What must be the highest goal and central point of all education and human culture? And here, least of all, can doubt or disagreement exist. "The formation of moral character," is this goal; the ancients called it "wisdom;" the present time calls it, the rule of whatever is good and purely human, "humanity." There has never been any division in opinion, as to what is the nature of moral will, the character of “goodness," the sign of humane intention for what is good, what ought to be, bears in itself its unmistakable, never denied token.

(6.) An essential difference of opinion still exists about the road to this goal and the secondary conditions which insure its attainment, which we can not thoroughly discuss here (this was done in our previously mentioned works), and in regard to which, therefore, it is sufficient to explain which of the two alternatives we choose. These are vital questions of such far reaching importance, that an exhaustive discussion of them would require comprehensive expositions. If one may be allowed to refer to such, then he has the right to give a summary decision, without having to fear the reproach of superficialty or unnecessary arbitrariness.

Some one speak of human, self-conceived morality, either acquired or based upon instinct; of its being entirely independent of religion and pious emotions, and not in the least influenced by the religious emotions of fear or hope; and that it is self-sufficient and in itself its own reward, as it is only the involuntary expression of a noble nature full of humane feeling. We shall not omit to consider the claims of this view.

(7.) If any are not satisfied with such sober morality, planted in mere unconscious impulses, and instinctive emotions, they must remember that this morality, with all its forms and expressions, still continues upon the natural plane, has not risen to the form of conscious " character," alone worthy of man. They are the still dark and sporadically working unenlightened impulses of the originally present (à priori) idea of good, but which, mixed with other impulses as changeable, can offer no picture of conscious, therefore in itself certain, morality. Therefore, because it is wanting in continuance, this form of morality is a very frail dowry for life, and it can not in the least give to man the inner satisfaction which religion yields him. Therefore, they further assert, with very good reason, that the perfected morality which is clearly conscious in its motives, the "ethos" upon the plane of character, can only be won within the pale of religion. For the will first frees itself from all wavering variance and deviation upon the plane of religious morality, because in each moral achievement, even down to the single deed, it seeks to satisfy only the one idea of goodness, (or as Kant more formally expresses it, "duty for duty's sake"). We have thus become one with the eternal will of goodness, and its instrument, at least in intention and conscious sentiment. This conception is here decisive, because it first fully explains the whole fact of conscious morality. That an eternal will of goodness is in God we experience in ourselves, when we are truly moved by that moral enthusiasm which transforms our self-will. For this reason morality has

become religion, not so that it alternates with religion or supplants it, but in this, that it perfects itself in religion by receiving from it the clearest and highest discernment of its own true being and with it, the feeling of sincerest self-certainty.

(8.) True religion or piety in its culmination is nothing more than the continually present consciousness of the true source out of which we draw our moral strength, and through which, alone, every moral consummation is possible. It is continual devotion to God, for it is conscious that it works only out of that highest and holy will; hence it attributes all its single achievements to him, not to itself. This is the deepest and indissoluble oneness of religion and morality. Inversely, this restores its highest value and essential truth to theoretical religion, in regard to what "faith" is, and what it is essential to teach.

On the contrary, a morality without religion is without foundation and superficial, therefore cold and barren; for it lacks its inspiring incentive. A religion without morality would be abstract and dead, a mere thing of perception, or better, an outwardly received faith, remaining a stranger to our innermost being. Both lack that enthusiasm which penetrates and sanctifies.

(9.) The foregoing hints, while they can not scientifically exhaust the matter, are still fully sufficient to conduct us, to the highest and concluding axiom, in regard to the educational question.

To rouse true piety in us, in the sense designated above, to make religious opinion the constant supporter and companion of our life and deeds, must constitute the highest aim of education, the goal of all its special achievements; for the formation of moral character, in an enduring and clearly conscious manner, is only to be attained by true piety.

Hence, the religious sentiment in the pupil should not be nourished incidentally and sporadically, but every thing in perception, emotion and will should awaken this sentiment, confirm it and help to found it in the right way. But this is only possible when religion wins a universally humane form, when it harmonizes with and is confirmed by all the most reliable researches of science, and by the noblest fruits which art and human culture are able to offer.

(10.) The greatest injury however-and this pedagogical mistake ought, first of all, to be removed-is when the young deeply sensitive mind is expected to receive doctrines of faith which are unintelligible, indeed wholly unapproachable by it, and which afterward-this is the unavoidable result-must be denied by his maturer judgment, and reckoned the trumpery of an obsolete religious culture. Thus, in the most important questions in regard to which man needs clear conviction from the beginning of his cultivation, doubt and discord are sown, where peace and the strongest confidence should be implanted. It is scarcely to be surveyed in detail how much has been missed or overrated by wiser religious teachers, in the well-meant, but short-sighted fear of deviating from old traditions. But that the results are most un

profitable, is shown by the inefficiency for after life of the religious culture thus received. And indifference, dull listlessness are not the worst results of such a mistaken, wholly unpedagogical treatment of the most important subject. In stronger, more resolute spirits, disinclination and disgust are the natural results!

We acknowledge, that it is one of the most difficult problems in the religious reform of our time--and no sensible person will deny the need of such a reform-to form something new and eternally valuable out of what is old and superfluous, gradually, and in such a way, that no offense shall be given to pious spirits, while what is superfluous shall be less and less valued. Perhaps it will be the best practical means of leading the older part of the community to a freer, sincerer and clearer view of Christianity, when they see the wholesome workings of the same upon their children. Numerous attempts at an improved religious instruction have been made in Germany. None have been found reliable, and thus the subject has remained an open question. But it must be solved, because of its urgent importance. A thorough, enduring reform can also here first come from above; the future preacher should be allowed a free philosophical theological culture, he should be released from all dogmatical compulsion, and freedom should be afforded him to proclaim unhindered his religious conviction as his own--as we have seen philosophers and naturalists, who have done this, have particular effect upon believers also, because their word, bursting forth out of their independent convictions, just as convincingly worked--and from this renewed and deepened religious life at the head of the parish, a better and more effective introduction into the Christian faith may be expected also for the growing believers.

It is desired that the old faith of our ancestors may be restored to us. We share in this wish with our most fervent convictions; we also are not willing to miss any of the power and blessings of this faith. But it can no longer be forced upon us with the old means; no road leads backward. The new period must, in accordance with its collective culture, reconstruct it out of the eternally flowing spring of religion; this new form does not therefore reject what is historical in it, but wins it again in a full historical sense. And this is not merely an indefinite wish, a vain effort; the process of this "discernment of faith" has already begun. One must resign himself to it, only gazing forward and trusting to the indestructible power of religion.

V. THE IDEA OF NATIONAL EDUCATION ACCORDING TO THIS PRINCIPLE.

From this outline of universal principles, and the highest goal of all education, we may claim the right to decide the practical question also; where, in the present, is the only correct starting point given, from which to remodel education and instruction in accordance with the higher demands of our time?

We can expect before hand, and our fatherland may be exceedingly

proud of it, that this most important, not only national, but universally human question will first be solved in Germany, where it was first proposed. Just as the church reformation could only proceed out of the religious depths of the German spirit, so the two most important problems of the present: a new reform of the church, growing out of a continuously developed theology, and a national education which is also destined to be the elementary culture of the whole race can only be expected from the energy and depth of the German mind. Both problems, however, the ecclesiastical as well as the pedagogical, are more interiorly connected than may seem at a glance. We have learned that all education finds in the cultivation of religious sentiment its final goal and firmest support. A more effectual and thorough religious education will be satisfied only with a spiritually renewed church, and inversely, religious education can go hand in hand only with a settled religious reform. For the best understanding must exist between the liberal pedagogue and the church believer, if it is to go well with the religious culture of the parish. We will leave it to unprejudiced observers to judge if this harmony already exists. In both respects we are referred to the future, but to a future whose commencements are already given.

Pestalozzi-Intuitional Method.

As regards the pedagogical part, we have already proclaimed at the beginning of our article, and we believe we have thus asserted nothing new or objectionable, that we recognize that memorable starting point in Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, because he has discovered the only correct foundation for the elementary education of the child. It may be still less known in all circles, what in his intended educational and instructional reform is eternally true and should be consistently developed. We consider it not yet superfluous to return to Pestalozzi's fundamental thought, in order to judge of its scope, and where something else, partly supplementary, and partly corrective, can be added.

What we hold to be the really memorable deed of Pestalozzi, what through him is forever won for human culture-is the simple truth, that a systematic development of the child's earliest consciousness must precede all real instruction-an achievement full of infinite blessings, not only in its direct pedagogical operations, but also in the incidental, subordinate result, that it has opened the way for a physical care and hygiene of childhood, more in harmony with nature. And just here, Friedrich Fröbel, his highly deserving follower, inaugurated his plan of reform. He has decidedly promoted that educational art of childhood, and if we do not err, completed it. But there remains an unlimited amount of work to be done for the realization and propagation of this educational idea. There have been but few beginnings made and these are really sporadic and incidental, the varied, highly important work is not yet, as a whole and in the intrinsic parts, a national question. It must be raised up out of the sphere of mere personal and private efforts, it

must be given to the legal organs of state government, to be put into execution. In what way, and within what limits, we shall here show.

Pestalozzi has confessed, with a touching conscientiousness, that numerous partially unsuccessful attempts were necessary, before he could see clearly into the fundamental thought of his educational reform. As it was merely a starting point which he won, and indeed only one of the starting points, as will be shown; as further he and his followers held the one for the whole: so it will be understood, how it could be spun out to such a superfluous and helpless breadth, that there was danger that the principle might be forgotten or overlooked. Pestalozzi designated the old style of instruction as the "monkish-gothic" educational indolence, congealed in superstitiously honored formulas. We may have shaken off the "monkish-gothic," but not the countless remnants of superfluous trumpery, which every new educational method carries with it, as lifeless dregs, and from which its representatives, through indolence or habit, expect the real success.

Every educational method is in danger of this ossification, this diffusion into an unnecessary breadth, if it prematurely mistakes its details for generalities, the mere beginning for the end, the part for the whole. In this case what is unessential, changeable and indifferent will be overrated, and an illusory value attached to it, which gives the opponents an unfailing opportunity to declare the whole principle to be false and worthless. We must remark already that Fröbel's theory appears to have arrived at the same dangerous point which, in the beginning, threatened the method of his predecessor, Pestalozzi, and a chief design of the following discussions is to free it from this danger.

Pestalozzi speaks with decisive clearness, in one of his later works, of the principle of his educational and instructional method, at the same time indirectly designating its limits.

"When I look back and ask myself what have I accomplished for the progress of the human race, I find I have placed the first principle of instruction in the recognition of intuition, as the absolute basis of all knowledge, and by the rejection of all single theories, sought to discover the essence of the theory (of learning and teaching) and the primal form, through which nature itself must determine the culture of our race." By nature," Pestalozzi means here, as the sense of the whole requires, not the outwardly objective, but the interior nature of man, his original capacities. These and only these should be roused to self-consciousness, in order to discover the "primal form" of their culture.

He expresses very clearly what he means by the cultivation of the theory of intuition," by the "art of intuition." The "intuition," from which all knowledge must proceed, to which it must be referred, or through which it must be controlled, does not consist of passive acquiescence, but of self-active reception. From the tenderest age, the child must be practiced in attentive observation, in discerning between what is accidental and essential, and must be guarded against all merely play.