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which formed a total of two hundred and seventy-seven thousand six hundred and ten men. The European nations augmented his fleet with a hundred and twenty vessels, each of which carried two hundred men, in all four and twenty thousand: these, added to the other, amounted together to three hundred and one thousand six hundred and ten men.

Besides this fleet, which consisted all of large vessels, the small galleys of thirty and fifty oars, the transport-ships, the vessels that carried the provisions, and that were employed in other uses, amounted three thousand. If we reckon but eighty men in each of these vessels, one with another, the whole number would

be two hundred and forty thousand men. Thus, when Xerxes arrived at Thermopylæ, his land and sea forces, together, made up the number of two millions six hundred and forty-one thousand, six hundred and ten men, exclusive of servants, eunuchs, women, sutlers, and other people of that sort, who usually follow an army, and whose number at this time was equal to that of the forces: so that the whole number of souls that followed Xerxes in this expedition amounted to five millions, two hundred and eighty-three thousand, two hundred and twenty.* This is the computation made of them by Herodotus, and in which Plutarch and Isocrates agree with him. Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Ælian, and others, fall very short of this number in their calculation ; but their accounts of the matter appear to be less authentic than that of Herodotus, who lived in the same age in which this expedition was undertaken, and who repeats the inscription engraved, by order of the Amphictyons, upon the monument of those Grecians who were killed at Thermopylæ, which expressed that they fought against three millions of men.

For the sustenance of all these persons, there must hare been daily consumed, according to Herodotus's computation, above a hundred and ten thousand three hundred and forty medimni of flour, (the medimnus was a measure, which, according to Budæus, was equivalent to six of our bushels) allowing for every head the quantity of a chvenix, which was the daily portion or allowance that masters gave their slaves among the Grecians. We have no account in history of any other army so numerous as this. And among these millions of men, there was not one that could vie with Xerxes in point of beauty, either for the comeliness of his face, or the tallness of his person. But this is a poor merit or pre-eminence for a prince, when attended with no other. Accordingly Justin, after he has mentioned the number of these troops, adds that this vast body of forces wanted a chief: Huic tunto agmini dux defuit.

We shouid hardly be able to conceive how it was possible to find a sufficient quantity of provisions for such an immense number of persons, if the historian had not informed us that Xerxes had employed four whole years in making preparations for this expedition.Ş. We have already seen how many vessels of burden there were that coasted along continually to attend upon and supply the land army; and doubtless there were fresh ones arriving every day, that furnished the camp with a sufficiency of all things necessary.

Herodotus acquaints us with the method they made use of to calculate their forces, which were almost innumerable. They assembled ten thousand men in a particular place, and ranked them as close together as was possible ;, after which they described a circle quite round them, and erected a little wall upon that circle about half the height of a man's body; when this was done, they made the whole army successively pass through this space, and thereby knew to what number it amounted.ll

Herodotus gives us, also, a particular account of the different armour of all the nations which composed this army. Besides the generals of every nation, who each of them commanded the troops of their respective country, the land army was under the command of six Persian generals; viz. Mardonius, the son of




* Herod. 1. vii. c. 56_99, and 194—187. f Diod. 1. xi. p. 3. Plin. I. xxxiii. c. 10. Ælian. xiii. c. 3.

Herod. l. viž. c. 20.

Herod. J. viii. c. 187. | Idem, c. 60.

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Gobryas ; Tirintatechmus, the son of Artabanes, and Smerdonus, son of Ota-, nes, both near relations to the king; Masistus, son of Darius and Atossa ; Gero gis, son of Ariazes; and Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus. The ten thousand Persians, who were called the Immortal Band, were commanded by Hydarnes. The cavalry had its particular commanders.

There were likewise four Persian generals who commanded the fleet. In Herodotus we have a particular account of all the nations by which it was fitted out. Artem.sa, queen of Halicarnassus, who from the death of her hus. band governed the kingdom for her son, wbo was still a minor brought but five vessels along with her ; but they were the best equipped, and the lightest ships in the whole fleet, next to those of the Sidonians. The princess distinguished herself in this war by her singular courage, and still more by her prudence and conduct. Herodotus observes, that among all the commanders in the army, there was not one who gave Xerxes so good advice and such wise counsel as this queen; but he was not prudent enough to apply it to his advantage.*

When Xerxes had numbered his whole forces by land and sea, he asked Demaratus, if ne thought the Grecians would dare to withstand him. 'I have already taken notice, that this Demaratus was one of the two kings of Sparta, who, being exiled by the faction of his enemies, had taken refuge at the Persian court, where he was entertained with the greatest marks of honour and beneficence. As the courtiers were one day expressing their surprise that a king should suffer himself to be banished, and desired him to acquaint them with the reason of it: “ It is,” said he, “ because the law is more powerful than the kings at Sparta.” This prince was very highly esteemed in Persia : but neither the injustice of the Spartan citizens, nor the kind treatment of the Persian king, could make him forget his country:# As soon as he knew that Xerxes was making preparations for the war, he found means to give the Grecians secret intelligence of it. And now, being obliged, on this occasion, to speak his sentiments to the king, he did it with such a noble freedom and dignity, as became a Spartan and a king of Sparta.

Demaratus, before be answered the king's question, desired to know whether it was his pleasure that he should flatter him, or that he should speak his thoughts to him freely and truly. Xerxes having declared that he desired him to act with entire sincerity, he spoke in the following terms: “Great prince,” said Demaratus,“ since it is agreeable to your pleasure and commands, I shall deliver my sentiments to you with the utmost truth and sincerity. It must be confessed, that, from the beginning of time, Greece has been trained and accustomed to poverty: but then she has introduced and established virtue. within her territories, which wisdom cultivates and the vigour of her laws maintains. And it is by the use which Greece knows how to make of this virtue, that she equally defends herself against the inconveniences of poverty, and the yoke of servitude. But, to speak only of the Lacedæm.onians, my particular countrymen, you may assure yourself, that as they are born and bred up in liberty, they will never hearken to any proposals that tend to slavery. Though they were deserted and abandoned by all the other Grecians, and reduced to a band of a thousand men, or even to a more inconsiderable number, they will still come out to meet you, and not refuse to give you battle.”§. Xerxes, upon hearing this discourse, laughed, and said he could not comprehend how men, in such a state of liberty and independence as the Lacedæmonians were described to enjoy, who had no master to force and compel them to it, could be capable of exposing themselves in such a manner to danger and death: Demaratus replied: "The Spartans indeed are free, and under no subjection to the will of any man; but at the same time they have laws, to which they are subject, and of which they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of your inajesty. Now, by these laws they are forbid ever to fly in batile, let the num




* Herod. I. vii. 89, 90. ! | Ainic.or patriæ post fugam, quam regi post beneficia.- Justin.

Plut in Apoph. Lacon. p. 220,

4 Herod. I. vii. o. 101-105

ber of their enemies be ever so superior; and are commanded, by abiding firm in their post, either to conquer or to die."*

Xerxes was not offended at the liberty wherewith Demaratus spoke to him, and continued his march.




LACEDÆMON and Athens, which were the two most powerful cities of Greece, and the cities against which Xerxes was most exasperated, were not indolent or negligent while so formidable an enemy was approaching. Having received intelligence long before of the designs of that prince, they had sent spies to Sardis, in order to have a more exact information of the number and quality of his forces. These spies were seized and as they were just on the point of being put to death, Xerxes countermanded it, and gave orders that they should be conducted through his army and then sent back without any barm being done to them. At their return, the Grecians understood what they had to apprebend from so potent an enemy.t

They sent deputies at the same time to Argos, into Sicily, to Gelon tyrant of Syracuse, to the isles of Corcyra and Crete, to desire succours from them, and to form a league against the common enemy.

The people of Argos offered a considerable succour, on condition they should have an equal share of the authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them a great deal : but into what errors and mischiefs are not men led by a mistaken point of honour, and a foolish jealousy of command ! The Argives were not contented with this offer, and refused to enter into a league with the Grecians, without considering, that if they suffered them to be destroyed, their own ruin must inevitably follow. I

The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily, and addressed themselves to Gelon, who was the most potent prince of the Greeks at that time He promised to assist them with two hundred vessels of three benches of oars, with an army of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, two thousand light-armed soldiers, and the same number of bow-men and slingers, and to supply the Grecian army with provisions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generalissimo of all the forces both by land and sea. The Lacedæmonians were highly offended at such a proposal. Gelon then abated somewhat in his demands, and promised the same, provided he had at least the command either of the fleet or of the army. This proposal was strenuously opposed by the Athenians, who made answer, that they alone had a right to command the feet, in case the Lacedæmonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more substantial reason for not leaving Sicily unprovided with troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, which consisted of three hundred thousand men.

The inhabitants of Corcyra, now called Corfu, gave the envoys a more favourable answer, and immediately put to sea with a fleet of sixty vessels. But they advanced no farther than to the coasts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to see the success of an engageinent, that they might afterwards range themselves on the side of the conqueror.||

Tue people of Crete, having consulted the Delphic oracle, to know what .esolution they were to take on this occasion, refused to enter into the league.

Thus were the Lacedæmonians and Athenians left almost to themselves, all the rest of the cities and nations having submitted to the heralds that Xerxes had sent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Thespia and of Platææ.** In so pressing a danger, their first care was to put an end to all discord and division among themselves ; for which reason the Athenians made peace with the people of Ægina, with whom they were actually at war.tt

* Irror! l. vii. c. 145, 146.

† Idem. licini. i. vii. c. 168. 1 Idemn, c. 161-171.

Idem, c. 148-152, ** Herod. l. vii. c. 132.

Idein, c. 153--161, If Herod. l. viii. c. 145

Their next care was to appoint a general : for there never was any occasioni wherein it was more necessary to choose one capable of so important a trust, than in the present conjuncture, when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the whole force of Asia. The most able and experienced captains, terrified at the greatness of the danger, bad taken the resolution of not presenting themselves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whose name was Epicydes, who had some eloquence, but in other respects was a person of no merit, was in disrepute for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice. Notwithstanding all which, it was apprehended, that, in the assembly of the people, the votes would run in his favour.* Themistocles, who was sensible that in calm weather almost any mariner may be capable of conducting a vessel, but that in storms and tempests, the most able pilots are at a loss, was convinced, that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicydes was chosen general, whose venal and mercenary soul gave them the justest reason to fear that he was not proof against the Persian gold.t There are occasions, when, in order to act wisely, I had almost said regularly, it is necessary to dispense with and rise above all rule. Themistocles, who knew very well that in the present state of affairs he was the only person capable of commanding, did for that reason make no scruple of employing bribes and presents to remove his competitor: and having found means to satisfy the ambition of Epicydes by gratifying his avarice, he got himself

elected general in his stead. We may here, I think, very justly apply to Themistocles what Titus Livius says of Fabius on a like occasion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were inclined to make a man of no merit consul, employed all his own influence, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the consulship, without being concerned at the clamour that might be raised against him, and succeeded in the attempt. The historian adds, the conjuncture of affairs, and the extreme danger the commonwealth was exposed to, were arguments of such weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct which might appear to be contrary to rules, and removed all suspicion of Fabius's having acted upon any motive of interest or ambition. On the contrary, the public admired his generosity and greatness of soul, in that, as he knew the commonwealth had occasion for an accomplished general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own singular merit in that respect, he had chosen rather in some sort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expose his character to the reproaches of envious tongues, than to be wanting in any service he could render his country.”'

The Athenians also passed a decree to recall all their citizens who were in banishment. They feared that Aristides would join their enemies, and influence a great many others to side with the barbarians. But they had a very false opinion of their citizen, who was infinitely-remote from such sentiments. Be that as it might, at this extraordinary juncture they thought fit to recall him, and Themistocles was so far from opposing the decree for that purpose, that he promoted it with all his credit and authority. The hatred and division of these great men had nothing of that implacable, bitter, and outrageous spirit, which prevailed among the Romans in the latter times of the republic. The danger of the state was the means of their reconciliation, and when their service was necessary to the preservation of the public, they laid aside all their jealousy and rancour: and we shall see, hereafter, that Aristides was so far from secretly thwarting his ancient rival, that he zealously contributed to the success of his enterprises, and to the advancement of his glory.ll

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* Plut. in Themist. p. 114. † Quilibet nautarum vectorumque tranquillo mari gubernare potest: ubi orta sæva tempestas est, ac tur bato mari rapitur vento navis, tum viro et gubernatore opus est. --Liv. 1. xxiv. n. 8.

1 Χρήμασι την φιλοτιμίαν έξωνήσατο παρά τ8 Επικύδε. Tempus ac necessitas belli, et discrimen summa rerum, faciebant ne quis aut in exemplum 'exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod cum semmo imperatore esse opus reip. sciret, seque eum haud dubie esse, minoris invidiam suam, ai qua ex re oriretur, quam utilitatem reip. fecisset. Liv. 1. xxiv, n, o,

# Plut. in Arist r 922323.


The'alarm increased in Greece, in proportion as they received advice that the Persian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been able w make no other resistance than with their land-forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to slavery. This exigence taught them how to set a right value upon the prudent foresight of Themistocles, who, upon some other pretext, had caused a hundred galleys to be built. Instead of judging like the rest of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he, on the contrary, considered it rather as the beginning, or as the signal of still greater battles, for which it was necessary to prepare the Athenian people ; and from that very time he began to think of raising Athens to a superiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the mistress of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to make the Athenian power entirely maritime, perceiving very plainly, that as she was so weak by land, she had no other way to render herself useful to her allies, or formidable to her enemies. His opinion herein prevailed among the people in spite of the opposition of Miltiades, whose difference of opinion undoubtedly arose from the little probability there was, that a people entirely unacquainted with fighting at sea, and who were only capable of fitting out and arming very small vessels, should be able to withstand so formidable a power as that of the Persians, who had both a numerous land-army, and a fleet of above a thousand ships.

The Athenians had some silver mines in a part of Attica, called Laurium, the whole products and revenue of which used to be distributed among them. Themistocles had the courage to propose to the people, that they should abolish these distributions, and employ that money in building vessels with three benches of oars, in order to makc war upon the people of Ægina, agaiòst whom he endeavoured to inflame their ancient jealousy. No people are ever willing to sacrifice their private interests to the general utility of the public : for they seldom have so much generosity or public spirit, as to purchase the wel-' fare or preservation of the state at their own expense. The Athenian people, however, did it upon this occasion : moved by the lively remonstrances of Themistocles, they consented that the money which arose from the product of the mines, should be employed in building a hundred galleys. Upon the arrival of Xerxes they doubled the nun er, and to that fleet Greece owed its preservation.*

When they came to the point of naming a general for the command of the navy, the Athenians, who alone had furnished two thirds of it, laid claim to that honour as appertaining to them, and their pretensions were certainly just and well grounded. It happened, however, that the suffrages of the allies all concurred in favour of Eurybiades, a Lacedæmonian. Themistocles, though very, aspiring after glory, thought it incumbent upon him on this occasion, to sacrifice his own interests for the common good of the nation; and giving the Athenians to understand, that, provided they behaved themselves with courage and conduct, all the Grecians would quickly desire to confer the command upon them of their own accord, he persuaded them to consent, as he himself would do, to give up that point at present to the Spartans. It may justly be said, that this prudent moderation in Themistocles was another means of saving the state. For the allies threatened to separate themselves from them, if they refused to comply ; and if that had happened, Greece must have been inevitably ruined.

SECTION V. -THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ. The only thing that now remained to be discussed, was to know in what place they should resolve to meet the Persians, in order to dispute their entrance into Greece. The people of Thessaly represented, that as they were the most cxposed, and likely to be first attacked by the enemy, it was but reasonable that their defence and security, on which the safety of all Greece so much depended, should first be provided for; without which they should


* Plut. in Thomist. p. 113.

t Herod. I. vui c. 213

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