This agreement was made with the knowledge and consent of appellee, and, we think, amounted to an assent on its part that appellant might pay the Fidelity and Deposit Company the amount of such policy, to be applied in extinguishment of the Appel judgment, and that such payment should amount to an extinguishment of its liability on the policy to appellee to that amount. When such payment was made to the Fidelity and Deposit Company it applied the same on Mrs. Appel's judgment and relieved appellee of its liability to Mrs. Appel to the amount of $5000. Under the circumstances we think the Appellate Court rightly held the payment was made for the use and in behalf of appellee and to that extent extinguished appellant's liability under the policy.

As to the further contention that appellee was entitled to be reimbursed for the $75 paid to the husband of Mrs. Appel, by the terms of the policy the liability for damages on account of injuries or death was limited to $5000 for each person, and the total liability assumed, in any event, was not to exceed $10,000, irrespective of the number of persons injured. The language of the policy is, "damages on account of injury to or the death of one person is limited to $5000 and subject to the same limit for each person." This language is too plain and clear to leave any doubt as to its meaning. It specifically limits appellant's liability to $5000 for injury or death to one person, irrespective of the number of persons who may make claim to damages on account of the injury to such person. In this case but one person was injured,—Mrs. Appel,—and under the conditions of the policy the appellant's liability was limited to $5000 on account of such injury. For this reason we think the Appellate Court was right in refusing to allow appellee's claim for such item.

As to the contention of appellant that it is not liable for any amount in excess of the policy except the $17.25 court costs, this contention is based on the language of the

policy wherein it provides appellant's undertaking is to indemnify appellee "against loss from liability imposed by law," etc. Its argument in support of this contention is, that by the terms of the policy the insurance is not against "liability for loss" but only against "loss from liability imposed by law," and that no loss is sustained, by the terms of such policy, until the judgment rendered is actually paid or the liability otherwise satisfied, and that as the loss in this case was not paid until after the interest had accrued, it constituted a part of appellee's loss only from the time the judgment was paid by it, and that it is not liable for any part of such loss in excess of the amount covered by its policy. Appellant cites in support of this contention the following among other cases: Davison v. Casualty Co. 187 Mass. 167; Coast Lumber Co. v. Ætna Life Ins. Co. 22 Idaho, 264; Puget Sound Improvement Co. v. Frankfort Ins. Co. 52 Wash. 124; Connolly v. Bolster, 187 Mass. 266; Cushman v. Carbondale, 122 Iowa, 566. These cases, however, are not decisive of this question, for the reason the policy in each of those cases made it a condition that no action should lie for a loss under the policy unless brought by the assured to reimburse it for loss actually sustained and paid in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issues, and therefore are not controlling here, where the policy does not make it a condition to a recovery thereon that the assured shall have actually paid or satisfied the judgment or claim before there shall be any liability under the policy. In this case the obligation of appellant was to indemnify appellee against loss from liability imposed by law for damages on account of injury or death sustained by a patient while under treatment at its hospital, etc. Appellant further agreed that it would "at its own cost defend such suit" unless it should elect to pay appellee the amount of the policy. What was meant by the phrase, “at its own cost defend such suit?" Clearly, that appellant would bear all of the expenses incident to the defense of such action,

This was to be in

no matter what their kind or nature. addition to the $5000 specified in the policy. When Mrs. Appel was injured the liability was incurred and when the court entered judgment against it the loss on account of such liability was sustained. (Stephens v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. 135 Mich. 189.) True, the loss had not been paid but it had been definitely ascertained and fixed, and if no appeal had been taken appellee would have been required to pay it at that time. The perfecting of the appeal did not relieve appellee of liability for the loss as ascertained and fixed by that judgment, but only suspended its collection until such further time as the judgment of the lower court could be reviewed on the appeal. Pending the appeal, and by reason thereof, costs and interest accrued. When the judgment of the lower court was affirmed the suspension of appellee's liability on the judgment was ended and its property was then subject to seizure in satisfaction of such judgment. Had appellant chosen to pay appellee the amount of its policy of $5000 when that judgment was rendered it would have thereby relieved itself from the expense incident to the appeal, and the appellee would have had the privilege of either using said amount to satisfy the judgment or in prosecuting its appeal. In either event appellant would not have been liable for the interest on the $5000 judgment pending the appeal. Had appellant elected to pay the amount of this judgment to appellee then liability for interest on its part would have ceased, and had appellee elected to prosecute the appeal it would have had the use of $5000 paid to it by appellant during the time the appeal was pending. But appellant did not choose to do this, but, on the contrary, insisted upon the case being appealed to the Appellate Court. Under the terms of the policy appellee was compelled to participate in the appeal or forfeit its rights under the policy. While the case was pending in the Appellate Court interest accumulated on the judgment, which appellee ultimately was required to pay.

In the meantime appellant retained and had the use of the $5000 which ultimately was applied in satisfaction of the judgment, on which appellee was required to pay interest. The policy, as we have seen, reserved to appellant full control over the defense of such action, and in consideration thereof it agreed to defend such action at its own cost. The appellant does not contend but that this included all of the expenses necessary and incidental to the carrying of such case by appeal to the Appellate Court, such as the procuring of the record, abstracts, briefs and argument, attorney fees and court costs. Interest on a judgment is as much an incident to the expense of carrying a case to the Appellate Court as are the court costs. The statute provides that the appellant shall pay interest on the judgment appealed from during the time such appeal is pending, as well as all of the costs of such appeal. Each item is a part of the expenses incurred as an incident to such appeal, and is, in a sense at least, a part of the costs of such appeal, and we think where a policy provides, as did the policy in this case, that appellant should have the right to carry the case to the higher court, but at its own expense, when it does so interest and court costs are to be deemed as much a part of the expense of such appeal as are the attorney's fees, the securing of a record, the printing of briefs and abstracts, or any of the other expenses incidental to such appeal. This is the view taken by the courts in Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Bowling Green Gas Light Co. 159 Ky. 732, and Century Realty Co. v. Frankfort Ins. Co. 161 S. W. Rep. 624, and we think these cases should be followed here.

For the reasons given the judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(No. 11505.-Cause transferred.)

THE PEOPLE Cx rel. Rufus M. Potts et al. Appellees, vs. THE CONTINENTAL BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed October 23, 1917.

I. APPEALS AND ERRORS-right of a foreign corporation to do business in Illinois is not a franchise. The right of a foreign corporation to do business in Illinois is a mere license and not a franchise, as the franchise of the corporation is the privilege emanating from the State of its creation, and hence a bill to enjoin a foreign corporation from further continuing business in Illinois does not involve a franchise.

2. SAME what necessary to give jurisdiction because the State is interested. To give the Supreme Court direct appellate jurisdiction on the ground that the State is interested as a party or otherwise, the interest of the State must be a direct and substantial one in the subject matter of the litigation; and such is not the case where a bill is filed in the name of the People to enjoin a foreign insurance corporation from continuing business in Illinois and asking for the appointment of a receiver upon the ground of the defendant's insolvency.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. AUGUSTUS A. PARTLOW, Judge, presiding.

DAVID K. TONE, for appellants.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, CHURCH, SHEPARD & DAY, and RYAN, CONDON & LIVINGSTON, (IRVIN I. LIVINGSTON, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: On November 17, 1916, the Attorney General filed in the superior court of Cook county a bill in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of Rufus M. Potts, insurance superintendent, against the Continental Beneficial Association, a Pennsylvania corporation licensed to transact business in this State as a fraternal beneficial association, charging the insolvency of the corporation and