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is the same as with the Malays; it has been strengthened in them by special customs and beliefs.

But we must never forget that both Malays, Japanese and Chinese, who in certain circumstances face death without showing any fear, are yet subject, in a high degree, to panic, the instinctive drive of which shows itself to be stronger than intellectual control.

We have thus seen in the Malays (who are not a low primitive race, but who show in certain respects more primitive features than the white races), in pathology and in normal life, many psychical phenomena in which a lack of resistance against, and the being overwhelmed by, certain instinctive affects leading to reflex-like reactions could be observed. The normal phenomena are not purely protopathic or of the nature of the mass-reflex; for with the Malays a fusion of protopathic with higher, epicritic apperception, leading to adequate reaction, has already certainly taken place.

Many of these 'atavistic' mechanisms may be observed in animals, partly in individuals, partly in the herd-life as gregarious phenomena, but also we frequently find them in our children, who often show typical 'protopathic' symptoms in their fear, sorrow, and anger, and in their reactions to these.

The 'pavor nocturnus'-the nightmare in its worst form of our young children may be regarded as having a protopathic character, being a vague anxiety of a most unbearable and unpleasant type causing the well-known bodily reactions of screaming, terror-torn facial expression, and general agitation and unrest, exactly the same as one can observe with young animals in danger and fear, who scream and try to seek protection with their mother.

In many of our dreams the same otherwise repressed instinctive affects most certainly play a rôle—in my opinion even greater than that of the much less repressed and far more innocent emotional complexes of our own individual experience. The same may be true of many of the neuroses and psychoses-in which far too much (e.g. fear and its reaction) has been ascribed to the repression of personal experience, whilst in my opinion every trauma, be it physical or psychical, can give rise to regressive pathological symptoms-the control of hidden forces having slackened.

A strong argument in this direction is the relatively small number of principal psycho-pathological syndromes, which always and again show nearly the same group of symptoms; regarding the symptomatology of psychical disorder as regressive phenomena which show the mechanisms,

both affective and effective, of earlier stages of development, might increase our insight into many of the psychoses.

In 'pavor nocturnus,' and also in Amuck and in Latah, there is still to be remarked one symptom which is very important, namely, the dissociation of consciousness which is complete in the former two, so that there is no remembrance at all of what happened during the attack; after awakening there is no knowledge of anything extraordinary having happened.

In Latah this amnesia certainly is not complete, but always memory is very vague, and it strikes the onlooker that there seems to exist a state of consciousness, quite different from the normal one, and resembling very much an hypnotic state.

Rivers has referred to this dissociation, in its most complete form, as alternate consciousness; it is like that which occurs in the well-known cases of 'double life' and 'double personality.' He regards these also as a special form of "repression under morbid conditions," in which early instinctive modes of reaction tend to reappear.

It seems to me that Amuck and Latah provide us with striking examples of such morbid conditions, where the special character of primitivity is the factor which enables these modes of reaction to arise more easily than with other races.

In normal Malay life, also, we meet many conditions in which dissociation plays an important rôle; in the so-called cases of kasurupan we see the possessed man, woman or child in terror-stricken flight, acting like an epileptic in a 'fugue,' playing the rôle of the animal or person-sometimes a bad spirit or a Messiah-and often found at a great distance from his kampong; driven, not by supernatural forces as the native thinks, but by the instinctive trends of his dissociated consciousness.

In daily life also one often may observe similar symptoms which point in the same direction. We once had a Malay boy, who lived a long time in our house, behaving and working quite normally as djonjos (boy) whilst he had lost all remembrance of a former period in which he had been a chauffeur! We observed the same in a babu (maid), in the hospital, who had absolutely forgotten how to cook-as was found out by a nurse who had known her several years ago as a perfect cook. In both cases they learnt again their forgotten capacities, and found as explanation only a Saja lupa—“I had forgotten it."

It seems to me, that in these lower, basic layers of the human mind, in the early instinctive and inherited qualities or tendencies, and in the

way and degree in which they have been either repressed or combined with our more adequate forms of instinctive and intellectual behaviour, we may find the real differences that exist between the human races. To investigate these differences in this way is better and easier than to do so by comparing their ways of thinking, calling them prelogical or logical, or by testing them with far too complicated experiments, only useful with highly developed cultured man.

MORALS AND SUPER-MEN.

(SOME ETHICAL PROBLEMS FROM THE
PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL STANDPOINT.)

By R. MONEY-KYRLE.

INTRODUCTION.

RELIGION has been defined as: "un ensemble de scrupules qui font obstacle au libre exercice de nos facultés1." But definitions that are epigrammatically expressed seldom cover more than half the common connotation of the concepts to which they are applied. And this is no exception; for the totality of a man's inhibitions does not, as a rule, exhaust his religion. I suggest, however, that such a description is adequate to delineate the scope of morals.

It may be objected that there are inhibitions that are not moral and morals that are not inhibitions, and that the proposed definition neither is covered by, nor covers, the common meaning of the word. But I think that these objections are less weighty than they seem.

Conscious inhibitions are clearly moral. But a man may be unable to do something of which his conscious morality approves. Such inhibitions he would not at first regard as moral; but psycho-analysis would show that they are due to an infantile morality that had become unconscious. Thus all inhibitions are, in a wide sense, moral. Again, most morals are clearly inhibitions. But there are 'shalts' as well as 'shalt nots' in the ten commandments. Actions determined by such precepts do not appear to be inhibitions. But if they are the free expression of altruistic inclinations they are not moral2. And if they are not free they are based on inhibitions. Thus all morals, in a narrow sense, are inhibitions.

I will therefore define morals as the totality of human inhibitions. Other definitions could be given, but this one seems to accord with the original meaning of the word-with a meaning that still requires a name. There have been free-thinkers, perhaps in all the great civilizations of the world, who have seen clearly that many religious inhibitions are 1 Solomon Reinach, Orpheus, p. 4.

2 In the first meaning of this word.

based on ignorance and superstition. And there have been sophists, since the time of early Greece, who have generalized this observation and have assumed that the rational man would be free from all internal restraints.

Such a conclusion has profoundly disturbed the minds of other thinkers, and since the days of Socrates there have always arisen philosophers to combat it, and to seek a rational foundation for morality. Sometimes these anti-sophists are merely shocked because their own irrational inhibitions are threatened. But often they are moved by the consideration that without restraints civilization would be impossible. Some, while seeing that such restraints are necessary, have believed them irrational and have taught that rulers in their own interest should promote the ignorance and superstition of the masses. Even Plato believed that the workers of his republic could only be reconciled with their lot by myths invented for the purpose by the guardians. And such a concession is the thin end of the wedge that leads to the view of Thrasymachus that the Republic was written to discredit. In the same principle Dostojewski's Grand Inquisitor saw the foundations of the Roman Church. But this solution did not satisfy Dostojewski; for in Crime and Punishment he created a character who, although free from superstition, failed to free himself from morals.

To-day the same problem presents itself in a new form. Psychoanalysis removes inhibitions. What would a completely analysed individual be like? Would a society of such individuals be stable? Would it be pleasant?

TYPES OF INHIBITION.

Inhibitions may be either conscious or unconscious, and conscious inhibitions may be either based on fear or accepted by the ego.

Conscious inhibitions based on fear are again of two kinds; for the fear may be rational or irrational. Thus if a man refrains from stealing because he does not want to go to prison, his inhibition is conscious and rational. But if he refrains from stealing because he does not want to go to hell, his inhibition is conscious and irrational.

Conscious irrational inhibitions depend upon ignorance and superstition. But conscious rational inhibitions based on fear are an insufficient protection for society. Therefore those who believe that all inhibitions are based on conscious fears do not desire to educate the

masses.

But there are also conscious inhibitions accepted by the ego. A child

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