ceived, and would have purchased the same commodities in the market; so that they have simply exchanged one thing for another. The government has gained nothing, having paid away all it had levied. But those who paid the taxes received no equivalent, and therefore have lost all that was taken from them. Suppose that instead of raising taxes to pay the wages of these workmen, the government had required all taxable citizens to furnish a quantity of the necessaries and comforts of life, and had paid their wages in these; would not the result have been the same, and would not the community have supported them for nothing? Where then is the utility or the benevolence of compelling them to roll the stone or turn the mill as the condition of their support? It is toilsome and painful to them; it gives neither pleasure nor profit to any body. It is not even labour, according to our author's definition, for it can produce neither the necessaries nor comforts of life. It is nothing but punishment. So that the conclusion of the whole matter is, that the industrious (for whatever may be the immediate effect of taxes, they ultimately fall on industry alone) are compelled to support the idle, and the idle are employed in tormenting themselves. Would it not be better to support them without this barren drudgery, and let them devote their time to their own amusement? Their enjoyment would thus be increased, without diminishing that of others, and so the happiness of society would on the whole be greater.

But this is not all. Had the property taken by the gov ernment for the support of these men, been left in the hands of the industrious citizens, by whom it had been produced, they would either have used it in procuring for themselves the necessaries and comforts of life, or if they derived these from some other source, would have been impelled by their own interest to employ it as an instrument of new production. If the former, then the government has deprived those, who labour successfully to produce the means of subsistence and enjoyment for themselves and others and to increase the wealth of the nation, of the comforts and necessaries of life, to bestow them on those, who are toiling to make themselves miserable and benefit nobody ;-if the latter, then this property would have been equally used to excite industry, but industry which would have preserved this capital or produced enough to replace it, besides affording a profit to its owner and a full sub

sistence for the workmen it employed. Whenever a work is worth less than its cost, the nation loses, and it makes no difference whether it was carried on by the government or by individuals. Otherwise the wealth of a nation might be increased to any extent by the very simple process of increasing its taxes and its expenses.

The chapter on protecting duties, contained in this work, denies the position of Smith, that individuals and nations should procure all they want as cheaply as possible. It is here said that if a man can find employment only for half his time, he had better devote the residue to making the articles he wants, rather than buy them. Undoubtedly ;-but this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of Smith, for in this case making is cheapest. According to the terms of the bypothesis, he can get nothing for the labour he devotes to making them, so that it has no exchangeable value; nothing can be cheaper. The question is not whether labour is better than idleness, but whether it is best to supply our wants with the least possible labour, for then it is, that we supply them cheapest. No one doubts that whatever increases the productive industry of the community is beneficial; but the position that a protecting duty, that is, a tax imposed on consumers, who are all the people, for the benefit of a particular class, tends to increase the industry of the community is the very point in dispute; and it is much easier to take it for granted, than it is to prove it. We do not mean to say that Smith's doctrine admits no qualification or limitation, but simply that the point on which the controversy turns is only approached in this work. The topic itself we have heretofore considered and shall not now renew its discussion.*

The question, on the decision of which the merits of the colonial system of modern Europe depend, is correctly stated in the work before us. It is not, whether a nation gains by monopolizing the trade of its colonies, but whether it gains more than the colonies lose, so that the nation and its colonies taken together are on the whole benefitted by the system. It is clear that we may gain by a monopoly. It is equally clear, and appears to be admitted by this writer, that we can gain by mere monopoly nothing but what others lose. He supposes, however, that by monopolizing the trade of its

See the article, on Foreign Commerce and Domestic Manufactures, in our number for April 1820.

own colonies, a nation gains something at the expense of foreign nations; founding this idea on the position, that the possessor of a monopoly obtains by it a profit at the cost of those who are excluded from it. But the expression is too general. The monopolist gains at the expense, not of all other men, but of those only who are bound by the authority establishing the monopoly, and therefore compelled to submit to unequal terms in dealing with him. An individual, who has a monopoly in his own country, derives by it a profit from his fellow citizens, but not from the citizens of other countries, to which his monopoly does not extend, even though he should trade with them. So a nation, possessing by treaty the monopoly of another's commerce, gains at the expense of the latter, since this is bound by the treaty; but it gains nothing by this monopoly from a third nation, which is not subjected to that treaty. In the same manner, by the colonial system a nation gains at the expense of its colonies, but not at the expense of independent countries. How does it gain? By prohibiting its colonies from purchasing of others, it is enabled to obtain from them a higher price for what it sells them, than it could otherwise do. This difference of price is obviously gained by the nation, and as obviously lost by the colonies. Again, it is said, by preventing its colonies from selling to any one but itself, it purchases their productions at a cheaper rate, and may sell them in foreign countries for a great profit. Is not this excess of profit gained at the expense of those foreign countries? By no means, but at that of the colonies alone, who, but for this monopoly, would sell directly to those foreign countries, and obtain that great profit for themselves. The colonial system is calculated to deprive the colonists of the fruit of their labour in order to bestow it on the citizens of the nation to which they are subjected, which is gross injustice, and a great discouragement to industry, and operates like other unequal laws, to the injury of the whole community. A case may be supposed, in which this system should not alter the proportion of the supply to the demand in the colonial market, and then it would be altogether inefficient, except as an instrument of revenue. The continuance of the colonial system by the nations of Europe does not prove, as our author supposes, that it is useful; since it is not continued by consent of the colonies, but merely perhaps, because those nations are willing to sacrifice the interest of their colonies to their own.

The book we have been examining is mainly founded on Lord Lauderdale's doctrine, that all accumulation is pernicious, and it is less wonderful that its writer should sometimes be surprised at his own conclusions, than that he should rely so implicitly on the soundness of the position. We shall not criticise minutely the arrangement and style of this work, but there is in it one fault of manner too conspicuous to be overlooked. We mean the frequent application of such epithets, as superficial, nonsensical, and absurd, to the works of authors of the highest celebrity, and particularly to that of Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations, indeed, is an incomplete work, not embracing the whole subject, which it professes to discuss; it is quite immethodical, and sometimes perplexed, obscure and unsatisfactory; but it abounds with original and profound thought, and may be said to have established the science of political economy. Those writers of all nations, whose works have shown them to be best acquainted with the subject of which it treats, have given it distinguished praise, and acknowledged the greatest obligations to it, even while confuting some of its arguments. Considering its exalted character, and the high estimation in which it has always been held by enlightened men, it might be expected that those, to whom, on a first perusal, it should seem superficial and incoherent, would feel some diffidence in their own opinion; and even though they should continue, after a diligent examination of it, to consider it unworthy of its high reputation, yet the admiration of all Europe, during three generations, ought to shield it at least from ostentatious contempt. It is right and laudable to maintain our deliberate opinions by fair argument against any authority, however venerable or illustrious; but it does not at all invalidate the assertions or arguments of another, to lavish on them the terms nonsense and absurdity; nor give the least additional validity to our own to call them dictates or laws of nature.

It is very evident, and it is to be regretted, that our countryman has given his thoughts on political economy to the world, without having read Mr. Say's treatise on the subject, which is beyond all comparison the most complete and scientific we have seen, distinguished by profound and comprehensive views, a lucid arrangement and great clearness and precision of style. Some parts of it may be thought unsatisfactory, as for instance, his speculations on the nature and

use of money, and on the foundation of value; and the language is sometimes so metaphorical as to admit of cavil, though the meaning of the author can rarely be misunderstood; but it ought to be read by all who would learn the progress and present state of this science, and to be diligently studied by those, who undertake to communicate their thoughts on this important and intricate subject to the public.

ART. XXV.-Yamoyden, a tale of the wars of king Philip, in six cantos. By the late Rev. James Wallis Eastburn, A. M. and his friend. New York, James Eastburn. pp.

339.

THIS is one of the most considerable attempts in the way of poetry, which have been made in this country. It is no less than a metrical tale in six cantos, after the manner of Scott; in saying which, we do not imply that it is in any obnoxious sense an imitation, for it is no more upon the model of Marmion and Rokeby, than are the Fire Worshippers of Moore, and the Bride of Abydos, Parisina, &c. of Lord Byron. The success of its inventor has given a classical character to this form of a poem between the ballad and the epic, and the author who adopts it is no more to be reckoned an imitator, than others who for no better reason divide epics into twelve parts, and tragedies into five.

Yamoyden is the joint production of two gentlemen of New York, one of whom, at the time of its completion, had numbered but twenty years, and the other was two years his junior. The former,-to whose history, as partly sketched in a very unostentatious manner in the advertisement, the work owes not a little of its interest,-first projected it in 1817, while pursuing theological studies at Bristol, Rhode Island, in which place and the vicinity the scene is laid. The plan was matured when the authors knew no more of the history of which they designed to make use, than they had gathered from a few pages of Hubbard's Narrative of the Indian Wars; and the poem, written in such moments as could be spared from severer occupations, was mutually communicated within six months after;-an example of rapid execution fully equal to Southey's epic of six weeks; for in