. The witnesses who testified that they had been depositors in this bank all testified that they had been induced by Levin to open an account in that bank. This testimony tended to support the charge of a conspiracy to secure the money of the public, generally, by false pretenses and misrepresentations, and was proper. The depositors of the LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank

merely testified to the amount of their deposits and to the fact that the money was wholly lost. The books of the LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank were admitted in evidence and showed the total amount of deposits at the time the bank failed. It was conceded by counsel for plaintiff in error that these books correctly disclosed that fact and that no depositor had been re-paid. In view of this situation it was improper to permit the State to produce only a few of the depositors of the bank, having small deposits, to testify to the amount of their particular deposits and to the fact that they had never been re-paid. Such evidence. could be of no assistance whatever to the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The court should have excluded this testimony.

There were involved in this case various transactions in reference to institutions in which plaintiff in error, Huttig and Lorimer were interested as partners or stockholders. During the trial witnesses were permitted to state the interest of these defendants in these various institutions by designating them as Munday concerns, Huttig concerns or Lorimer concerns. It is insisted that this was error. The record conclusively shows, aside from these references of the various witnesses, the institutions in which plaintiff in error was interested and the institutions in which Lorimer and Huttig were interested. The references made by these witnesses were for convenience, only, and could not have been misunderstood, and were unobjectionable.

A. H. Hill, president of the A. H. Hill & Co. State Bank, testified to his dealings with plaintiff in error in the organization of that bank, of his deposits in the LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank, and of his purchasing securities from that bank. It is insisted that inasmuch as there was no loss to the A. H. Hill & Co. State Bank growing out of these transactions the testimony was immaterial and foreign to the issues. The transactions detailed by this witness had a bearing upon the offense charged against