somewhat as Hamlet did when he jumped his presence would be a nuisance if he did upon Laertes at the grave of Ophelia. Send so. So he went to the little inn at Rediher seventy-five pounds indeed, while he was ready to drink up Esil for her, or to make over to her the whole Belton estate, and thus abandon the idea for ever of being Belton of Belton ! He reached Taunton in the middle of the night, during the small hours of the morning in a winter night; but yet he could not bring himself to go to bed. So he knocked up an ostler at the nearest inn, and ordered out a gig. He would go down to the village of Redicote, on the Minehead road, and put up at the public-house there. He could not now have himself driven at once to Belton Castle, as he would have done had the old squire been alive. He fancied that cote, reaching that place between four and five o'clock in the morning; and very uncomfortable he was when he got there. But in his present frame of mind he preferred discomfort. He liked being tired and cold; and felt when he was put into a chill room, without fire, and with a sanded floor, that things with him were as they ought to be. Yes, he could have a fly over to Belton Castle after breakfast. Having learned so much, and ordered a dish of eggs and baron for his morning's breakfast, he went upstairs to a miserable little bedroom, to dress himself after his night's journey. From the Spectator Oct. 14. We it not been almost forced upon him by the fact that the secret feeling of the American people has always supported him, and supTHE correspondence between Mr. Adams ported him very strongly in his view, and Lord Russell on the question of com- insisting so much on what he calls our " prepensation for the damages inflicted by the cipitate and unprecedented" recognition of Alabama and her consorts on the commer- the South as a belligerent power as the cial marine of the United States is too origin of the naval exploits of the Confedgrave, moderate, and carefully self-restrained erates, and the source of all the subsequent on both sides not to wear an uncomfortable mischief. Lord Russell admits indeed that aspect to all who wish for permanently the recognition was "unprecedented" in its pacific relations between the two countries. earliness, but he points out that all the cirBoth the statesmen write with that care cumstances were unprecedented also, that and guarded courtesy which show how sen- they involved interests unprecedently large, sible they are to the possible ill effects of a spread over an unprecedented area of the single word of needless provocation, and globe, and absolutely calling for as early as each has enough of precedent on his side possible a definition of our policy. either in the former conduct of the other or acted before France, it is true, but the imthe vague maxims of international law gen- mense maritime interests involved required erally, to make the case look like one for us to take the lead. It would have been compromise, without affording sufficient pop- mere shutting our eyes to facts to affect to ular apology to any but a weak power for doubt the existence of a war certain to yielding its own views. If either were no- cover-indeed then covering—a vast area, toriously the inferior of the other in strength, and certain to involve dozens of ports disthere is sufficient of doubtful matter on both tributed along the whole coast from Mexico sides to make a concession on either side to the Potomac; and it would have been feasible, and if there were no popular irrita- childish to doubt that the President in protion in the United States there is no ques- claiming the blockade, really meant to exertion but that the policy of the United States cise the rights of an international, not merely in former discussions of the same kind would of a municipal blockade, and stop all assistbe sufficient justification for a silent with-ance sent to his enemy on the high seas if drawal of the claims of the Government. necessary. The assertion now made, that But in fact the irritation in the States, but for England and France the blockade especially since the piratical ravages of the would have been purely municipal, and its Shenandoah among the whalers in Behring's rights not been exercised on the high seas Straits subsequent to the close of the war, at all, is simply ridiculous. To have been is intense, and on the other hand, the Eng- guilty of such a neglect of natural advanlish people are in no mood to concede claims tages would have been in the highest degree of a kind which the United States peremp- culpable, and not permitted by the Ameritorily repudiated towards Portugal as recent- can people for a moment. We do not believe ly as fifteen years ago. The situation is that the thought of a mere municipal blocktherefore one in which neither party is in- ade ever crossed Mr. Lincoln's mind. It is clined to recede a single step, and yet in a mere gloss of controversial criticism now. which there is but little chance of the con- But Mr. Adams says we might have waited, troversy sinking into abeyance without as the custom is, till the need for the discusserious consequences. Arbitration has been sion of the international law bearing on the proposed and absolutely refused by Lord subject had been forced upon us by a conRussell, and the mixed Commission which he crete case of capture. No doubt we might, has suggested in its place, to consider all but we were not obliged to do so, the war such claims for injuries done to the subjects being a flagrant fact, and its dimensions no of either nation through the war as either Gov-matter of reasonable doubt. And undoubternment shall consent to submit, is evidently edly the necessary tendency of all the modnot intended to cover the only class of injuries on which the pride of the American Union is really roused. We will briefly sketch the strongest aspects of each side of the case, and point out the only consideration in which we can see any reasonable hope of coming to a mutual understanding. Mr. Adams has, we think, made a mistake a serious mistake we should think it, had ern practice in such cases, necessary because the scale of transactions to which the practice of each neutral and belligerent in such wars applies grows so rapidly from generation to generation, is to take a definite line as early as possible, in order that all the interests affected in every part of the globe may not be without early notice. It behoved us to let our Australian colonies, for instance, know at once whether the Southern privateers which Mr. Davis had declared his intention to send out, were to be treated as pirates or to have the rights of belligerents. Thereon depended in great measure of course the behaviour of such privateers to neutral ships, and the subsequently proved poverty of the Confederate resources in manning and sending out these ships, which bore so little proportion to their resources on land, though it was scarcely anticipated in England, would, even if it had been known, have furnished no excuse for not giving the naval rights of a belligerent to any power so well-organized on land as to cover millions of square miles with rebellion for four years. In short, no one can deny that the promptness of our action in this matter was in the interests of humanity and of commerce, and that under similar circumstances the American Government would certainly have been equally prompt, and justified in such promptness by the necessary conditions of modern commerce and warfare. It is true that Mr. Adams is right in saying that if we had held the Southern privateers to be pirates, we should have had no Alabama difficulties, because they would have been deprived of all ports but the generally inaccessible Southern ports. But to treat them as pirates would have been impossible in any part of the world. As Lord Russell justly observes, even in the North itself it was impossible to treat either privateersmen as pirates, or the Southern soldiers as rebels. And this being obvious to all the world, it was the clear duty of England to take the position necessarily laid down for her by every consideration of prudence and humanity as early as possible. On Mr. Adams's second point, that, belligerent rights once granted, our Foreign Enlistment Act proved inadequate to its end, that our Government refused to strengthen it, though requested by the United States and having half acceded to the request, that inefficient as it was, it was even still less efficiently administered, he has a very much stronger case, and Lord Russell only becomes effective in reply when retorting with his tu quoque by recalling the consistent conduct and language of the Federal Government itself towards Portugal between 1816 and 1850. There is no doubt whatever that our Foreign Enlistment Act when tried by the test of experience was quite unequal to the demands on it, and that the only cases in which the Government adequately fulfilled its intention were those in which they exceeded the powers given them. There is more to be said in Of apology for their refusal to adopt the new clauses suggested by Mr. Adams and embodied in the American Act. Our Government maintain that in the hands of the American Government those clauses had proved practically quite as inefficient as our own Act, weak as it is, in the hands of the British Government, and that in four years far more cruisers escaped from American ports to assist the revolution against Portugal than escaped from English ports to assist the Confederates in the same time. It does not seem likely therefore that had we adopted Mr. Adams's suggestion it would have removed the cause of offence. course Lord Russell has not much to say in excuse for the escape of the Alabama, and on this head, except so far as to exonerate the Government from any wilful neglect, his answer is exceedingly weak. The Board of customs had pledged themselves to "keep a strict watch on the vessel," which they failed to do, and the telegram to detain her was not sent till two days after her escape. It was a blundering business, as we may very well afford to confess, but it was the only case in which all reasonable and legal precautions were not taken; and the United States refused to be responsible for much worse and more numerous deficiencies of a similar kind in the case of Portugal. Where good faith and a reasonable amount of diligence have been shown, no State can be expected, except on grounds of high policy affecting its own future, to accept any responsibility for acts done by those over whom it has no control, simply because a minor administrative blunder of its own was one condition of the power to commit those acts. For the escape of the Shenandoah, as Lord Russell shows, we are in no way to blame. No evidence was produced against it, and its equipment was all managed in waters where we had no jurisdiction. Is there, then, no ground at all on which an approximation between the views of the two Governments might be attained without sacrifice of dignity on the part of either? We think there is. America has, since the beginning of the century, exactly changed places with England, upholding now the claims of belligerents which she formerly resisted, and resisting the claims of neutrals which she formerly upheld. England's attitude is equally inconsistent with that taken by her in Lord Stowell's time, when she was intent upon curbing the mischievous power of neutrals to assist belligerents. Ought not this reciprocal change of position to suggest to both Governments the dangers attending a too exclusive advocacy of the catch them in the opposite mood, and secure, by a reasonable concession, their better conduct for the future. rights of either belligerent or neutral, and an agreement in some new line of policy freely admitted by both as inconsistent with some of their own former positions, and accepted, not on the strength of former precedents, but for their own interest as a precedent for the future? We do not hesitate to say that there is great future danger to THE us in asserting the rights of neutrals even so strongly as Lord Russell does in the present controversy. If, says Mr. Adams, neutrals are to be permitted in future to refuse all responsibility for the acts of cruisers which have escaped from their ports, whether with or without culpable negligence, "neutral ports will become the true centres from which the most effective and dangerous enterprises against the commerce of belligerents may be contrived, fitted out, and exe cuted. Ships, men, and money will always be at hand for the service of any power sufficiently strong to hold forth a probability of repayment in any form, or adroit enough to secure a share of the popular sympathy in its undertakings. New Floridas, Alabamas, Shenandoahs will appear On every sea." This argument has always seemed to us to have the greatest force, and we have frequently pressed it on English statesmen. We can blockade Prussian ports, for instance, but if Prussia may give a flag to any American cruiser escaping from Boston or New York, English commerce will quite as soon be swept from the sea in a war with Prussia as Prussian commerce. This is fatal to English interests. Therefore while maintaining, as we do, that we have done nothing and omitted nothing which cannot be far more than justified by American precedents, is not the present condition of mind of the United States a great opportunity for improving the future precedents on this subject? Why should not English statesmen, while expressly repudiating all obligation to give compensation for the Alabama on the principles of existing international law, avow their wish to establish a new English precedent for the future, if they can obtain the concurrence of the United States, and even give their consent to some indemnification as the price of a treaty by which the two Governments should engage, with the consent of the Legislatures of both countries, to accept such responsibility in future wherever reasonable evidence of any departmental or ministerial negligence could be produced? It is quite true that the United States have hitherto refused to apologize for much greater sins than those of which we have been guilty. But that is just the reason why it is wise to From the Saturday Review, 14th Oct. CORRESPONDENCE OF EARL RUSSELL AND MR. ADAMS. THE letters which have passed in the last few months between Lord RUSSELL and Mr. ADAMS, and which have just been published, are very creditable to their writers. The arguments are good, the language is good, and the sentiments are very good. We in England may be especially glad that the conduct of the case on behalf of the United States has fallen into the hands of Mr. ADAMS, who argues with moderation and courtesy, who knows how to put his strong points without anything like blustering and arrogance, and who has the mind of a lawyer, and, while he makes the best of all on which he can really rely does not run a weak argument to death. The subject of the correspondence is the American claims against us for compensation on account of the injuries inflicted by ships in the Confederate service, but fitted out and armed from England. With this claim Mr. ADAMS mixes up the old grievance of our hasty recognition of the South as a belligerent Power. If we had not recog nized the South as a belligerent, it could not have had a flag to sail its ships under, and the Alabama and her sister vessels would never have been sent to sea. It is a good thing that the question of the propriety of our recognition of the South so soon should have been once more raised, because the discussion of the point has now been so exhausted that we may hope to hear very little of it again. Mr. SEWARD urged that it was an unfriendly thing to recognize and encourage, so quickly and decisively, those who were rebelling against a friendly Power. It looked as if we were glad of the calamities of the United States, and anxious to make the most and the worst of them. So speedy and instantaneous a recognition of rebels as belligerents was without any precedent to justify it, and this in itself ought to have made England pause. RUSSELL replied that the rebellion itself was unprecedented, and that never before in history had rebels to the number of five millions been able on the moment to form a civil government, establish a large army, and exercise undisputed sway over thousands of miles of territory. On other occa Lord sions foreign nations had waited to see whether the rebellion would become large, but here the rebellion was large from its outset. This is a very fair argument, and the the Americans might perhaps be brought to think so, although they are at present profoundly convinced that we are much to blame because we did not see from the outset that the North must win. But, very fortunately, the main argnment by which our conduct may be justified is one as to which there is much less room for contention. From the moment that the North instituted a blockade, and announced its intention to capture foreign vessels that broke, or threatened to break, the blockade, we had no choice. The North assumed towards us the position which a belligerent holds towards neutrals; and thenceforth we could not say we were not neutrals because neither the Federals nor the Confederates were belligerents. It was not a question of courtesy, nor a mere theoretical way of regarding men and things. British ships were captured because there was a state of war, and this was a fact which very much affected us, and of which we could not possibly avoid taking notice. Lord RUSSELL had the satisfaction of bringing to the notice of Mr. ADAMS an elaborate judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, in which it was held that the Confederates had been belligerents from the outset, and that therefore Prize Courts had jurisdiction over vessels seized under the laws of war. Mr. ADAMS had nothing really to say in opposition to the arguments which convinced an American court of justice; and the only adverse observation he can think of is to suggest that we were too hasty, even on our own showing, in treating the establishment of a blockade as involving the recognition of the belligerant rights of the Confederates. The facts appear to be these. Tae PRESIDENT, on the 19th of April, 1861, proclaimed the blockade of seven States; and Lord LYONS wrote a despatch, not giving the actual words of the Proclamation, but saying that the Government intended to establish a blockade. If Lord LYONS had actually sent a copy of the Proclamation of the PRESIDENT, then the recognition of the South, which was announced in Parliament on the 6th of May, would have been quite proper; but Lord LYONS only said that it was intended to establish a blockade, and Mr. ADAMS thinks it was very unfriendly in the English Cabinet not to wait to see whether these intentions were carried into effect. On the other side of the Atlantic there was no delay, and an English ship was seized for breach of blockade on the very day when the QUEEN'S Proclamation was issued. When the PRESIDENT, by proclaiming a blockade, established a state of war, and exercised belligerent rights against English ships, it is very hypercritical to say that the English Government were not very definitely informed of this by their own diplomatic agents, and had to act to the best of their judgment. The facts of the case, not the wording of Lord LYONS'S letters, determined whether they acted rightly or not. It might with much greater reason be said that the United States Government acted with precipitate harshness towards us when it seized our ships as prizes before the fact of the blockade could have been brought to the knowledge of the English Government, and the QUEEN'S Procla mation of neutrality have been made known to English shipowners. It must be remembered that the form which the recognition of the South as a belligerent Power assumed was a warning to British subjects not to overstep the position of neutrals, and it is hard to say that the warning was issued too soon. This discussion of the premature recognition of the South is, however, only ancillary to the main arguments on which Mr. ADAMS relies in asking compensation for the injuries done by the Alabama and her sister vessels. The general result of the facts stated appears to be that, on the whole, the British Government was vigilant, and successfully vigilant; that it exerted itself strenuously, that public opinion aided it, and that very few Confederate ships got to sea which any amount of watchfulness could have prevented from getting to sea. But in the particular case of the Alabama there were not those early, prompt, and effectual measures taken which were taken in later cases. In the case of the Alabama, the Government waited for legal proof; in the case of the steamrams, the Government seized without legal proof, and merely on suspicion. That is, in the first case that arose the Government acted legally, and in the latter cases illegally. That the conduct of the Government in the case of the Alabama was very irritating to Mr. ADAMS, may easily be imagined. A month before he could get the British Ministry to take any steps whatever, he had intelligence of the construction and destination of the Alabama, and immediately informed Lord RUSSELL. The authorities at Liverpool were immediately asked to report, but, as Mr. ADAMS very plainly says, they were bribed, and consequently reported |