(c.) The free navigation of certain rivers,' and the perma nent neutrality of works of improvement upon them.

(d.) The neutrality of ship-canals and other artificial means of communication between bodies of water of which the navigation is free to ships of all nations.

(e.) The payment of loans. In this case the guaranteeing powers usually become guarantors, and are obliged to make good any default of their principals in their stipulated payments of principal or interest.

Reciprocity Treaties. These are compacts containing stipulations requiring the mutual or reciprocal observance of certain duties or obligations. Most treaties, to a certain extent, involve reciprocal action, or the recognition of mutual rights and duties. It is only when a treaty involves a considerable number of such obligations that it receives this name. Extradition and naturalization treaties are reciprocal, but only on the subject from which each is named. Most reciprocity treaties, properly so called, are of a commercial character, and stipulate for specially favorable terms of commercial intercourse, for consular privileges, for the admission of certain products of each state into the ports of the other at special rates of duty, or without the payment of duty. They are usually entered into for a limited period of time, at the end of which they expire, or, at the will of the interested states, are revised and extended for a further period. The component states of a union or confederacy are frequently obliged, by the constitution or treaty of union, to grant many reciprocal priv

1 Klüber, § 157.

In the Treaty of London, in 1832, France, Great Britain, and Russia guaranteed a loan of Otho, the Bavarian prince who had been created by them King of Greece.

Treaties containing what is known as "the most favored nation clause" are not generally regarded as operating to entitle states whose treaties contain them to special privileges stipulated for in reciprocity treaties. This for the reason that

the subjects covered by the "most favored nation clause relate to gratuitous privileges merely, and do not apply to reciprocity treaties which contain stipulations which, as they are based upon consideration, partake of the nature of contract obligations. A contrary view, however, has been asserted by Great Britain.-II Dig. Int. Law, § 134; I Ibid. § 68; U. S. For. Rel. 1896, p. 429.

ileges to each other. This was the case in the Zollverein, and is so in the existing German Confederation. According to the Constitution of the United States, the states of the Federal Union are obliged to extradite criminals on the demand of other states, to accord the privileges of citizenship to citizens of other states, and to give full faith to the properly authenticated records and judgments of courts in the other states of the Union.

Rules for the Interpretation of Treaties. Treaties, like laws, are drawn in general terms, and in their preparation the effort is made to frame their provisions in such terms as will include all cases that may fairly arise under them. This is a task of extreme difficulty. As the parties to such agreements, more frequently than not, speak different languages, and represent different, and sometimes opposing, legal and political systems, it is not at all remarkable that causes of difference should arise more frequently in the execution of treaties than in the operation of municipal laws. The rules of interpretation in both cases are substantially the same; the task of interpretation, however, is vastly more difficult, in the case of treaties, than in the case of contracts and municipal laws. The attempt to frame rules for this purpose has been frequently made; not always, however, with entirely satisfactory results. The English rules of Rutherforth are based upon the common law rules of interpretation as applied to contracts. Those of Vattel and Domat are based upon the rules of the Roman law. To these authors the student is referred for a general discussion of the subject.'

The following rules are now generally sanctioned: (1.) Interpretation must be

' Grotius, liv. ii. chap. xvi.; Vattel, liv. ii. chap. xvii.; Rutherforth, book ii. chap. vii.; I Halleck, pp. 244-250; II Phillimore, §§ 64-67. Phillimore arranges the several rules of interpretation under three heads: (a) Authentic interpretation; that is, the exposition supplied by the lawgiver himself. (b)

mutual. Neither party to a

Usual interpretation; that which is founded upon usage and precedent. (c) Doctrinal interpretation; that which is founded upon a scientific exposition of the terms of the instrument, and which, according to many jurists, is the only interpretation properly so called.II Phillimore, § 67; Klüber, § 163.

treaty can apply his own rule without impairing, or destroying, the binding force of the instrument.'

(2.) A clause of a treaty can have but one true meaning.'

(3.) The words of a treaty are presumed to have been used in their usual sense and acceptation at the time the treaty was made, unless such interpretation involves an absurdity.'

(4.) Terms technical to an art are used in the sense or meaning applied to them in that art; terms peculiar to the language of one of the contracting parties are given the meaning which they have in that language. Where a treaty is executed in more than one language, each language being the language of a contracting party, each document is to be regarded as an original, and the sense of the treaty is to be drawn from them collectively."

(5.) Clauses inserted at the instance, or for the benefit, of one party, are strictly construed; that is, they are given the meaning least favorable to the party at whose instance they were inserted; it is his fault if he has not expressed himself clearly.

(6.) Favorable clauses are to be interpreted liberally. Odious clauses are to be interpreted strictly. Favorable clauses are those granting privileges to individuals or states, or doing away with, or modifying, restrictions upon rights. Harsh clauses are those depriving individuals, or classes of persons, of rights already existing, or abridging such rights or privileges, or rendering them ineffective."

(7.) An interpretation which renders a treaty inoperative is

to be rejected. Treaties are entered into for the purpose of accomplishing an end, or of attaining an object. An interpretation, therefore, which renders a treaty wholly or in part inoperative, is absurd.'

(8.) Special clauses are to be preferred to general: prohibitory clauses to permissive; and, in general, that which is expressed in great detail is to be preferred to that which is stated in general terms, or in less particular detail. General clauses are declaratory of a principle. If exceptions exist, they are accurately defined and stated in the modifying clauses which follow the principal clause. The broad terms of a general clause, or title, cannot be appealed to as authority against the precise limitation or exemption of the special clause.'

(9.) In the interpretation of a treaty the instrument must be regarded as an organic whole, and every part must be considered with reference to every other part. Hence earlier clauses are explained by later clauses in the same treaty, or by clauses on the same subject in later treaties between the same parties. Obscure clauses in earlier treaties are explained by clearer and more precisely stated clauses in agreements of later date. As regards any particular subject of stipulation, the whole treaty policy of two states on that subject is to be considered. Later treaties explain and modify earlier treaties on the same subject.'

Strict, or Restrictive Interpretation, consists in the precise application of the terms of an instrument to a particular case arising under it. It involves the exclusion of all cases not covered by a literal rendering of its terms.*

Liberal, or Extensive Interpretation, consists in an attempt to so construe the provisions of a treaty as to include within its operations cases similar in principle to those specifically

'Hall, § 111; Vattel, liv. ii. chap. xvii. §§ 282, 283, 286; Wildman, p. 177; Woolsey, § 113.

2 Wildman, p. 185; Vattel, liv. ii. chap. xvii. §§ 312-317; II Phillimore, § 97.

Vattel, liv. ii. chap. xvii. § 286; II Ferguson, § 133; Wildman, p. 180; Woolsey. § 113; II Phillimore, § 70; II Dig. Int. Law, § 133.

Vattel, liv. ii. chap. xvii. §§ 292, 293; II Phillimore, §§ 82-87.

provided for. It is, in substance, a broad and comprehensive rendering of the clauses of a treaty, regard being had to the spirit rather than the letter of the instrument.'

In connection with the subject of interpretation the following definitions are given of terms frequently used in connection with treaties:

Protocol. This is a word of Byzantine origin, and was at first applied to the first, or outer, sheet of a roll of manuscript, upon which was written or impressed the writer's name, the date of the instrument, and the title of the minister from whose office it issued. As a diplomatic term it is applied to the rough draft of a public act, or to the preliminary draft of an agreement between two or more states, which is to constitute the basis of negotiations in a treaty to be subsequently executed; the term is also applied to the formally authenticated minutes of the proceedings of a congress or conference. In a similar sense it is applied to the preliminary acts and agreements entered into by ambassadors in the preparation of a treaty.

Recez. This term is applied to the act of a diet, or congress, in reducing to writing the result of its deliberations upon a particular subject, before final adjournment.

Separate Articles. These are clauses added to a treaty after it has been formally signed and ratified. They are contained in a separate instrument, and are duly authenticated, but are construed in connection with the treaty to which they refer, and of which they form a part.

The Most Favored Nation Clause. The use of this clause is becoming constantly more frequent in treaties, especially in those of a commercial character. It commends itself by its convenience. Its effect is to extend the scope and operation of a treaty to cover any concessions of privileges, of a similar character to those stipulated for, which may be granted in the future, by either party, to other states, or to their citizens or subjects. The clauses of later treaties granting such concessions in this way become an integral part of the early treaty.

1 Vattel, liv. ii. chap. xvii. § 290; II Phillimore, pp. 82-87; I Wild

man, p. 184; II Twiss, § 230; I Halleck, pp. 244, 245.